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This study applies the concept of civil society in analyzing the role of 
grassroots participation in Thai society. It aims to clarify the emergence of 
Thai local civil society and how it is developed and sustained. Civil society in 
Thailand often emerges from protest movements and then needs to adapt to 
survive when the protests end. The thesis examines this process.  
The framework identifies the key factors in three phases: civil group 
establishment, civil group development and civil group sustainability. The 
participatory approach was used for observation, in-depth interview and 
textual analysis. The study used three local civil groups for comparison in two 
case studies. The cases showed that Thai local civil groups emerged in relation 
to social capital in their communities. Social capital, in terms of trust and 
reciprocity, operated through social bonding and relationships.  
Villagers created informal structures through self-organization. 
Leaders played a very significant role, in particular to connect the actors 
within and outside the civil groups. The study shows that social capital 
facilitated the operation of civil groups. Individual social capital developed 
into group or collective social capital based on the groups’ values and norms, 
which could sustain the civil groups. The adaptation of the civil groups came 
about through building linkages with other organizations, both at horizontal 
and vertical levels. Civil groups that needed to convert to or combine with 
other organizations, such as NGOs, could not survive, so civil society that 
developed during the protest eroded.  
The study found that the keys to effective Thai civil society are good 
human resources and local orientation. Leaders were very important for civil 
society to remain local in its orientation. Civil society also needs to be 
independent because civil society loses its horizontal ties, social capital and 
purpose when it is drawn into national politics, or is converted into NGOs and 
led by nationally oriented NGOs or activists. Consequently, Thai civil society 
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In Thailand, the concept of civil society emerged as an alternative for 
strengthening and consolidating democratization. Civil society appeared to be 
a public space for the Thai people, who have been facing crises of political 
development. The political process seemed to be an arena for elites, 
businessmen and politicians, while the grassroots have been largely ignored in 
Thai society. Consequently, the concept of civil society became, for some, the 
solution for problems of democratization, because this concept provides a 
platform for collective activities so that Thai grassroots can participate in the 
Thai democratic process.  
Thailand’s democratization problem is due to an excess of state power. 
There have been many groups of Thai people involved in civil organization. 
Some groups established organizations to assist underprivileged Thai people 
in the form of foundations or NGOs. However, there particularly have been a 
lot of communities organized to present the grassroots’ demands, these 
grassroots groups mostly aim to respond to state policies that lead to conflicts 
between grassroots and the Thai state. These groups mainly organized the 
collective activities of people in the form of social groups, which indicates the 
social power of civil organization. 
The term ‘civil society’ has recently become well known in political 
science. Some writers believe civil society is advantageous for democracy. For 
instance, Falk (2005, p. 285) states that civil society creates space for growing 
alternative ideologies. Putnam (1993) indicates that development of civil 
society encourages democracy. Heelsum (2005, p. 21) notes that civic 
community theory can be used to investigate the relationship between civic 
participation and political participation. In relation to different political 
performances (Putnam, 1993), the concept of civil society therefore has been 
accepted worldwide as a political development idea related to democratization. 




ideal of civil society. In this regard, the consideration of the Thai context 
needs to be understood in order to effectively apply the civil society concept to 
Thai society.  
Recently, civil society appears to have grown progressively in Thailand. 
This has included the development of the concept of a civil society, but it has 
also been frequently conceptualized as consisting of social movements. The 
concept of civil society originated in Thai society in relation to political 
development when Thai politics was transformed by a student-led popular 
uprising on October 14, 1973. This marked the original emergence of activists 
that underpinned the role of grassroots in order to participate in 
democratization. This also provided evidence that the concept of civil society 
applied in practice to Thai politics, even though at the beginning the civil 
society concept applied to the Thai context more in relation to social sectors, 
in terms of voluntary organizations (Chuensiri, 1998; Yoshihide and 
Srisontisuk, 2003). Regarding this, the role of the student-led popular 
uprising in changing politics at the national level showed the power of people, 
which led Thai people to increasingly discuss the civil society concept as the 
solution for democratization and political development. In particular, the role 
of students indicated the social power built by people who had never had 
political power in Thai society previously.  
In terms of political development, the grassroots also attempted to 
balance state power by seeking ways to participate in state decision-making, 
particularly in the policies or projects that affected the grassroots. Thai people 
consequently became more concerned about their rights to political 
participation, which were part of the democratic process. Civil organizations 
created by the grassroots seemingly promised revolutionary politics as a social 
force that could empower the grassroots (Yoshihide and Srisontisuk, 2003). 
Moreover, the ability of the grassroots in building civil organizations reflected 
the Thai people’s capability for democratization in terms of popular 
participation in the political process, which could make democracy 
sustainable in Thailand. 
Thai civil society is currently emerging around Thailand. Civil 
organizations developed with different goals and in relation to many different 




which also affects their capability for survival in Thai society. Civil groups 
have emerged to face the crises and confront the state and other state 
agencies; thus, the civil groups and the state are opponents, and the Thai state 
is an enemy in the grassroots’ eyes because their problems came from state 
policies (Tantivitayapitak, 2008). In the same way, the state identified these 
civil groups as groups of local people who oppose the state or the development 
policies of the state. Facing these difficult situations, some civil groups 
succeed in their missions, others fail. Many disband; some civil groups 
develop under the circumstance of conflicts and are sustained after the crises.  
With respect to the proposition that a civil society can be part of the 
solution for issues of democratization and political development, this notion 
of a civil society has become an interesting critical issue. For example, the 
question arises: if civil society is an enlightening idea for the political context, 
why has Thailand experienced so many crises resulting from the struggle of 
social movements that are rooted in civil society or civil organizations? Why 
has the growth in the prominence of the concept of ‘civil society’ coincided 
with political conflicts, and why has the very existence of Thai civil movements 
begun to be considered as a major political problem?  
Given these questions, scholars need to present the reality of civil 
society and the role of grassroots that participate in developing civil 
organizations. Understanding civil society in Thailand may be a study of a 
microcosm or be a micro-reflection of the wider scope of Thai politics at the 
national level. It perhaps indicates a more subtle understanding of an 
increasing degree of political complexity at a time when the role of the 
grassroots appears as a key factor of democratization participating through 
civil society. 
Background to the Problem 
A current concern within Thailand contends that the Thai political system 
comprises a centralized state. It is also holds a high level of political power in 
decision-making. Additionally, the political sectors have become a site for 
elites, businessmen and the bourgeois to build channels to facilitate achieving 
their own interests through the system of representative democracy. Therefore 




and the political sectors seem to operate separately from the grassroots even 
though the grassroots or local people are identified as the major group of 
people in the social sectors in Thai society. Ignoring the grassroots’ 
participation and voices, many policies and projects launched by the Thai 
state have faced the grassroots’ dissatisfaction because the policies and 
projects were decided by the authoritarian-style state. 
Importantly, conflicts emerged due to policies and projects that mostly 
affected the grassroots or local people because the Thai state tended to pay 
more attention to issues of economic development, with the idea of 
industrialization and modernization, while ignoring the concern of the local 
communities’ livelihoods. Therefore, local people have attempted to 
participate politically by creating civil groups in order to address their lack of 
rights and power in relation to the state.  
Moreover, it was often the case in the past, and in more recent political 
struggles, that local Thai communities have faced exclusion, and the 
consequences for development, especially in the case studies of this research, 
have involved conflict. Some of the political processes set up in order to fulfill 
the political interests for some politicians and business people have given 
birth to social movements, usually in which a group of local protesters have 
taken action to claim their rights from the Thai state.  
The most recent social movements have been local communities 
affected by the decisions of the Thai state on the projects or policies that affect 
the lives of local people, such as environmental and agricultural problems. 
Moreover, governments have often seemed incapable of finding solutions, 
which has led local people across the country to attempt to claim their rights 
from the state by joining together in social movements. As a result, many 
grassroots groups have been engaged in protests and have obstructed many of 
the state’s policies and projects. Some of the projects have even been cancelled 
or postponed, but some, arguably including the worst and most hated, went 
ahead, like Map Ta Put and Mae Moh1.  
1 Map Ta Put is a project of the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailnd located in Rayong Province. Mae 
Moh is the coal-fired power plant in Lampang province. Both projects are a controversial issue between 





                                                   
Importance of Research 
The idea of ‘civil society’ has become an important issue in Thailand recently. 
In particular, there are many social movements by local civil groups. There 
remains the question, however, as to whether or not they have had a 
strengthening effect on civil society more generally over the last few years. 
Significant to this research is the role of grassroots participation in terms of 
civil groups. The civil groups in this research refer to the organized groups of 
local people in their own communities. Further, these groups are considered 
important in the process of community or civil organizational change. In the 
Thai context, they are important for engaging the grassroots in local 
community development until they can be empowered to work with local and 
central government.  
In other words, the politics of the local community and their 
participation is an important aspect. The development of the capacity of any 
community involves a study of the networks inside and outside the 
community. It is necessary to consider factors that influence community 
actions and intentions, and also necessary to learn about issues confronting all 
actors in the process. 
There is a need for research with the grassroots communities to identify 
and understand the real issues they face as civil groups, in order to learn how 
to better ensure that the grassroots membership of civil groups can become 
organized more effectively. Furthermore, seeking successful ways for 
collaboration between local communities and local government (and their 
agents) may prove useful to decrease conflicts and to support the eventual 
development of democratization. 
Research Questions and Objectives 
Based on this background, this research has several main questions related to 
how the group of grassroots were established and developed into civil groups. 
How did the grassroots organize their civil groups during crises with the Thai 
state and probably other state agencies? Another lay question of this research 
is how the grassroots could sustain their civil groups after the end of crises. 
To understand the civil groups, this research investigates the role of 




participation in the trajectory of the civil groups. The research describes and 
explains the form and function of the civil groups, with attempts to ascertain 
some of the possible factors that have determined the form and function of 
Thai civil organization. Additionally, this research examines how some of the 
more successful Thai grassroots organizations have developed in terms of the 
concept of civil society while analyzing some of the ways that local civil 
organizations successfully operate in order to move forward successfully and 
sustainably. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter Two presents a critical assessment of the literature where possible 
with the aim of creating a theoretical framework with which to analyze the 
problem. This chapter reviews first the diverse definitions of civil society 
internationally, and then those used in the particular Thai context. The 
argument for civil society that it is a desirable aspect of democracy, as well as 
the challenges it faces, are focussed on. The chapter also reviews the various 
theoretical and research frameworks used to analyze democracy, participation 
and social capital that are used in the development of the framework for this 
research. Finally, the case studies are introduced, including the background 
and the rationale for choosing those case studies. The research methods used 
for the study and the choices of methodologies are also outlined.  
Chapters Three and Four present the case studies and their contexts, 
applying the research framework, which analyzes the case studies in three 
phases: civil group establishment, civil group development and the sustaining 
of the civil group. Chapter Three has case one, the Pak Mun civil group. This 
chapter presents the background to the Pak Mun civil group and the 
emergence of a grassroots organization in terms of civil society concepts. The 
roles, actions and interactions of the civil group members (the grassroots in 
the case study), leaders and alliances involved are also explained in terms of 
Thai civil society relationships. The political activities of the case study are 
interpreted using the research framework. 
Chapter Four has a second case study with two local civil groups, the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The same framework is used as in the 




Grassroots political activities are seen in terms of the roles, actions and 
interactions of the civil organization members, leaders and alliances. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the study and discussion. This 
chapter tabulates, establishes themes and illustrates, with detailed examples, 
data from the two case studies pertaining to the interpretations of the origins 
and development of the organizations emerging out of community movements, 
along with the organizations’ characteristics, activities and roles. For example, 
the role of leadership will be addressed, including their strategies and 
networks.  
This chapter also contains a discussion of the case studies in 
comparison, in terms of the potential for capacity building for ‘civil society 
organizations’ in the form of ‘civil groups’. A rationale is then developed for 
why grassroots utilize ‘civil groups’, and what is required for their self-
organization. This is described as necessary if they are to achieve the capacity 
to fulfill an advisory role for state institutions. The chapter addresses the 
significance of the civil groups’ linkages, such as NGOs. It makes critical 
comments on the role of linkages as described in the literature. In addition, 
this chapter discusses this critique in relation to Thailand. Chapter Five 
concludes with an assessment of the contributions to the literature on civil 
society theory and theories of democratization. The possible practical 










It is necessary to explore the overall ideal of civil society at the beginning of 
this study in order to pave the way for potentially grasping the way specific 
civil society emerges, before focussing on how it is doing so in Thailand. This 
chapter reviews first the historical concept and definitions of civil society. 
Second, the main argument for civil society is reviewed, namely that it is an 
effective approach for democracy. Third, the chapter reviews the challenges 
civil society faces, followed by how it is used in a particular Thai context. The 
chapter reviews various theoretical frameworks and develops research 
frameworks used in this study. Finally, the rationale for the chosen research 
methodology is discussed, followed by an outline of the research methods 
used in this study. 
Definitions of civil society 
The term ‘civil society’ has recently become increasingly well known 
internationally, and in various ways. However, it is accepted that the term is 
also very controversial.   
Gramsci (1971) defines civil society as located between state and market, 
whereby its identity resembles a diverse whole of institutions with non-state 
and non-market structures and activities. In a narrower sense, for Gellner 
(1994, p. 56), civil society is a part of society which critically but constructively 
challenges the relevant political structure of states in order to provide 
channels to combine market efficiency with cooperative value (Edwards, 2004, 
p. 14). In the same way, Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1621) have clarified the 




dominated by interactions of a certain kind”, by the public space between the 
state and individual people.   
Gellner (1994, p. 5) defines civil society as “the set of diverse non-
governmental institutions, which are strong enough to counterbalance the 
state”, and the different institutions can be described in terms of either formal 
or informal institutions. Other commentators, however, suggest that the 
emergent institutions of civil society can also have both formal and informal 
characteristics at the same time (Diamond, 1994, p. 6). Networks and cultural 
aspects of civil society have this characteristic (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996). 
Moreover, Gellner (1995) affirms that the segmental character of civil society 
marks traditional society. By this, Gellner means that the distinctive aspects of 
a particular civil society relate to the sociocultural form in which it operates. 
For these theorists, civil society is the public space comprised of 
institutions that in their dominant interactions respond to the political system 
such that they impact on the operation of democracy (Rueschemeyer, 
Stephens, and Stephens, 1992). The essential nature of civil society is 
comprised of institutions which exist in the social space between the economic 
sector and state (Foley and Edwards, 1996; Salamon and Anheier, 1998; 
Eikenberry and Kluver, 2004). However, in recognizing this, there is also 
recognition that the institutions filling this space can be informal as well as 
formal. This can be understood by considering how democratic processes 
involve both formal and informal operations (Blau and Scott, 1962; Rehg and 
Bohman, 1996; Lauth, 2000). This is taken up further in the following 
sections when the roles of democracy and institutions of resistance in civil 
society are considered.  
Historically, the concept of civil society originated from Western 
European countries’ concern with the development of democratization in 
terms of individual rights and freedoms (Lefort and Macey, 1988; Diamond, 
1999; Edwards, 2009). It is an idea that has been explored in well-known 
works of major philosophers of Western Europe, such as Locke, Hobbes, 
Ferguson, Hegel and Marx. However, the idea has been overshadowed by the 
link to commerce by some theorists – in particular, by Ferguson, Hegel and 
Marx. Civil society is nevertheless still generally expected to develop 




Edwards (2009) reviews how some classical thinkers and those of the 
Enlightenment, such as Aristotle, Plato and Hobbes, also viewed civil society 
as a defence against unjustified invasions by the state. This is not to suggest 
that the state is essentially against civil society, but rather that the situation 
can become unbalanced towards the state (Kumar, 1993). Based on this, it can 
be proposed that the emergence of civil society re-establishes balance within 
social space (White, Howell and Xiaoyuan, 1996).  
Edwards (2002) had earlier pointed out that the rise of civil society is 
causing a change in world politics, and it must be managed carefully because 
it needs to be useful for different situations and contexts. In these individual 
situations and contexts, different balances are provided by civil society, 
between the state and the economic sector, and also between formal and 
informal institutions. 
Other contemporary writers, such as Putnam (1993), emphasize that 
civil society is not only different in different contexts, but also emphasize that 
the extent to which civil society has developed is a determining factor for the 
degree of democracy. As a result, it can be seen that civil society is seen to 
encourage democracy.  For instance, Putnam (1993) suggests civic culture 
explains different political performances, in terms of democracy, in various 
regions of Italy. For Putnam, civic culture refers to a kind of social capital that 
supports the establishment and development of civil society, which ultimately 
encourages democracy (Heelsum, 2005, p. 20).  The role of civic culture in 
terms of social capital is taken up further in the section outlining the 
framework used in the research. 
Baker (1998, p. 81) also claims that civil society operates as a safeguard 
for democracy. Baker argues that where there is undemocratic state power, an 
independent civil society can operate and will emerge as a safeguard. Baker 
(1998, p. 82) also points out that in the case of the former communist states, 
civil society emerged as a necessary characteristic to maintain ‘self-
determination’ and work to protect itself from the intrusion of both economic 
and state power. In Eastern Europe particularly, even after communism, the 
concept of civil society and defence against the powerful state has remained, 




Consequently, according to Edwards (1998), civil society refers to 
various types and forms of organization; however, it generally includes 
informal as well as formal networks and associations between the family and 
the state, which impact on the levels and types of democracy. So the difficulty 
in understanding the term ‘civil society’ is due not only to the complexity of 
today’s society but also to the many ways it has been and is used, and what 
aspects are emphasized.   
Following the main concepts of civil society found in Gellner, Edwards, 
Putnum, Baker and Hadenius and Uggla, civil society for the purpose of this 
thesis will be defined as diverse institutions that operate independently from 
the state and economic sectors in order to develop their democratization. 
Historical Development of the Concept of Civil Society 
Historically, the civil society idea has developed in diverse ways, with major 
theorists associated with the various traditions. Two main traditions can be 
distinguished, one focussing on commerce, and another focussing on state 
institutions.  Shils (1991) has reviewed and sketched out the evolution of the 
orientation of the term ‘civil society’, pointing out that, while differences of 
scope have occurred, a consistent undertone has existed for many centuries, of 
a municipality of citizens with rights to participate and discuss political issues. 
Nevertheless, there are other emphases, which focus on commerce. In the year 
1767, Adam Ferguson was the first to look at the features of civil society 
through the lens of commerce. In 1776, Adam Smith then detailed its nature, 
though without using the term. It was a century later that Karl Marx similarly 
used an economic lens, but with a different focus to Ferguson. On the other 
hand, after Adam Smith, early in 19th century, before Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Hegel focussed on the role of state institutions for civil society. For Hegel, 
even though the forms of civil society build upon the state, civil society and 
state are, having said that, separated (Levine, 2009, p. 356). Hegel’s view of 
civil society does, however, focus on the market mechanism to some extent. 
He does so when it is seen to lead to the development of conditions for 
materialism within bourgeois society’s social life. Even so, civil society, in 




parts of society, in particular emphasizing non-economic institutions as the 
central factor of civil society (Kumar, 1993, p. 377).     
Marx developed the concept of civil society, extending the detailed 
work of Smith by incorporating the then newly developing factory system into 
a class system of analysis based on commercial activity. Marx, however, also 
developed his class system analysis by applying Hegel’s definition of the key 
origins of the civil society concept, but limited their scope.  
In Marx’s class concept, it was also accepted that the role of the group 
of people comprising bourgeois society is the vital factor for the motivation of 
civil society (Maguire, 1978, p. 17). Marx’s view is that the ‘property-centred’ 
concern of the bourgeois class is at the heart of the civil society concept. Marx 
linked civil society and the state by emphasizing the role civil society has on 
the growth of capitalism and the political economy.   
Marx’s thought provides critical insight into how classes of economic 
inequity arise from private ownership, even though something is lost in 
Marx’s critical adoption of Hegel. To place Marx and Hegel’s thought in 
juxtaposition, it can be seen that they both thought of civil society in similar 
ways in relation to commercial and economic features, but Marx took a 
narrower view. Civil society in Marx’s thought is equated with the whole of 
capitalist society, while Hegel referred to it as only one part of society, the 
bourgeois class. It has since led some Marxists to use the term ‘civil society’ to 
refer to both the commercial part of society as well as to the whole of society. 
Therefore, in the Marxian tradition’s analysis of civil society, the relation of 
non-bourgeois classes to civil society became obscured. This has arguably 
resulted in the failure in the Marxian tradition to recognise the cultural 
aspects of civil society, and hence also the regional differences in civil society. 
Nevertheless, the Marxist focus on commerce has also made a large impact 
and so also needs to be considered, even though it is not the focus of this 
research. An argument in this study is, however, that narrowing the focus of 
civil society to commerce only means one cannot capture its complexity in the 
contemporary world. 
That civil society has multiple forms, as well as having multiple 
definitions and emphases, has brought some confusion, leading some 




outlined how the term has sometimes been taken to refer to a need to 
emphasize commercial activity when state power is seen to be needing to be 
limited, for example during the communist era, whilst in other contexts being 
taken to refer to a need to emphasize the power of the state to limit 
commercial interests. Kumar suggests that the ambiguity of the term indicates 
that it is a normative term, operating primarily with a ‘melancholic’, ‘feel-good’ 
orientation. Notwithstanding, civil society has remained relevant. It has even 
become a ‘shining emblem’ (Gellner, 1994, p. 1). So an alternative conclusion 
to Kumar can be reached and is taken up by this research, namely that the 
inconsistent definitions and aspects of civil society provide the possibility of 
illuminating the concept as a useful concept. It can be shown to be an ideal 
with the flexibility to enable applicability to multiple specific contexts, all of 
which are needed in order to allow practical contributions to be provided by 
the concept. Key contemporary political philosophers continue to value it 
precisely because these tensions in the concept are helpful to explore the 
phenomena of democratization. 
The role of enhancing democracy is central but is not a sufficient 
explanation. Classical concerns with a polis of open discussion and free 
association have remained central even though they were eclipsed to some 
degree by a focus on the link to commerce by some modern thinkers, in 
particular Marxists. One approach is found in Antonio Gramsci’s thought.1 
Gramsci (1971) defines hegemonic processes, of which commerce is a part, 
along with the state. The significance of hegemonic process, other than that 
provided by the state – for example commercial activities – are how Marxian 
concerns with coercive power are dealt with by contemporary commentators 
(Gellner 1994). 
In summary, it can be seen that the origins of the term ‘civil society’ are 
explored at the modern edge by key political philosophers who have 
illuminated commerce as a key point that has led or allowed civil society to 
1  1.Bates, T. R. (1975). Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony. Journal of the History of Ideas   
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become an idea within the development of liberal democracy. But this is 
neither a sufficient description, nor central. More importantly, civil society is 
the grassroots’ expression “bearing the premise of democratization” (Colas, 
2002, p. 142). The concept has been described as a “wave of global citizen 
action” (Zadek and Raynard, 2004, p. 319) and the center of “globalization 
from below” with alternative ideologies “growing in its space” (Falk, 2002, p. 
285). The concept of civil society has continued to evolve around the world up 
to the present. In this thesis a chief concern is to determine what features of 
civil society have evolved in Thailand and how these relate to how the concept 
of civil society has been evolving globally.  
Civil Society and Democracy 
The development of civil society is now global, and it has occurred in different 
contexts, so that some further differences within civil society have emerged 
globally. Ever since the neoliberal ideology has become globally hegemonic, 
with its domination promoted by groups of powerful state and international 
organizations (Thomas, 2001; Falk, 2002; Yeates, 2002; Plehwe, Walpen and 
Neunhöffer, 2007), there has also been recognition of the significance of 
Gramsci’s idea and concerns about the hegemonic power of the modern state 
destroying older forms of cultural life (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p. 146). For 
Gramsci there are two main aspects to hegemony – the economy and the 
ideological superstructure, which are related, and together form what he calls 
the ‘historical bloc’. The ‘historical bloc’ of hegemony can, however, also be 
considered to be comprised of two main ideas – political society and civil 
society (Cox, 1993). The economic or productive sphere is unable to contribute 
to civil society (Bratton, 1989; Hyden, 1997; Castells, 2011) and is instead 
reliant on the state to do so (Kumar, 1993, p. 382). Based on this, it can 
therefore be seen that hegemony is closely related to the state, as Gramsci 
argued. It is a hugely complicated realm, which contains the dynamic and 
relation between economic and ideological superstructure in terms of both 
political and civil society. The dynamic of the sphere of hegemony produces 
the ensemble of ideology to constitute spontaneous consent in society, which 
is ultimately what makes hegemony dominate social life. In this way, it can be 




ideology onto local culture. Civil society, therefore, cannot become too tightly 
linked to neoliberal ideology because the cultural aspect of civil society can 
then be interfered with. Furthermore, civil society prevents and 
counterbalances such hegemonic power by using an idea of institutional 
pluralism (Gellner, 1994, p. 1). 
Gellner (1994) affirms that civil society is the counter-vision ideal of 
institutional and ideological pluralism, which is set up against the monopoly 
of state power over society. It means the prevention of the domination of 
society by monopoly through the supporting and nurturing of social liberty. 
Similarly, Bermeo and Nord (2000) have presented the civil society idea as 
the ‘seedbed of liberty’, in reference to European countries such as Portugal, 
Russia, Italy, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, in order to present the 
bonding of liberalization with democratization. Such a view is also held by 
Baker (2002), who celebrates the understanding of civil society as the one 
singular point that engages the hegemonic liberal democratic perspective in 
his work.   
Baker (1998, p. 85), however, warns that the concept of civil society 
remains based on the experiences of the West, where it originated. Inevitably, 
civil society is recognized as still being a ‘Eurocentric’ concept, and so it may 
not be applicable outside the West (Baker, 1998, p. 85). But according to 
Seligman (1995), the idea of civil society has now come to refer to the set of 
principles and practices for the thinkers who work under the liberal tradition 
of politics (Waldron, 1987; Aronowitz and Giroux, 2003), which allows 
multifarious views. As a result, the idea of civil society now resonates 
differently across the West and the rest of the world. Hann and Dunn (1996, p. 
27), for example, explore this through the example of the Mormon Church – a 
religious group founded and based in the United States. Hann and Dunn have 
created a form of ‘civil society’ that looks much more like those described for 
‘non-Western’ societies.   
Edwards (1998) argues, however, that the differences in the forms of 
civil society are rather mainly due to the differences between levels of 
government and the differences expressed within representative democracy 
(Shils, 1991; White, 1994). So it can be interpreted that Edwards emphasizes 




linkages as the primary difference. Also it can be proposed that, as well as 
traditional cultural differences, the multiple linkages available due to the 
differences found in democratic institutions create the types and forms of civil 
society (Stepan and Linz, 1996; Mercer, 2002), as well providing the flexibility 
related to the levels, types and interactions between the institutions of 
democracy.   
So for many reasons, civil society challenges attempts at clarification as 
to its definitive identity and effective role in the social space. As Hadenius and 
Uggla (1996, p. 1621) argue, however, civil society can nevertheless be 
adequately described as containing both organized and collective activities 
that refer to groups arranged in social networks comprising of linkages. The 
basis of civil society organization is, from this perspective, independent and 
free both from the state and from construction by family bonds. It is 
comprised primarily of social networks associated with common objectives, 
which range from small to large levels within the organizations of civil society. 
Additionally, Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1622) state that the growth 
of collaboration and trust among citizens are factors that facilitate the ability 
to initiate activities in organizations and establish social networks.  
Significantly, social interactions are often developed by the mutual supports 
between organizations in social networks. Put differently, ‘social capital’, 
defined as the “potential groups have to develop requisite institutional 
structures and organization”, develops within the arena of civil society 
(Hadenius and Uggla, 1996, p. 1622). Or similarly, Newton (2001, p. 201) 
states that using the dense network of civil organizations can generate trust 
and cooperation between citizens and higher levels of civic engagement and 
participation. However, his research also provides evidence that social trust 
between citizens is not necessarily related to an equivalent higher level of 
political trust between people and political leaders. 
Following Hadenius and Uggla’s definition of social capital, it is clear 
that there is potentially a wide range of social capital held by groups. 
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that the groups’ capacity is able to be easily 
changed. It is determined by regulatory and political constraints of history and 




society to enable change in organizational structure are key means by which 
groups with low social capital can learn to gain higher social capital. 
Furthermore, Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1662) outline two main 
aspects to what they define as the primary task of social capital for civil society, 
which is to fulfill democratic functions. Firstly, a pluralist function to facilitate 
collective action of different groups in society and, secondly, an educational 
function whereby democracy’s fundamental principles and/or democratic 
skills can be created by the experience of people through a process of learning 
by doing in the democratic structures of civil society. Based on that, the 
activities involved in civil society to fulfill the educational democratic function 
have to be in horizontal operation. This is because the associations involved 
within civil society must themselves be democratically structured if people are 
to learn how to participate democratically (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996, p. 
1623). 
Hadenius and Uggla (1996, p. 1623) also point out, however, that 
horizontal organization has to avoid becoming ‘locally “encapsulated” 
together’. They emphasize that the best results are achieved when local civil 
activities are to some degree vertically linked with regional and national levels. 
Moreover, they conclude that there is inherent tension and even conflict 
between horizontal integration and civil society activity. Incorporating this 
insight with those of theorists emphasizing the role of democracy enables civil 
activity to be seen to require a degree of vertical integration to provide 
flexibility within horizontal integration. This synthesis provides a framework 
for the research carried out here. 
In summary it can be seen that social capital shapes civil society, while 
the features of social capital are enforced by the power of hegemony within 
society. Based on this, it can be understood that the forms, functions and 
actions of civil society depend on the interweaving of sociocultural details, 
which then result in the particular contribution of a collective action of people 
to form particular interest groups and/or civic movements. Consequently, 
social capital is an important factor for facilitating civil society, and will be 
applied in the research framework in this study, with careful attention given to 




Civil Society, Resistance and New Social Movements 
Civil society can be developed to provide the ways of resistance for and by 
people against the state. Currently this is usually explored in terms of social 
movements. Accordingly, Diamond (1994, p. 6) identifies civil society as 
formal and informal organizations, including groups, particularly civic 
organizations and social movements. Moreover, Buechler (1995) specifically 
considers New Social Movement theory as being particularly useful in order to 
analyse the form of collective actions, and so New Social Movement theory can 
be expected to potentially provide an insight into civil society.  
The complex interactions can be seen in part by how a significant 
feature of New Social Movement theory is a critical analysis of Marxist theory. 
Given this research’s argument that there is a strong link between New Social 
Movements and civil society, a study of New Social Movement theory 
potentially allows critical insights to be gained from the Marxist theory of civil 
society. Marx analyzed civil society as a feature of class conflict that emerged 
in response to industrialization, whereas some New Social Movement 
theorists have changed the attention from the analysis of the conflict of classes 
to look instead at the ways people in society are proposing new forms of 
society based on other logics of political action (Buechler, 1995, p. 442). They 
do so whilst still arguing in agreement with classical Marxism; however, 
society is still nevertheless dominated by capitalists and remains problematic 
because of this. But the New Social Movements emphasize networks or 
informal institutions rather than political parties or formal institutions; local 
action, rather than the seizure of the power of the state, is sought. It is a type 
of populist strategy. 
These new theorists, who are generally critical of Marxist theory even 
though they have been influenced by it, take the New Social Movement model 
as the basis for the argument that there is a complicated society in the real 
world and civil society provides the capacity to create improvements in social 
life without having to try to resort to political revolt. From this perspective 
they argue that old-style Marxist-influenced political movements were unable 
to overthrow the hegemony of the state, even in the emergence of a post-
industrial era, because they remain wedded to the power of the state and its 




There are some contemporary scholars, for instance Manuel Castells 
from Spain, Alain Tourain from France, Alberto Melucci from Italy and 
Jurgen Habermas from Germany,2 who have revived the New Social 
Movement model so it evolves closer to the hegemonic model of theorists who 
are far more sympathetic to Marx, in particular Gramsci. Their similarity to 
the other contemporary scholars is that they also attempt to show how the 
New Social Movement can be a way to strengthen society. The basis of their 
argument, however, is that the New Social Movement contains a diverse set of 
means and tactics by which the identity of groups or movements are 
constituted, thereby shaping the state power relationships with wider society 
in multiple ways. This is consistent with the framework developed by this 
research, which comprises of a need for both vertical and horizontal 
integration. The difference is that the framework developed here also provides 
a basis with which to create multiple means and tactics through the 
incorporation of vertical linkages. 
Some of the New Social Movement theorists’ thoughts, such as Castells 
(1983), present grassroots mobilizations and urban social movement as 
practical attempts to protest hegemonic domination and to keep cultural 
identity. Interestingly, Tourain in this light has placed the New Social 
Movement between the logics of two systems. The first logic is that of the 
system that consists of the relations of domination due to the attempt to 
maximize processes of production, and the second logic is that of the system 
focussing on seeking to sustain individuality. Based on this analysis of the 
New Social Movement, it can be seen that the concept depends on the same 
principle as the civil society idea, namely, a synthesis of democracy and 
economy.   
According to Buechler (1995), Jürgen Habermas adds a further insight, 
by proposing that social life is not only dominated by economic and political 
power but also by the supremacy of media colonization, dominating the area 
of social life that he calls the ‘lifeworld’ of everyday largely unconscious 
2  These theorists illustrate the New Social Movement theory in their own context  







                                                   
socialized and cultural activities. Habermas places the New Social Movement 
between the social system and the ‘lifeworld’, whereby the New Social 
Movement seeks to and potentially can protect the ‘lifeworld’ against the 
invasion of coercive and hegemonic societal modernization systems.   
Another New Social Movement theorist, Alberto Melucci (1989), sums 
up the New Social Movement similarly as the way people respond to the 
modern world. Interestingly, he emphasizes the informal dimensions of the 
movement much more than their formal organization, as does Habermas with 
his notion of ‘lifeworld’. What he leaves out, however, is that this means that 
the influences on the ‘lifeworld’, for example the media, can provide both a 
means of resistance as well as a means of state and commercial coercion. This 
point is another feature of the framework developed by this research, because 
it is central to the formation and maintenance of linkages between the impact 
on the development of civil society and civil society existing. 
However, one main point of their arguments is that this can and does 
still include participation in political parties. Moreover the New Social 
Movement is seen as a way to encourage people in society to have political 
motivation generally, so that it can become a counter-hegemonic strategy to 
all forms of hegemony. For instance, the New Social Movement can be rooted 
in people power as a counterbalance to state power. This is in response to how 
the old-style Marxist analysis of civil society, which relied purely on political 
movements to capture state power, failed to disrupt hegemony because they 
simply replaced one set of hegemonic ideas with another. One group 
continued to dominate the others to the exclusion of minorities, leading 
inevitably to a hierarchy within society and privileged elites, even if the 
hierarchy of groups had become inverted. By contrast, New Social Movement 
theory can potentially attack all such hegemonies from the basis of an 
understanding of civil society reliant on the role of the ‘lifeworld’.  
Kumar (1993) adds a word of caution by pointing out that the notion of 
civil society remains ambiguous, and so reliance on civil society to provide 
resistance may be misguided. Kumar emphasizes that the features of civil 
society as the space between state and commerce also provide a means for 
coercive power by either state or commerce, or both, and that this is occurring 




equated with civil society. Whereas New Social Movements can be said to 
always provide resistance to state and commercial coercion, civil society 
cannot, because civil society requires vertical integration to allow grassroots 
interaction and cooperation to work with the state. 
In summary, Marx analyzed civil society within a paradigm of class 
conflict, enabling civil society to be usefully analyzed in terms of class. Owing 
to the effect of globalization on society in all countries, there has, however, 
been a growth in resistance to state and commercial power, including by social 
movements. This has led some scholars to now understand civil society as 
incorporating social movements, which refer to the collective actions of people 
as they act together in order to provide resistance by establishing different 
cultural identities, claiming the space and rights for minorities, and making 
society accept different ways of life.  In that way, civil society contains social 
movements within the collective space that is neither the state nor the market, 
but cannot be equated with social movements of resistance due to the need for 
civil society to also facilitate linkages to allow grassroots to work with the state. 
This thesis focuses on the effectiveness of civil society to provide resistance, 
looking in particular at the importance of linkages to grassroots to do so, what 
features of civil society maintain these linkages, and how these may differ to 
social movements in the Thai context. 
Thai Civil Society  
The emergence of Thai civil society occurred prior to its formal 
conceptualization by scholars. As in many countries, however, Thai civil 
society has developed in ways that its conceptualization by scholars utilizing 
Western models of civil society has not been able to adequately analyze.  
Commonly, civil society is conceptualized in Thailand as equivalent to 
social movements whose members are associated with various social roles; for 
example, farmers, fishermen and environmental groups (Archavanitkul and 
Poungsomlee, 1999). In actuality it can appear that, in Thailand, civil society 
is only comprised of social movements, but this is due to inadequate analysis 
of how civil society emerges. Its apparent development in Thailand into social 
movements is better able to be analyzed as being due to a limitation to its 




civil society are also often accepted as originating and having been developed 
from New Social Movements (Buechler, 1995, p. 446). As a result, the focus 
until now, in the study of Thai civil society, has been related to the concept of 
New Social Movements. This needs be corrected, so that the analysis of how 
civil society in Thailand became limited to social movements can be critiqued.   
With respect to the proposition of civil society as the solution for 
democratization and political development, civil society has become an 
interesting critical issue. On the one hand, the concept of civil society in 
Thailand is an enlightening idea for political development. On the other hand, 
Thailand has experienced the crises resulting from the social movements 
rooted in civil society. The growth in the prominence of the concept of civil 
society has coincided with political conflicts, and Thai civil movements are 
often considered to be a major political problem. Thus, as reviewed in the 
previous section, that civil society in Thailand has different contexts from the 
Western one, which originated the ideal of civil society, so that, in order to 
apply the civil society concept effectively, consideration of the Thai contexts 
are needed. 
Generally, Thai scholars consider civil society in three different yet 
related ways. There is the perspective of civil society under neo-Marxism, 
which is based on class3, and that stands on the political left wing. Secondly, 
there are many Thai scholars who emphasize civil society as community 
strengthenin4, and thirdly there are some who focus on social movements.5 
These three different ways are related as all three focus on the horizontal 
dimension of civil society, leaving aside the vertical dimension of interaction 
with state institutions. 
Even though there are these three different emphases, they all share a 
common idea of civil society in terms of being an alternative to existing 
democratic processes. Thai scholars generally agree in emphasizing the 
3  See more from Jiles Ungpakorn (2009) Social Movement in Thailand (Thai  
    version); Prachatipatai-Rang-Ngan publication. He shows obviously that he is left wing. 
4  Well-known Thai scholars, such as Prawase Wasi, Nithi Eiwsriwong (Supawong and  
    Kadkarnkai, 1997). 
5  For example, Prapas Pintobtang (1998) shows his view in the book Politics on the road: 99    
    days of forum of the poor and history of the demonstrations and protests in the Thai     




                                                   
encouragement of Thai citizens to participate in political processes to claim 
rights and/or to protest against the state. 
Social movements in Thailand have been formed by diverse groups 
which have issues that are broader than usual for civil society (Pongpaijit, 
2002). There is stronger than usual horizontal integration, at the expense of 
necessary vertical linkages and integration with regional and national state 
institutions. This being the case, most claims for the benefits of civil society 
are now focussing on the benefits of grassroots and special interest groups, 
which mostly relate significantly to community-based groups. For example, 
Boonmee (2007) believes that civil society in Thailand will provide 
alternatives to solve political problems if it also becomes focussed on the 
horizontal integration of grassroots and special interest groups. He applies the 
word ‘Sangkom Khemkhaeng’6, meaning strong community, in order to 
develop the civil society ideal in Thailand. Boonmee (2007) explains that Thai 
society is mainly led by two types of power: state power and economic power. 
He implies that these two powers have class characteristics to leave out the 
middle and lower classes. Boonmee suggests, however, that a third type of 
power is possible to empower the middle and lower classes, which he terms 
Sangkom Khemkhaeng. He uses the term to refer to how people from diverse 
classes, careers and places of Thai society attempt to empower themselves 
through cooperation by participating in political issues. They do so by joining 
groups and/or social movements. He explains how the groups and movements 
use the networks of power diffusion within society as a strategy to achieve 
their specific goals.  
Dr. Prawase Wasi, who is the one of the best-known social thinkers in 
Thailand, employs the set of words, ‘Community’ and ‘Civility’ in a fashion 
similar to the way others use the term ‘civil society’. Generally, he views civil 
society as a way to make local people stronger, by using the words ‘Pra Cha 
Sang Kom’7, which means the community leads people to focus on the 
expansion of the horizontal networks which are the essential means to 
strengthen community or society. The idea is that if Thai communities are 
strong, this would enable them to take care of themselves in terms of well-
6  Sangkom Khemkhaeng = สงัคมเขม้แขง็ 




                                                   
being and education, in particular, then members of the community would 
have the ability to take leading action within society. He insists that if the 
grassroots can be strengthened through their movements, then social 
movements are one of the ways to reform Thailand. However, it can be seen, 
forWasi, networking is an effective factor to tie civil groups together, 
particularly in terms of horizontal networks (Wasi, 2000). 
This brief survey of Thai scholars’ work on civil society indicates that 
there is a limited perspective in Thai scholars’ work in relation to what is 
considered to be civil society. On the one hand, some scholars use civil society 
as a narrow concept to refer to the strengthening of local community. On the 
other hand, some view civil society as a social movement that is a tool for 
political reform. Both sets of views, however, focus almost exclusively on 
horizontal networking, and therefore both overlook the role of vertical 
involvement with state institutions, as well as over emphasize horizontal 
integration to the extent that mass mobilization and/or community 
empowerment becomes equated with civil society. 
To adequately analyse Thai scholarly work on the aspect of Thai civil 
society, it is necessary to remember the distinction between civil society in 
practice and the conceptualization of civil society. The work of the Thai 
scholars briefly surveyed and outlined above is a survey of their 
conceptualization of civil society, which has been based largely on 
international literature on civil society interested in the class dimension. It is 
instructive to be attentive to this because the period of international, then 
Thai, scholarly interest in Thai civil society coincided with the emergence of 
social movements, even though civil society was actually established prior to 
this by several decades. Civil society appeared in Thailand shortly after World 
War II, mainly through the work of voluntary organizations; for example the 
Red Cross and volunteer students from universities. However, it appears that 
soon after, scholarly interest in Thai civil society began when the ‘interesting’ 
social science phenomenon of mass social movements began to erupt in the 
1980s, giving fuel for class-based analyses, and hence a focus on the 
horizontal dimension at the expense of the vertical dimension. This can be 
seen clearly in the work of Thai scholars who equate Thai civil society with 




Two Thai scholars who survey the conceptualization by Thai scholars of 
civil society as social movements, Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee (1999), 
outline three ways to analyze Thai social movements in terms of their 
response to the state. The three ways are: (i) to cooperate with the state; (ii) to 
make demands of the state; (iii) to allow protests against the state. The first 
way, cooperation with the state is, however, uncommon, and they point out 
that if it is claimed, it is often experienced actually as the state dictating to 
citizens. In the same way, they point out that Chairat Charoensin-o-larn 
(1999) analyzes civil society as a new civic movement that does not have the 
aim to snatch power from the state, but rather to critically engage with the 
state. However, there is little evidence of this actually occurring. It is more 
common that civic movements refuse to accept the power of state and carry 
out civil disobedience to oppose the existing system so as to force social 
transformation (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 5). Similarly, they 
point out that, even though Anek Laothamatas describes the Thai civic 
movement as a network of various groups or organizations that link the state 
and individual, the main point to be taken is that activities of civic movements 
are not undertaken with or through the state, but in order to limit the power 
and duties of the state (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 6). It is 
considered by these scholars that it is in this arena of confrontation with the 
state that the networks of civil groups essentially act. The effect of this arena 
of confrontation toward the state, on the relationships linking the state and 
the individual, needs to be clarified but is overlooked by these scholars. It 
appears to be presumed by these scholars that this is normal for civil society, 
probably because the models used have drawn on class-based views of civil 
society that were applied when social movements began to emerge in Thailand. 
Nevertheless, the limitation of this approach has been seen by some Thai 
scholars who have recognized the important role that formal institutions as 
well as social movements play in Thai civil society. 
There are some Thai scholars who look at civil society as a form of 
organization, and some scholars even use the term civil society in Thailand to 
mean non-profit organizations (Archavanitkul and Poungsomlee, 1999, p. 
301). For example, Supawong (1997) claims that civil society refers to 




collective benefits, so in other words, they must be non-profit organizations. 
He interprets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the main 
representative of the civic or social movement. There are many other Thai 
scholars who hold this point of view, because NGOs have been taking action in 
social movements since the 1976 (Thai) coup. For example, many NGOs play 
an important role at grassroots level to support local people’s claims for their 
rights in environmental management.8 Consequently, several Thai scholars, 
for example, Naruemon Thabchumpon (2008), Somchai Phatharathananunth 
(2006) and Bruce Missingham (2003), have paid attention to the role played 
by NGOs because they believe that NGOs could play a key role in the 
development of civil society in Thailand. However, it is also recognized, 
especially by Missingham (2003), that the role being played by NGOs toward 
the grassroots is paternalistic. The NGOs presume that the grassroots need the 
NGOs’ assistance to enable them to achieve their goals because the NGOs have 
superior knowledge due to their higher education (Naruemon, 2002). A 
paternalistic relationship has emerged between the middle class and the 
grassroots within the arena of civil society. 
Even though Thai civil society and social movements have been 
growing gradually for many decades in this way, inspired by grassroots 
networking and non-profit organizations, Ungpakorn (2006) argues that the 
most obvious reason that civil society has emerged in Thailand is so that it can 
cause a decrease in state power in response to the Thai Rak Thai Party 
winning the election in 2005. By that time, Thai civil society, mostly led by 
NGOs, had begun to show the effort of the ‘third power’ of networks 
(Phongpaichit, 1999; Boonmee, 2007) in order to protect themselves from the 
hegemony of the Thai Rak Thai Party. Third power refers to the addition of 
civil society to attempt to balance the power of the state and business. 
However, he also points to the weakness of Thai civil society, which lacked any 
power to prevent the increasing economic encroachment caused by the 
8 For instance, the major Thai NGOs; NGOs Coordinating Committee on Development (Kor  
   Por. Or Poh Choh) has been involved in many issues of environmental management  
   problem and there extended to be NGOs network by region such as, for the Northern of  







                                                   
populist policies of the government. As Missingham (2003) also points out, 
the Thai Rak Thai Party quickly proved to be paternalistic in its relations with 
the grassroots. Their arguments raise the interesting point that most Thai 
scholars' perspectives about civil society are still normative.  They focus their 
attention on conceptualizing civil society’s functions and roles but ignore its 
interaction with the actual surrounding factors, such as the sociocultural 
dimension. To move beyond this, there needs to be further consideration of 
the unique ‘path trajectory’ and its effect on social capital forming a civil 
society in the uniqueness of the Thai context. A key concern here is to consider 
what the actual establishment of civil society was in Thailand. The 
presumption that civil society emerged when conceptualization of it began in 
the face of ‘interesting’ social movements has to be put aside. The research 
here attempts to address this by developing a model comprised of general 
concepts outlining the phases of particular civil societies as they follow their 
own unique ‘path trajectories’, including the unique forms that enable it to 
fulfill its general function to enhance democratization.   
With respect to the present models of thought of Thai scholars, where 
civil society is defined as the solution for democratization and political 
development, with an emphasis on the important role of NGOs, it is worth 
questioning the grassroots’ actual ability in Thailand to be self-organized into 
NGOs, including the possibility of civil society standing independently and 
integrating vertically with state power.  Moreover, if Thai NGOs play the ‘third 
power’ on their own, excluding the role of the grassroots, it would have to be 
concluded that civil society cannot be described well by the concept of a ‘third 
power’. There would have to be four powers defined: state power, market 
power, NGO power, and the grassroots. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Thai civil society has recently 
begun to be considered a political problem, because it has been equated with 
social movements in terms of protests or mass mobilization. While there have 
in actuality been an increasing number of social movements (Pintobtang, 
1998), this shows the growth of the civil society concept is being influenced by 
political agendas. It appears to have become an ideological tool of some NGOs 
and populist political parties because of its theoretical link to democratization.   




Poor’, provides insights into the facts of the grassroots movement, 
emphasizing significantly the movement’s strategy to pressurize state 
decision-making. What is less clear, however, is how much the social 
movements can in fact be described as grassroots movements, given that they 
are orchestrated largely by NGOs. The horizontal interaction between NGOs 
and the grassroots is overlooked, when it needs to be a focus of analysis 
because one of the key ways in which the function of civil society enhances 
democratization is by civil society providing an educative role. Namely, the 
grassroots learn how to participate democratically within state institutions by 
doing so first horizontally within civil society. However, if NGOs are acting 
paternalistically toward the grassroots, the same as state institutions are, this 
educative role is not being carried out by civil society. Moreover, the NGO 
middle-class activists are orchestrating undemocratic confrontations with 
state institutions, and so neither are they an example to the grassroots they 
are supposedly guiding because of supposed superior knowledge. 
The limitation in the development of civil society in Thailand can be 
seen in how the successful ones challenged state decision-making through the 
enormous efforts of social movement actors, with tragic consequences in some 
cases, although there have been some successes and some failures by diverse 
movements. Important values of civil society, including non-violence and 
tolerance, are conspicuously absent. For instance, the case of the Pak Mun 
villagers: the controversial case study of the dam construction presents details 
about how state decision-making is based on economic growth, and how this 
conflicts with local livelihoods, in particular for the local people in the north-
east who then attempt to struggle and protect their rights 
(Phatharathananunth, 2006). There is also the example of a group of local 
people from Prajuab Kirikhan who protested the coal-fired plant projects, 
some of whom joined the Assembly of the Poor once this had moved to 
Bangkok.   
These two cases indicate why Thai civil society groups have come to 
commonly be presented as social movements or ‘mobs’ on the street, and led 
to the image of civil groups or the civil society ideal as being the ‘problem’ 
rather than the ‘alternative’. Ultimately, the conflicts become chronic 




the organizations of civil society. Unlike in many other societies where state–
society conflict does not result in the fragmentation of society, in Thai society 
the conflict results in social fragmentation, which is not helping 
democratization. In contrast to the theory of civil society as it relates to many 
other countries9, in Thailand, it may be potentially creating a barrier to the 
development of democracy. 
In summary, Thailand could possibly develop and democratize its 
politics through the emergence of many strong grassroots movements, which 
might relate to the development of civil organizations. Theory on civil society 
suggests that a cause may be inadequate vertical linkages between grassroots, 
other civil societies and other organizations. An analysis of linkages is 
therefore necessary to attempt to understand civil groups connecting to other 
organizations in any kind of collective activity in relation to the political 
processes. However, this thesis seeks to understand the dynamics of civil 
society in Thailand to critically analyze how civil society can help democratize 
the politics to Thailand. Of particular interest is the relationship of national 
social movements or NGOs to civil society in Thailand and the significance of 
the relationship.  Therefore for the purposes of this thesis, analysis of linkages 
is necessary to attempt to understand how civil groups’ connections to other 
organizations in any kind of collective activity, relate to the development and 
sustainability of civil society. 
Social Capital and Thai Community Participation  
The concept of social capital examines the linkages within networks in a 
community and the relationships between the actors in networks or, in other 
words, the role of members in a community. Social capital has been described 
as the networks and connections between people (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1995) and is a kind of resource capital like economic and cultural capital 
(Bourdieu, 2011; Kay, 2005). Also, social capital is a very important part of a 
community because it contains the sense of belonging that exists between 
9  For example, Bratton (1989) studies in the case of Africa, Hadenius and Uggla (1996)  
      study the case of Sweden, Kim (2000) studies in the case of Korea and the case of Japan  







                                                   
individuals and organizations and which comes from their connections. Social 
capital comprises trust, mutual understanding and shared norms and values, 
which can be other forms of capital – it is like a stock or fund or resource that 
can be used for community development.  
Similarly, according to Fraser (2005), social capital can be affected by 
the political view of ‘community’, to prefer business or individual or inclusive 
community, according to the political views of the community. It can be seen 
that the community is closely related to social capital. The social capital in a 
community may be constructed by kinship bonds. It is primarily social 
networks associated through common objectives and ranges from low to high 
levels of civil society organization.  
Kay (2005) states that social capital is created by the six elements of: 
trust; value; reciprocity; mutuality; shared norms of behavior; shared 
commitment and belonging, in both formal and informal social networks; and 
effective communication channels. The connections are important but other 
components such as trust can develop social capital in communities. Trust can 
be an important element of social capital because it is needed for the 
development and maintenance of other elements of social capital in social 
networks (Glaeser et al., 2000). Civic community building is created by trust 
in the same way (Fennema and Tillie, 2000).  
In the case of Thailand, a broader view of trust does not appear to exist 
between the government and communities, perhaps due to the economic 
growth development policy of the government, which has a negative impact on 
the ecosystem and the livelihoods of local people; for example, the Kaeng Suea 
Ten Dam10 project (Sretthachau, 2000), the project of Map Ta Phut Industrial 
Estate (Sripoung, 2007) and the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project 
(Kouprianov et al., 2002). Trust exists and is developed among people in local 
communities. Local people develop networks and develop shared views in 
order to seek proper ways for dealing with this kind of situation. Trust is an 
essential factor for building networks to support people so they can participate 
in their activities. Similarly, Williams (2005) states that the development of 
community and social capital brings community acknowledgement. The 




                                                   
acknowledgement comes when the community view is recognized. The formal 
kind of community is most likely to be recognized, even though this form of 
community participation may not be the most common form for a group. 
However, the underlying sense of community and the networks and trust 
between them came out, and the social capital became clear as if the 
community achieved status and was recognized. 
O’Sullivan and Tajaroensuk (1997, p. 41) state that social capital in 
Thailand is based on distinctive Thai culture ways.  ‘Few societies place 
greater emphasis on relationships than Thailand. Social capital comes from 
the connections between people, which trust and shared norms and values 
build up. Moreover, Thai networks have an informal structure and are 
connected by kinship, friendship and neighborliness. There is a respect system 
by hierarchical status ranking in Thai culture. The young usually respect the 
elders (Komin, 1990a, 1990b), which leads to the presence of the other social 
capital factors. However, the relationship of networks is the same as social 
cohesion, which leads the people of a community or the actors of a network to 
come along and share their ‘sense of belonging’ and link their resources and 
livelihoods (McMillan and Chavis, 1986; Hardin, 2002; Ostrom and Walker, 
2003). This kind of network produces collective action in Thai society 
(Promphakping, 2007).  
Reciprocity is one kind of social capital factor in Thai society (Tsuruta, 
2004; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Cheamchenkool, 2013). Castelfranchi 
(2008) states that reciprocity and trust are related, as reciprocity and trust are 
generated along with posonal relationships and networks (Maraffi et al., 
2008). Reciprocation, or reciprocity, is created as doing something beneficial 
for other(s) and expecting to get (something) back. Evans (1995) studies the 
Lao peasants’ collective economy. His work explains the traditional labor 
exchange, which has the aspect of strict and loose reciprocity. Both kinds of 
reciprocity mean ways of helping (chuay leua) 11 with payback (torp thaen).12 
Strict reciprocity implies a kind of helping that needs to be according to rules 
11  Chuay lua = ช่วยเหลือ 







                                                   
and exactly returned; for example, giving one day of work is returned by one 
day of work or by the payment of one day’s rate. In contrast, loose reciprocity 
is helping without any specific return. This appears in terms of the mutual 
assistance that usually works for kinship, friends and neighbors, which they 
assume will be balanced later on. Strict reciprocity tends to be cleared in 
trading, while loose reciprocity is a way of helping each other in times of need.  
In addition, reciprocity in the Thai context has some similar aspects to 
Evans’s study of the Lao traditional labor exchange. According to 
Srithongtham (2009) studies the role of social capital in the Thai community. 
She explains that the feature of reciprocity produces Thai culture along with 
the social norm in terms of being kind to others. Also, the features of 
reciprocity are inherent in the manner of Thai society, and reciprocation is a 
condition of Thai cultural values (Piyakarn, 2010). It can be seen that 
reciprocity is one of social capital aspect, which is generated in Thai culture. 
Moreover, the specific pattern of Thai reciprocation is that Thai people usually 
appreciate help with an opportunity for future payback in mind.  
Komin (1990b, 168) states, “Reciprocity of kindness, particularly the 
value of being [grateful] is a highly valued characteristic in Thai society.” In 
terms of this, Thai reciprocity seems to be ‘loose’ because it generates far more 
from trade or favors and has no conditions to pay back. 
In brief, the aspects of social capital in the Thai context appear in 
accordance with Thai culture. Trust is the key factor relating to producing 
social norms and values, together with reciprocal orientation. However, the 
occurence of social capital aspects in Thai society has different detail 
depending on the specific societal and cultural aspect. However, the 
occurrence of the various aspects of social capital in Thai society can be 
expected to vary in detail, depending on the specific context. This thesis 
focuses on the contextual details of social capital in an attempt to understand 
the dynamics of how social capital works to support civil society. 
The Research Framework  
The research framework has been constructed to ensure that key dimensions 
of civil society are addressed. The dimension allows exploration and analysis 




sustaining of civil society. Within these stages the various aspects, functions 
















Figure 1 The phases of civil society 
 
The overall research framework synthesizes the literature pertaining to 
the phases of civil society, namely the establishment, development and 
sustaining of civil society. The overall research framework is analytical in 
terms of how to understand Thai civil society with normative implications. 
Hence, the phases that are focussed on are first the establishment of civil 
society, second its development, and third its sustenance. The framework 
seeks to have general analytical significance to be applicable across cultures 
and historical periods and, moreover, to capture the dynamics so that the 
unique ‘path trajectories’ of civil society across cultures can be understood. 
A research framework, able to capture the dynamics giving rise to 
unique ‘path trajectories’, is necessary to be able to adequately analyze the 
Thai civil situation for at least two pertinent reasons. One, there are 
inadequacies in the analysis of civil society in Thailand that appear to have 
arisen due to a failure to consider the different phases of Thai civil society. 




occurs as social movements, and whether these two are related. This 
inadequacy in the analysis of Thai civil society appears to have led to 
overlooking how civil society developed after its establishment. And two, Thai 
civil society appears to be under threat of not being sustained, so greater 
clarity is being sought about what possible avenues are available to transform 
it into a sustainable form, after establishment.   
The two reasons are possibly related because overlooking the emergent 
aspect of the establishment of civil society in Thailand appears to have 
coincided with also overlooking the role of state institutions in the 
development and sustaining of civil society. The research framework has been 
constructed to ensure that both of these oversights in the literature on Thai 
civil society, and potentially in other ‘path trajectories’ as well, are addressed 
by the research.    
There are two main issues raised in the literature in relation to the 
general dynamics of civil society that have been incorporated into the 
construction of the research framework. One is the relationship of social 
capital to civil society (Fox, 1996; Brown, 1998; Fukuyama, 2001); the other is 
the relationship between the function and form of civil society (Heinrich, 2010, 
p. 25). 
There are opposing perspectives on whether social capital is caused by 
civil society or civil society is the cause of social capital. The issue is related to 
the role of institutions in civil society and whether or not they are formal or 
informal. Putnam (1993, p. 89) emphasizes that social capital is produced by 
civil society, and so implicitly focusses on the role of formal institutions in 
civil society, including the possibility of its establishment by the external 
institutions of the state and of commerce, and hence through policy initiatives. 
In contrast, other scholars emphasize how civil society emerges due to the 
presence of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1998). The role of culture and 
hence informal institutions of civil society are, for example, considered 
important in this perspective, though they also include awareness of the role 
of external shocks or interventions in the form of grievances and incentives. 
Culture is considered important because, unlike external shocks and 




they are mutually supportive. So the participation of culture in social capital is 
the primal ingredient necessary for the establishment of civil society.  
The research framework synthesizes these two views by recognizing 
that both views can be valid and can be incorporated together by considering 
the dynamics forming the phases of civil society. Even though the 
establishment of civil society is emergent and as a result, due to the prior 
presence of social capital, contra Putnam, Putnam’s model is nevertheless also 
correct in that civil society is also one of the sources of social capital, once civil 
society has been established. Accordingly, social capital continues to be a 
source of innovation as well within civil society once civil society is established. 
Thus, social capital remains a necessary feature for the development of civil 
society and continues to be necessary for its adaptability and therefore 
sustainability (Bourdieu, 1980). So the primal integration provided by culture 
appears to be necessary throughout the whole ‘path trajectory’ of civil society.  
To frame the complex nature of civil society, systems theory has been 
utilized to produce Figure 2 below, to outline a non-linear and dialectical 
development process of civil society. Systems theory has been used to 
synthesize the various perspectives and models in the literature. 
The establishment of civil society starts from its emergence from social 
capital due to multiple causes, including social capital’s primal integration 
with culture, but not initially including civil society (main arrow from left to 
right). Then as civil society begins to emerge, civil society becomes another 
cause of social capital (main arrow from right to left), thus creating a positive 
feedback within civil society that develops both social capital and civil society. 
The feedback is why the process of the development of civil society in relation 
to social capital is non-linear and hence complex and so appears potentially 
able to take on new unique ‘path trajectories’. Furthermore, the positive 
feedback can be considered to occur internally within civil society, because 
social capital can be considered to be part of civil society, thus creating a 
secondary but still internal integration within civil society. But because social 
capital initially exists before civil society, social capital has to also be modeled 
as a distinct aspect of civil society. This is why civil society is also dialectical 
and hence self-organizing in its dynamic, in relation to the role of social 




Moreover, the environmental or external causes of social capital (i.e. 
other than civil society and culture) and the environmental causes of civil 
society (i.e. other than social capital) are also significant for the necessary 
adaptation of social capital and civil society to their changing environment. 
Hence the various environmental or external causes of both social capital and 
civil society are significant for the sustainability of civil society. In particular, 
the continuing influence of culture in the production of social capital is 
significant, as is the influence of state institutions in the production of civil 
society. So the research framework has had to model these influences.  
Also, when civil society develops and is sustained, mutually supportive 
relations are involved, and hence a tertiary new and external integration by 
civil society emerges. This includes horizontally – with other organizations of 
civil society, regional NGOs and local or regional state institutions – and 
vertically, for example with national state institutions and national NGOs 
(Hulme and Edwards, 1997). But there is also another important point made 
by Hadenius and Uggla (1996), which is that this (tertiary) integration has to 
be of a requisite level. It can be too strong, both in relation to horizontal 
integration and vertical integration. Hence the term linkage is used to describe 
the level of integration. Moreover, this therefore also applies to the role of 
values involved in social capital and civil society, for example trust. ‘Thin trust’ 
rather than ‘thick trust’ is the requisite level of trust for social capital and civil 
society (Newton, 1997; 1999). The same is noted as applying to the integration 
of culture and social capital. It has to be of a requisite level or it becomes too 
encapsulated and so pluralism is lost (Newton, 2001). Similarly, the 
(secondary) internal integration between social capital and civil society has to 
be of a requisite level to enable openness to allow innovative self-organization 
and external integration to develop (Baiocchi, Heller and Silva, 2008). 
Otherwise neither horizontal nor vertical linkages can be formed, and 
adaptation of civil society development cannot be continued, and civil society 
cannot be sustained. 
Finally, the various requisite integrations involved in the dialectical 
nature of civil society in relation to social capital and hence culture, and also 
the continuing significance of external factors from the environment, raise 




implicitly in the use of the terms ‘arena’ and ‘social space’ in the definition of 
civil society. The boundary that encompasses civil society appears to be fuzzy. 
This can be seen in how there is a two-way arrow between social capital and 
culture, and the one-way influences on social capital due to incentives or 
stimulates and grievances, which can often have their source in state decision-
making. It is therefore arguable that it is helpful to consider the external 
institutional influences on social capital and civil society, otherwise the 
establishment, development and sustainability of civil society cannot be 
adequately appreciated. Some external institutions, such as NGOs, may 
interfere with civil society in some ways. This is particularly pertinent to the 
Thailand situation, because overlooking the significance of the effects of the 
various external influences, such as NGOs and state institutions, on civil 
society, appears to have led scholars of Thai civil society to mistakenly equate 
civil society with social movements. Accordingly, the research framework 
leaves open-ended what exactly the boundary to civil society is. It is developed 
in more detail later, in terms of the other key issue, that of the function and 
form of civil society, and how the fuzziness of the boundary of civil society is 
recognized in the literature in relation to the values of civil society and in the 



















The other issue, of the relationship between the form and function of 
civil society, further emphasizes the need to focus on the phases of civil society. 
Failing to do so confuses the function and form of civil society. The history of 
civil societies and their conceptualization highlights great diversity and 
complexity, including regional, and hence the inability to assume that a 
specific model of civil society at a particular time and place can be adequate in 
another time or place. Recognition of this has led some scholars to focus on 
the function rather than form of civil society, because the functions are more 
consistent than the forms (Heinrich, 2010, p. 29; Diamond, 1994, p. 7). The 
research framework adopts this approach but is also careful to continue to 
distinguish between function and form. Otherwise there is a danger of 
presuming certain forms of civil society and formal institutions in civil society 
have a particular function for civil society. This mistake is equivalent to 
assuming that civil society is not an emergent phenomenon, is not innovative 
in its development, and does not need to be adaptive to be sustained. 
According to the argument above, this mistake therefore overlooks the role of 
the causes of the emergence of civil society, such as social capital, and 
accordingly, culture, grievances and incentives. As outlined above, there are 
multiple sources of social capital other than civil society, including state 
institutions carrying out education, and cultural institutions, which are also 
causes for the emergence of civil society (Hadenius and Uggla, 1996; Heinrich 
2010, p. 72). 
As mentioned above, the role of external institutions in civil society is 
also a key and significant feature of the research framework. These are 
significant because there is disputed in the literature,some scholars argue that 
the environment of civil society is not part of civil society (Heinrich 2010, p. 
67). This bracketing of the external environment, although, it is out of the 
research scope, potentially makes it impossible to understand adequately the 
causes of civil society, and hence the diversity of its forms and the strength of 
its functioning. So the research framework includes the environment. 
A final related point is that some scholars also do not consider that the 
values of social capital involved in civil society are part of civil society, 
claiming instead that they are what constitute civil society (Heinrich, 2010, p. 




view, that social capital is what forms civil society. Whereas social capital is 
also part of the situation, it fails to appreciate the complex dynamic nature of 
civil society. Hence the research framework also includes the values of civil 
society. 
So the general components of the research framework that strengthen 
civil society include the key values and environmental factors. This is outlined 
below in figure 3.  
The dynamic processes involving the key components of civil society, 
modeled by Figures 1 and 2, are not modeled in Figure 3, which instead sets 
out pertinent research concepts associated with the key components. The 
pertinent research concepts form the themes of the research framework. So 
Figure 3 provides further detail of the research framework outlined more 
























Several points can be deduced from Figures 1, 2 and 3. A central one is 
that the dynamism of civil society is associated with the creative role of social 
capital. Accordingly, the dynamism of civil society is expressed politically as 
participation in democratization, and commercially as entrepreneurship 
(Newton, 2001). Associated with this central point is the previously outlined 
deduction of a general description of the ‘path trajectory’ of the phases of civil 
society in terms of the three stages of requisite integration. The creativity 
necessary for civil society both requires requisite constraints, and also forms 
the requisite constraints in a dialectical manner. 
The ‘path trajectory’ cannot start with any external integration, neither 
horizontal nor vertical, even though they can exist in other. The establishment 
of civil society is an arena comprised of culture, grievances and incentives, all 
of which initially only nurture social capital. As social capital emerges in the 
arena, requisite horizontal integration or linkages become established as 
social roles and the actors of civil society emerge; for example, the emergence 
of grassroots leaders, along with their interactions with other groups or 
organizations, both formal and informal. Even though vertical influences are 
present, for example the subject of grievance or incentives, there is no creative 
dialogue providing requisite vertical integration or linkages at this stage. 
To describe the general complex dynamics involving horizontal and 
vertical integration between social systems, adaptive environmental 
management literature has been utilised. As well as supplying the terms 
horizontal and vertical integration, it also teases out the dynamics involved in 
cooperation where there are multiple and/or pluralistic institutions at play, as 
are found in civil society. In particular, the differences between reactive and 
proactive approaches are explored (Cohen, 1996). This has helped define the 
important actor roles, namely civil group members, leaders, activists and 
advisors. Associated with what can be deduced generally about the initial 
phase of the development of civil society is the need for requisite horizontal 
integration if the development of civil society is to continue. Features of 
requisite horizontal integration include the need for multiple inclusive 
institutions, which nevertheless have specific interests. According to adaptive 
environmental management literature, this provides resilience (Reed, Fraser 




participation and empowerment or self-organization. If there is too much 
horizontal integration through too much trust, strong leaders dominate, and 
so democratization through critical dialogue is hindered. Strong leadership in 
civil society can occur in grassroots mobilization and can therefore potentially 
become problematic. The two-way arrow between civil society and NGOs in 
Figure 2 refers to the need for critical dialogue to maintain requisite 
horizontal integration. Alternatively, if there are too many interests integrated 
into a single institution, decision-making within civil society becomes stifled 
due to internal conflict. 
It can be further deduced that once the initial development phase of 
civil society is under way, requisite vertical integration is required if civil 
society is to be sustained. In terms of adaptive environmental management 
literature, adaptive governance is required (Armitage et al., 2009). Moreover, 
the occurrence of requisite vertical integration is tied in some way to the 
development of requisite horizontal integration. The openness to seek critical 
dialogue with state institutions, instead of either passively receiving incentives 
or reacting out of grievance, is tied to recognition of the inadequacy of relying 
solely on horizontal integration, which would in that case become too strong. 
It can similarly also be deduced that there is the need for requisite 
vertical integration, or vertical linkages, provided by maintaining requisite 
horizontal integration or linkages. If there is too much trust by grassroots in 
state institutions, the key democratization values of self-organization, 
empowerment and critical dialogue are lost. However, the two-way arrow in 
Figure 2 between civil society and state institutions indicates the need for 
critical dialogue for requisite some conciliation processes in order to 
developing democratization. This is where civil groups can participate in the 
democratization process. To maintain both horizontal and vertical linkages 
implies requisite levels of both horizontal and vertical integration. Moreover, 
because linkages are dynamic, they imply critical dialogue, and so the process 
of democratization fulfilled by civil society can be summarized as being 
sustained to the extent that both horizontal and vertical linkages are 
established and maintained. 
In summary, the research framework has been synthesized and 




Diamond (1994) and Heinrich (2010), through the use of systems concepts. 
Gellner’s definitions of the institution of civil society have been extended to 
include the linkages between them and the role of social capital in establishing, 
developing and sustaining civil society. Hadenius and Uggla’s concept of 
requisite integration has been extended to consider the horizontal and vertical 
interactions, by appealling to the adaptive environmental management 
literature. Diamond’s model has therefore been clarified in terms of defining 
vertical and horizontal linkages. Finally, Heinrich’s analysis of what 
strengthens civil society has been extended to include the phases of civil 
society, so that the complex dynamic can be analysed and cross-fertilized by 
the development studies literature.  
Rationale for the Research Framework 
A composite research framework has had to be synthesized because the focus 
of the research has not been carried out previously in Thailand, and because 
there are unique features of civil society in Thailand. This means that similar 
studies elsewhere in the world have not required the type of framework 
developed here. The unique characteristics of Thai civil society that have had 
to be incorporated include a relatively greater role of social aspect, culture and 
social activities or actions in civil society. Clarification of the interactions 
occurring at both the horizontal and vertical dimensions has been found to be 
necessary to allow adequate analysis of the main innovations incorporated in 
the research framework developed here.  
 The theoretical frameworks constructed enable the functioning of 
democracy and the role of social capital to be examined through the lens of the 
emergence, development and sustenance of civil society. In turn, focussing on 
the functioning of democracy and the role of social capital provides a 
framework of analysis in order to illuminate aspects, tasks and processes of 
Thai civil society. However, to understand the dynamic situations surrounding 
those problems, which potentially can assist in improving the situations if 
incorporated into political processes, it is also important to consider how 
social capital assists in the functioning of democracy. This is the key reason for 
the analyses of the case studies, which clarify the characteristics of the 




 From the background of the case studies, it is clear that Thailand has 
been facing serious situations of conflict and frustration between people and 
the state. In particular, they clearly illustrate that the concerns of local people 
have brought about very intensive levels of grassroots participation in some 
aspects of Thai civil society. The research framework synthesized from the 
literature review enables the research to begin by examining the opportunities 
for grassroots participation in Thai civil society. The establishment and 
development of civil society in both cases provides data about this. The key 
concepts of civil society presented in the framework are then used to analyze 
the activities and responses of local community organizations, including the 
‘New Social Movements’. In particular, this enables the analysis of the 
establishment, development and sustenance of grassroots groups in the 
community with shared attitudes, who seek more autonomy and 
empowerment of their communities with a role in influencing the apparatus of 
state decision-making. Ultimately this allows some analysis of the role of the 
emergence of civil society in Thailand to promote democratic processes to be 
carried out. In particular the case studies are analyzed in terms of the social 
movements in Thailand that are engaging in processes to enhance 
participation and expand democratization. The concepts and models of civil 
society are used to analyze the case studies to gain a better understanding of 
the development of democratization within grassroots community movements. 
 In Thailand, civil society emerged out of a crisis and protest. Civil 
society usually referred to groups of grassroots or local people, who joined in 
the communities’ activities willingly. However, the association of local people 
could be developed to be social protests or mobilization later led by facing the 
crisis. Regarding this, horizontal ties, especially within communities, are very 
important early on, along with social bonding and relationships of people in 
the communities. Moreover, leadership had been very important for building 
solidarity and units of civil groups. These encouraged civil society to work 
productively, thus, the vertical ties of civil society with state institutions could 
not develop efficiently due to the protest orientation.  Nonetheless, the crisis 
also leads civil society to some demand for external expertise and support, 
which can be problematic. It is due to civil society’s need to be converted to 




other organizations that means civil society cannot be sustained in the long 
term.  
 In this regard, the study argues that even though there are a lot of civil 
groups that have emerged in Thai society, not all of them can survive in the 
long term. In terms of this, the research framework provides key components 
in order to examine the hypotheses of this study, that Thai civil society needs 
to remain local, and civil society needs to be independent in order to be 
sustained. 
Background of Case Studies 
The two case studies selected for this research were chosen because, in the 
context of different controversial issues involving community interaction with 
the state, they have raised different aspects of the establishment, development 
and sustenance of civil society in Thailand. In the first case, Dam, there was 
strong resistance by local people towards the state and continual conflict since 
the project was first launched, until now. In the second case, the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups, initial conflict arose in the face of the state’s 
decision to build coal-fired power plants. Eventually, the projects were 
cancelled due to local people’s resistance.  
Pak Mun civil group 
The Pak Mun Dam was constructed in the Khong Jiam district of the Ubon 
Ratchathani province of the north-east region of Thailand. After the dam was 
constructed and began operations in 1994, there were effects on people living 
along the Mun River, one of Thailand’s richest rivers and the largest artery of 
the Mae Khong River (Dudgeon, 2000). The Mun River originally contained 
265 different kinds of fish in very beautiful surroundings, with wetlands and 
other varied ecosystems, all of which have been negatively affected. The Pak 
Mun Dam has had other serious negative impacts; for example, people could 
no longer earn a living from the fisheries. Through the formation of a social 
movement, the local people forced the government to be concerned about this 
problem. There were many protests from many groups. Community 
movements, through the media, researched the ecosystem themselves. As a 
result of mediation between the community and state, the dam gates were 




temporary dry season, and this was repeated annually. This annual closing 
and opening of the dam gates has continued until the present and is also 
considered on the political agenda for annual state decision-making. 
 Pak Mun Dam is not the only contentious environmental issue, but it 
has also brought about many debatable issues such as rights, equality and top-
down decision-making. The significant presentation of grassroots community 
struggles amidst the social changes forced on them has led to the dam being 
called ‘the shame monument of the power state’. The dam has cost a huge 
amount of money but it cannot be fully operationalized. 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 
This case examines two related civil groups. The Baan Krut community was 
the local civil group opposed to the Hin Krut coal-fired power plant project, 
while the Bor Nork local civil group resisted the coal-fired power plant 
projects in their village. Both projects were run by the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) jointly with the Union Power Development Co. 
Ltd and the Gulf Power Generation Co. Ltd. The projects were planned for 
construction in the Prajuab Kirikhan province in Thailand. 
These projects were highly controversial because of the potential 
negative impact of coal plant emissions, but especially so because of the 
conflict between the people affected and the state that promoted the projects 
to them. The projects were part of an independent power production program, 
which was drafted in 1994 while Mr. Chuan Leekpai was the Prime Minister. 
At the beginning of the projects in 1995, Gulf Power Generation and district 
officials informed people in the area about the plan for the project. People in 
the village began protests against the project. Regulations that required public 
hearings were issued under a new Thai constitution called ‘The People’s 
Constitution’, in 1997. A complaint was handed to the Justice and Human 
Rights Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, and local 
representatives submitted a letter to the director of the Department of 
Harbors to revoke the approval of the department with respect to the impact 
on local fisheries. However, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) of 




Krut power plant project, which is essentially the same project and adjacent to 
the Bor Nork area, was approved.  
 People in both Baan Krut and Bor Nork villages played roles to protest 
against the projects in various ways, while the Thai state used the approved 
EIA as a strategy to negotiate with people in the area of the projects in order to 
take responsibility for the contract they had signed with the projects’ 
constructors. Nevertheless, the EIA was proven by the communities to have 
been mishandled by a consultant company hired by Gulf Power Generation Co. 
Ltd, the contractor of those projects. Among the flaws found in the EIA were 
that it had not adequately researched bird species and the complicated ecology 
of the wetlands, it did not look at acid rain effects on those wetlands, and it 
neglected to include the impact upon whales and dolphins, and they 
underestimated water resources for local fishing activities (Mekong Watch 
Japan Fact Sheet, 2002). 
 The projects were originally approved under the new Thai constitution, 
the first to stipulate public hearings in order to support democratic 
disciplinary accountability. Therefore, public hearings of Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork projects were held. However local people boycotted the hearings because 
the processes of the hearings were ambiguous and poorly communicated; 
villagers in opposition were excluded from decision-making processes. The 
hearings recommended resolution by establishing a committee to deal with 
the problems and to monitor pollution, but the committee was never active in 
monitoring the projects. Local people believed the hearing process was just a 
facade set up by the head and district chiefs who had made a profit from 
brokering land sales on behalf of the project construction company.13 
 As for the ecological problems, the projects would have harmed local 
community livelihoods, because of the negative impact of the projects on the 
small-scale fishing and agricultural activities of people in the villages. Thus, 
there would also likely have been social fragmentation problems due to 
13  Personal talk with Jintana Kaewkow, the representative of Baan Krut community, member  
      of tripartite committee, Bangkok (July 22, 2007). 








                                                   
conflicts in the local communities because only some business groups would 
have benefited from the projects. Moreover, many parts of the political 
process had problems, leading to it becoming a significant conflict between 
the communities and the state, which resulted from an ongoing prior lack of a 
role for local people in the democratic process and the distrust of people in 
participating in the procedure.   
 In brief, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups showed their strong 
role in protecting themselves from economic unfairness and state power. The 
demonstrations successfully halted the projects, and the five community 
groups that arose from this movement now continue to support each other to 
organize groups to protect their rights and engage in the general political 
participation processes. 
Methodologies and Methods 
This section covers the methodologies and methods which underpin and guide 
the proposed study, and also describes how the data was collected and 
analysed in this research. 
 The research is mainly qualitative, and the data collected has been 
mainly analysed inductively. This has been done because the intention is to 
make sense of the lived experiences, behaviors, emotions and feelings, as well 
as organizational and institutional functions and interactions among the 
actors involved in the case studies. This enables the unique features of the 
cases, namely the relatively greater role of social resistance, social movements 
and culture in civil society, to be addressed. Further, the data collected is 
descriptive and, in the patterns of relationships discovered, fits into categories, 
moving from the specific to analytic generalisations found in the literature 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1969; Patton, 2002). The approach to qualitative research 
taken here assumes that the reality constructions by actors cannot be 
separated from the world in which they are experienced, and that observations 
are inevitably contextual (Lincoln and Gub, 1985, p. 189). The qualitative 
research allowed the study of things in their natural settings, attempting to 
make sense of, or interpret, lived experiences in terms of the meanings people 
brought to them. This case study approach has formed the essence of the 




used is a form of phenomenological inquiry that has brought to the fore the 
insights of the researcher in connection with understanding the meanings 
grassroots people and other actors give to their actions.  
Research methodologies 
There are two aspects to the research methodology. The first aspect covers 
data collection, and the second aspect covers how the data is analyzed. 
Specific research methodologies utilized in the research, however, cover both 
aspects. Four research methodologies have been explicitly used and 
synthesized to form the research methodology: hermeneutics, participatory 
approaches, discourse analysis, and grounded theory. The types of 
methodologies utilized also cover two types of data, primary data from 
fieldwork, and secondary or documentary data.  
Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics is a critical phenomenological approach. This is necessary 
because the research is interdisciplinary. As shown in the research framework, 
civil society requires concepts and their synthesis from multiple disciplines to 
be able to understand the complexity of contemporary civil society.   
 Shapiro and Sica (1984, p. 15) state Giddens’s view in terms of 
hermeneutics: “Today … real and profound convergences of interest and 
problems are occurring across broad spectra of intellectual life.” 
Hermeneutics is at the “very centre of these convergences, having both to 
contribute to and to learn from them.” Moreover, there are multiple insights 
brought to the fore, both from the micro level, such as from grassroots 
communities, and from the macro level, such as national or government 
institutions, as well as networks that link the micro and macro levels together, 
and from the reseacher. Owing to the richness of the information generated 
from the controversial issues of the case studies, the research has required and 
challenged the researcher to engage with key informants to understand the 
issues. So the researcher is one of the important actors involved in discovering 
answers to the research questions and to achieve the research goals. The 
hermeneutic principle is that concepts and theories of the social sciences must 
make substantial reference to those of actors in the real world (Outhwaite, 




used in this research – because there are many actors related to the case of 
community participation in Thai civil society.   
 For Shapiro and Sica (1984, p. 3), hermeneutics is about the theory and 
practice of interpretation, but it does not give conditions to show the 
achievement or recognition of understanding. So the flexibility of the 
methodology is suited to the complexity of the study of civil society. 
Hermeneutics seeks to understand what is distant in time and culture, or 
obscured by ideology. The hermeneutical process aims to “make such 
understanding meaningful for life and thought” (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 4). 
As part of this, hermeneutics seeks to clarify the cultural phenomena distorted 
by ideologies of class or power (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 5). Because this 
research incorporates historical data and occurs across cultures, hermeneutics 
is appropriate to this research. Moreover, hermeneutics can also be applied to 
social situations for the interpretation and understanding of social events. It 
analyzes their meanings for humans and for the culture of humans. It stresses 
the importance of the context as well as the form of any social behavior, 
because the central principle of hermeneutics is that it is possible to 
understand the meaning of an action or statement only when it is related to 
the whole context (Shapiro and Sica, 1984, p. 4) of interpretation. 
Hermeneutics seeks to understand the meaning underlying human action as if 
interpreting texts rather than gaining knowledge of objects in nature, and 
which views experience as a narrative. Accordingly these research results are 
presented as narratives.  
Participatory approach 
The participation of a grassroots community involves in general terms “active 
involvement of people in making decisions about the implementation of 
processes, programmes and projects which affect them.” (Nelson and Wright, 
1997, p. 2). This research uses a participatory approach as a tool for analyzing 
data about grassroots people who have been involved in Thai civil society.  
Nelson and Wright also note that if participation is to be effective, it must 
involve shifts in power. In this research, the empowerment is a process 
through which the grassroots are able to participate in order to shape their 




 This research investigates the internal and external factors, which can 
maintain sustainable grassroots participation in civil society. This includes the 
manner of participation by and within institutions, as they seek to develop 
civil society and ultimately democratization. The features of the participatory 
approach are also used to determine who participates in Thai civil society. 
Participation defines the interactions or linkages within and between the civil 
institutions of society.    
Discourse analysis approach 
A discourse is a system of meanings. The understanding depends on different 
cultures and can be conditional on whether the discourse benefits or 
disadvantages people. Parker (1992, p. 7) also says that in terms of discourse 
analysis, things such as “speech, writing, non-verbal behaviour, …” can all be 
forms of text. Parker (1992, p. 10) says discourse paints a picture of reality, 
and this forms statements about reality.   
 Ideas are structured by discourse in a community, so the ideas of 
knowledge and social practice come from a particular discourse (Intoo-Marn, 
2003, p. 5). This is why discourse analysis is pertinent to the research of civil 
society, which contains collective activities. In this research, a ‘discourse 
community’ is a civil institution, which creates discourse representing the 
particular knowledge, interests, goals, cultural belief systems, trust and norms 
of that civil institution. A principle of discourse is used by a discourse 
community, which agrees on a meaning (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 4). 
 Burman and Parker (1993) state that language is organized into 
‘discourses’ or ‘interpretive repertoires’, and these are able to influence how 
we experience and behave in the world. When people talk about a 
phenomenon, they must make use of shared patterns of meanings. The 
discourse analysis approach can examine how discourse is constructed in the 
discourse community. The reality for the community is a social construction 
(Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 9).  
 Fairclough (1992, p. 226) states that the specific details about a 
particular kind of discourse concern the social situation in which the discourse 
is a part. Therefore research projects in discourse analysis must first look at 




of sociology, political science and history are used. The ideal analysis of 
discourse is, however, interdisciplinary, which is how it is used here.   
 To analyze discourse, the signs and symbols of the discourse are first 
categorized for analysis. The discourse analysis then examines how discourse 
is constructed in the discourse community (Intoo-Marn, 2003, p. 5) and so is 
used in this research to analyze how civil institutions construct discourse. 
Fairclough (1992, p. 231) provides a summary of the three dimensions of 
analysis used in the practices of discourse analysis. It begins at a macro level, 
then goes into a micro level, and finally looks at an analysis of the social 
practice in which the discourse is used. The three dimensions are: 
  1) Discourse practice at the macro level looks at the relationship 
between texts and the relationship between discourses in terms of 
interpretation. 
  2) Text at the micro aspect is the analysis of individual texts in 
terms of description. 
  3) Social practice is the analysis of the situation in which the 
discourse is embedded or set in terms of the interpretation of both of the 
above dimensions. 
 In this research, the discourse approach is used to analyze all three 
dimensions. The discourse practice analysis at the macro level looks at the 
national plans, in terms of the linkages and interactions between the state 
government and the grassroots civil institutions, in the three case studies. The 
discourse practice analysis at the micro level looks at the internal interactions 
within the grassroots civil institutions of the three case studies, which are 
social practices for text production. The power and social relations, which are 
the networks in the case studies, are examined by the social practice 
dimension of discourse analysis.   
Grounded theory approach 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) have described grounded theory as a research 
methodology, which is developed inductively from the parts of the data. It 
means the researcher will get the ‘theory’ or ‘model’ from the data processing 
systematically, without first making such steps to conduct the research. The 




research questions. In other words, the research does not have the tight frame 
of a hypothesis. It is a general theory and a method to explain the social 
phenomena that is then used to focus on understanding action from the 
perspective of people, networks and communities and so is relevent for the 
research carried out here. 
 The name for the method is telling. The theory that is developed comes 
from or is ‘grounded’ in the actions, accounts and behavior of the participants 
that are the focus of the study. The development of the research framework 
required grounded theoretical study of the two cases, as outlined in the next 
section. Therefore, the realities, or the situations that are the focus of the case 
studies, can be kept close to the theory used.  
 To define grounded theory and its role, Strauss and Corbin (1998) say 
that a theory is a set of relationships that proposes a suitable explanation of 
the phenomenon being studied; for example, the focus of this research’s 
analysis of the linkages within Thai civil society. They also say that theory is 
“systematically interrelated through statements about relationships, to form a 
theoretical framework that explains some relevant social, psychological, 
educational, or other phenomenon” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 22). This is 
how grounded theory is used in this research: to form an appropriate research 
framework to be used to consider the educational function of civil society, 
which is the key factor for democratization.  
 Charmaz (1994, p. 73) states that the function of a (grounded) theory is 
to make a phenomenon clear, to name particular concepts as a framework for 
the phenomena, to state the relationships between concepts, and to give a 
kind of framework for analysis. This is precisely how it has been used here.  
Research Methodology Synthesis 
Synthesis of the four research methodologies has been carried out according 
to a constructivist approach. According to Guba (1990, p. 27) in a 
constructivist approach: 
“Hermeneutic, dialectic individual constructions are elicited and refined 
hermeneutically, and compared and contrasted dialectically, with the aim of 
generating one (or a few) constructions on which there is substantial 





Constructions have been created for each group or institution of Thai 
civil society researched within the case studies. The constructions involved the 
use of all four of the research methodologies according to a similar sequence, 
as shown in Figure 4 below. 
 The participatory approach structured the research data collection. The 
participatory approach ensured that grassroots groups and institutions, both 
formal and informal, were involved, with the intention of enabling their 
empowerment to better participate in civil society. Both internal and external 
factors of each grassroots group were considered. The external actors allowed 









Figure 4 Research methodologies synthesis 
 
The use of grounded theory began with the construction of data from 
the detail of phenomena from the case studies. It was inductive, directed by 
the aims of the research and guided by the participatory approach.  
Discourse analysis then located the data socially from the phenomena 
the grounded theory brought to the fore. Discourse analysis defined the 
‘discourse community’ from which a consensus about the meaning of the 
phenomena was obtained. The ‘discourse communities’ are the informal and 
formal institutions of civil society in the case studies. During this analysis, the 
distinction yet inseparable relationship between ideas and social practice were 
noted. This ensured that the task of empowerment of grassroots groups to 
participate in civil society remained focussed upon.  
Hermeneutics then flexibly, in interdisciplinary ways, created 
narratives about the linkages within civil society in the case studies. The 




and the empowerment process of grassroots actors within the arena of civil 
society between the state and commercial activities, and how this involves 
multiple features and cultural structures.  
Finally, the four-step process for each case study, even though it was 
linear, was also cyclical and iterative to varying degrees. This was particularly 
so in relation to state institutions because they were to some extent common 
to the two cases. 
Research methods 
To complete the outline of the structure of the research design of the data 
collection, two distinct groups of informants were defined: those at the 
national level, and those at the regional level. The two levels have been defined 
as they reflect the structure of the arena of civil society. Collection of data 
from the two distinct groups enables linkages within the social space of civil 
society to be analyzed. The first level, set at the national level, contains 
government representatives and NGO representatives; the second level, set at 
the regional level, consists of local government representatives, local civil 
institution leaders and members of local civil institutions. However, the 
regional level groups of informants are different for each of the two cases, 
even though the types are similar for each case study. The national level 
groups of informants are, however, common to all the case studies. This 
means that for the national level data, the primary textual discourse analysis is 
the same, whereas the hermeneutics based on the context and social relations 
are different for each case. 
Participation observation techniques 
The researcher spent time living within the case study communities and 
working alongside and following activities of local communities for a sufficient 
period of time. Note-taking was the significant tool the researcher kept in 
mind for everyday fieldwork. 
 Formal, informal and in-depth interviewing techniques 
Informal interviews were mostly used for those members of local civil 
institutions. Meanwhile, formal interviews took place with the participants of 




process of sampling and selection of interviewees, the key informants of local 
civil institution leaders of case study communities were discovered during 
fieldwork, and in-depth interviews were set up with them.  
Group discussion 
This is the technique used for discussions and for gathering data from 
attending the local civil institution meetings (the questions are presented in 
the appendix). As a researcher, and also with the status of being a university 
lecturer, the researcher was given a role in the discussions. The researcher was 
trusted and respected, and expected to facilitate discussion due to the 
researcher having the status of an expert with an overview of the issues being 






The Case Study of Pak Mun Civil Group 
 
“The Pak Mun villagers never called themselves ‘Hero’; in fact, they have no 
choice. So, the state intrusion by building the large dam indicated that Pak 
Mun villagers were excluded from policy processes. They had been fighting 
for their rights for more than 14 years” (Vanida, 2008).1  
  
The Background to the Pak Mun Disputation 
The Pak Mun Dam was a large irrigation and hydroelectric project launched 
by the Thai Government of Prime Minister Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan in 
1989. At that time, Thailand was focussed on economic growth by the 
commercial sector, under the National Economic and Social Development 
Plan (NESDP).2 The NESDP contained the principles as the main guideline for 
the government’s implementation of economic growth. Consequently, there 
were many projects approved for the private sector, particularly infrastructure 
development projects. Moreover, there were also diverse projects and policies 
that the Thai Government generated as an industrial development plan which 
related also to the Power Development Plan (PDP) (Ratakidrungrod, 2002; 
Molle, Foran and Käkönen, 2012). 
Prime Minister Gen. Chatichai aimed for turning battlefields into trade 
after the Cold War and the resolution of the Indochina War, the Thai 
Government aimed to be the fifth Tiger of Asia (Suea Tua Ti Hah)3 (Hussey, 
1993; Dixon, 1999). As a result, the main goal of the 6th NESDP was to support 
economic development and the growth of industrial investment, and the 
Power Development Plan was developed to address the increased demand for 
electricity generation.    
1    Tantivitayapitak, V. (2008) and http://prachatai3.com/journal/2007/12/15051  
2   Previously, NESDP; the main national plan was the four years term of the economic plan.     
     The first plan ran from 1961 to 1966. It developed into The National Economic and     
      Social Development Plan by adding the social plan in the fourth term. However, Thailand is  
      now on the 11th NESDP. 
3   Suea Tua Ti Hah= เสือตวัท่ีห้า.  
      Note: The ‘four tiger economies of Asia’ are Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and    




                                                   
In fact, there were six large hydropower and irrigation dam4 projects 
during the 1980s, which were planned by the Thai Government of Prime 
Minister Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda. But there were only two projects 
constructed: the first was the Ratchaprapha Dam, the second was the Pak 
Mun Dam, while the other four plans were stopped by protesters due to 
concerns about forest destruction. Thus there were signals from people who 
were dissatisfied by state decision-making, in particular the power plants, 
which caused Thai people many drastic problems. Therefore the projects 
arguably accumulated even though groups of local people were not strongly 
against the state decision. However, the Prem government had to postpone 
the plan to build four dams entirely. 
Nevertheless, the Pak Mun Dam construction project still came forward 
for approval by the next government, which was the Gen. Chatichai cabinet. 
The approval of the Pak Mun project in 1989 sparked controversy about the 
implementation of authoritarian policies, as there was previously local 
opposition in the case of the Nam Choan Dam project. In other words, the Pak 
Mun Dam opponents had learnt to proactively seek to protect their livelihoods 
by the inspiration of the Nam Choan case. Moreover, the issue of the Pak Mun 
Dam constituted local group and helped to form the Thai national social 
movement, namely the Assembly of the Poor (AOP)5 a few years later.6  
The project of the Pak Mun Dam construction was developed by the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), which took the main 
responsibility to build and operate the dam by the electricity planning of the 
Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO).7 The Pak Mun Dam project was 
located just 5.5 kilometers upstream of the confluence of the Mun and 
Mekong rivers in Khong Jiem district, Ubon Ratchathani province, in north-
east Thailand. The dam’s capacity of generated electricity was to be 136 
megawatts. EGAT expected the capacity of the dam could meet the highest 
needs of the people, otherwise Thailand would need a 150-megawatt gas 
turbine power plant instead. Nevertheless, there was an argument that the 
4  Nam Choan, Haew Narok, Kaeng Krung, Kaeng Suea Ten, Rachaprapha and Pak Mun. 
5  Assembly of the Poor (AOP) = Samatcha Khon Jon = สมชัชาคนจน 
6  Vanida Tantivitayapitak (Mod) has known as a leader of Pak Mun villagers. She was also    
     one of former The Assembly of the Poor (AOP). 
7  The Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) used to be a department of the Thailand  




                                                   
planned demand for power consumption was overestimated (Green World, 
2000).  
Construction of the dam began in 1991 amidst controversy, involving 
multiple agents, significantly the Thai Government, who made the decision 
and the project was implemented by EGAT. In terms of this, local people in 
this area were affected by the dam. The dam project was finally completed in 
1994 after many confrontations with local people involved in many types of 
social movements. During the building of the dam, there were two main issues 
that drove local people against this project: one issue was the loss of assets 
and livelihoods due to inundation, and the other was the ecological effects. By 
the time the dam was eventually successfully built, these two contentious 
issues had been faced for the whole period (Ratakidrungrod, 2002). Moreover, 
the conflict between the Thai Government and the Mun River villagers 
continued afterwards and was still a protracted, chronic problem more than a 
decade afterwards. 
The historical trajectory of the Pak Mun Dam since the project had 
been approved and until it was completed resulted in the villagers’ way of life 
being thoroughly destroyed (Roberts, 1993; Pintobtang, 1998; Awakul and 
Ogunlana, 2002). However, the experience from this project brought about a 
grassroots awakening so they could participate in state decision-making 
(Foran and Manorom, 2009). Significantly, the grassroots responded to the 
Thai state according to the Thai constitution amendment in 1997.8 The crucial 
aims of this constitution were rights for Thai citizens, and to encourage 
participation of Thai citizens in politics. It detailed the rights of Thai citizens 
and the political participation procedures noticeably so that it is named the 
‘constitution of the Thai citizen’ (Klein, 1998; Bowornwathana and Farazmand, 
(2001); Bureekul and Thananithichot, (2002).  
Accordingly, the Mun River villagers reluctantly then turned to the 
issue of a claim for compensation, after the dam was finally completed. In the 
case of a claim for compensation, the first point was in terms of losing their 
inundated assets, and the second was the loss of fisheries income (Green 
World, 2000). By that time, the Thai Government was under Prime Minister 
8 “The Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540” written No. 16 was ended by the  




                                                   
Chuan Leekpai. The Mun River villagers and the anti-dam networks began to 
negotiate with the government for compensation during the period 1991–94 
(‘Assembly of the Poor’, n.d.).9 The compensation campaign covered three 
years lost income from fisheries during the period of the dam construction. 
Likewise, there was also a compensation campaign claim for the case of the 
permanent loss of fisheries livelihoods.  
 With regard to the two aspects of the claim, Gen. Chavalit 
Yongjaiyudh’s government agreed to them in 1997. Nonetheless, the claim was 
later denied by the Chuan Leekpai government in 1998. As a result, the 
grassroots Mun River villagers who suffered the fickle cabinet’s consent 
process developed their actions, together with networks, in order to appeal not 
only on behalf of the victims of the state policy decision-making but also as 
Thai citizens who have rights to seek the improvement of the government’s 
transparency and accountability (Po-ngam, 2006). 
Additionally, the villagers claimed against the government and state 
agency EGAT for more conditions by referring to citizens’ rights in order to 
take action for the improvement of government accountability, especially in 
terms of faulty decision-making. In this regard, the claim was extended to seek 
the opening of Pak Mun Dam’s sluice gates to allow fish migration between 
the Mun and Mekong rivers each year during the breeding season. This 
condition was sought as compensation in relation to faulty problem-solving in 
the design stages that should have been carried out to supply the villagers who 
were affected by the fishery problems associated with the dam.   
Based on the conclusions of the study report10 of the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD), the Pak Mun Dam was the one case study that 
showed lessons could be learned from the state planning and decision-making 
process. It concluded that not only was the dam harming fisheries in the Mun 
River, but also that the benefits and costs of the project had been inadequately 
assessed. It can be seen that the Pak Mun Dam was built according to faulty 
state decision-making processes, because the actual capacity of the dam was 
found to be less than half of what had been expected. EGAT has, however, 
responded by arguing that the WCD study report was misleading and led to 
9  See more http://www.oocities.org/munriver_2000/even.html 




                                                   
unfair conclusions, because the report used data that was not credible and also 
used the wrong key purpose to justify the dam’s capability (World 
Commission on Dams, 2000). 
In 2001, the government’s approval to open the Pak Mun Dam gates 
temporarily for one year was a brief victory for the Pak Mun villagers. They 
were also given a commitment by the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
that there would be a further study of the impact upon downstream fisheries. 
The study was planned to consider the possible solution of opening the dam’s 
sluice gates permanently (Assembly of the Poor, n.d.).  
Nevertheless, the government under Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra failed to comply with the commitment.11 The cabinet confirmed 
instead a decision to close the sluice gates for eight months a year. The 
government ignored the study of Ubon Ratchathani University that 
recommended the dam should have its sluice gates open year-round. 
Consequently, there was more dissatisfaction by the grassroots, and networks 
motivated them to claim their rights in many ways, including rising up in 
protest.  
The Pak Mun Dam is widely considered to be one of the most notorious 
problems between the state and grassroots (Foran, 2006). Both grassroots 
and their networks engaged in addressing the problems in many ways, mostly 
through groups of protesters. The villagers established a camp outside 
Government House in Bangkok for months. Most recently, in January 2011, a 
thousand villagers were mobilized in front of the city hall of the Ubol 
Ratchathani province to demand the permanent opening of the dam sluice 
gates and to reinforce their claim for compensation. 
Accordingly, the Pak Mun Dam history shows that civil society arose 
through grassroots responses to the Pak Mun Dam project. In an attempt to  
understanding of the emergence of civil society through the Pak Mun Dam, 
villagers’ responses and participation, moreover, in seeking out Pak Mun civil 
society, developing and strengthening in the networks of a wider Thai civil 
society, the research framework outlined in chapter 2 (pp. 32–41) is used to 
frame the analysis. 




                                                   
The Pak Mun Civil Group Establishment 
In this study, the grassroots in the Pak Mun Dam case refer to both local 
people who live around the Mun River and those who have had their lives 
affected by the dam project. As a result, the grassroots who are mentioned in 
this research include not only the members of Khong Jiem district, where the 
dam was constructed, but also the Pak Mun Dam villagers who no longer live 
there, as well as other local people who live around the dam area. The other 
local people defined here to be grassroots are those also affected by the Pak 
Mun Dam construction project. They are defined by effect rather than through 
geography. 
The original motivation of the grassroots to engage in collective action 
was found to be the factor that the grassroots attempted to protect their 
livelihoods (Ratakidrungrod, 2002). This collective action is what led to the 
emergence of civil society. The emergence of civil society out of the initial 
concern of the grassroots for their livelihoods occurred at the beginning of the 
project. The stages of the emergence of civil society at the beginning of the 
project are detailed below. 
The emergence of grassroots civil group: Mun River villagers 
name ‘Mae Mun Man Yean Village’ (Long-lasting Mun River 
Village)12 
The Pak Mun civil societies were created by grassroots villagers who joined to 
form their groups around the dam area. All of them initially gathered 
informally. They were initiated immediately after the village was told of the 
decision by the government to build the dam. The decision was announced to 
the villagers by local government officers through the local hierarchical leader 
called both ‘Kamnan’13 and ‘Phu Yai Baan’14, but who was also locally 
traditionally called ‘Poh Yai’ in the north-east of Thailand, or ‘E-Sarn’ area. 
The impact of being told and how it initiated the collective action is 
shown well by a 79-year-old villager on behalf of Poh Yai who said of the 
12  Mae Mun Man Yean = แม่มูลมัน่ยืน  This village developed to be the Assembly of the Poor   
      (Samatcha Khon Jon) after 1995. 
13  Kam Nan = กาํนนั 




                                                   
initial period immediately after being told, “It was the time we know that we 
needed to be strong and you would not be strong if you stood alone.”15 
After the villagers knew they would be told to move, they continued to 
discuss the situation at Poh Yai’s place every evening. There were both male 
and female, including children, and some who came from other villages 
around Mun River in order to share their ideas.   
At the beginning of the government’s announcement, Poh Yai’s place 
was the center of discussion most of the time, particularly after work.  Some of 
the villagers were of the same family, though some were not, but most knew 
each other. Most importantly, they were facing the same problem, which had 
just been announced by the government; that they had to move out of their 
own places. This was an unusual situation. Even though it was quite usual for 
villagers to informally meet, it was not so usual for them to informally gather 
to talk about a serious issue. The serious issue added another dimension to the 
informal gatherings. What was also unusual about the informal meetings was 
that there were many villagers who came to join the meetings without formal 
invitation, who had several different kinds of roles and relationships to each 
other, meaning that normally they would not meet each other informally.16 
The villagers had formed a small informal civil society, initiated by an 
external event. Even though the formation of the arrangement was very 
unusual due to the issue stimulated by the state, which therefore required a 
leader or chairperson17, it was nevertheless easy to join together because they 
were mostly either members of families, friends or neighbors. One villager 
who was in charge with leading grassroots said it felt normal, as if they were 
all like siblings.18 
In the case of the Pak Mun Dam, however, the villagers have more 
recently also developed more extensive networks, the best-known one being 
called ‘Mae Mun Man Yean Village’. It was at this stage that civil society, in its 
full form, emerged. By addressing the cause of the emergence of civil society, 
so as to critically explore the factors underlying the Pak Mun grassroots power, 
it has been found that there are significant interactions between the four 
15  Interview with Poh Yai Thongjan (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 28, 2008) 
16  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008) 
17  Interview with Poh Yai Pokoon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 28, 2008) 




                                                   
factors in the emergence of civil society already outlined: the social capital; the 
culture aspects; the issues of incentives (or stimuli); and the consequences of 
grievances. These are now analyzed in greater detail, including emphasizing 
also the significant interactions between them.   
Social capital in the Pak Mun community 
To clarify the emergence of civil society in this stage is to begin by analyzing 
the phenomena according to the fundamental factors of civil society 
associated with social capital, which are outlined by the research framework. 
These are the factors that motivated the grassroots before they became 
members of the more extensive and integrated Mae Mun Man Yean Village 
civil society. 
In terms of the research framework, at the later formation of Mae Mun 
Man Yean Village, members had built themselves up beyond the emergence 
stage, into the developing stage. The analysis of the developing stage is 
explained in the next step of the research framework, in the developing of the 
Pak Mun civil society section (p. 81). In this section the focus is still on the 
initial features of the process of the emergence of civil society that led to the 
emergence of the Mae Mun Man Yean Village.  
The Pak Mun Dam villagers lived according to Thai local style. This has 
a relationship to social capital in terms of the role of culture. According to an 
informal group discussion19, the Pak Mun Dam sufferers concluded that the 
initial key significant thing that encouraged villagers to fight for about two 
decades was that they could trust each other, because they thought people who 
lived around the Mun River all achieved benefits from the same river and so 
could be considered to be like the same family. This was a traditional cultural 
interpretation of a relationship to the natural environment. The trust among 
them was such that they all believed that all villagers had a spiritual 
attachment to (adored) their places, as they all considered that the Mun River 
granted them their lives. Undoubtedly it was true that they were all devoted to 
preserving the Mun River and to fighting for it. But more importantly for 
social capital, they all shared it with each other and so trusted and understood 




                                                   
each other. Accordingly, they were helpful to each other, which was useful in 
that it allowed the solving of problems.20 
With respect to trust among the grassroots, the leader of the Pak Mun 
villages told the researcher that he did not contrive himself to build trust. 
Trust was implicit and surprising, as many local people came from different 
villages; some of them had not known each other before, but they stayed 
together at his place in the first meeting, and similarly people previously 
unknown to each other also sometimes stayed afterwards at his place during 
the protest, such as during the 99-day protest in Bangkok in 1997. Almost all 
of the grassroots have become associated with Samatcha Khon Jon in such a 
way. He believed that: “It was due to the relationship beyond kinship or 
friendship through the common spirit of Mun River that they only took a few 
minutes after first meeting each other to trust each other.”21  
Besides the internal social capital factors revolving around the role of 
culture, there were also some external factors in terms of networks. These 
external factors are found, however, to have arisen due to the trust that 
spontaneously emerged, according to Tantivitayapitak (2008). Vanida played 
a recognized key role in the Pak Mun civil group; she started to join the Pak 
Mun villagers as a member of an NGO after the dam project had been under 
way for about a year. Initially she joined the grassroots covertly as a voluntary 
student from university, in order to try to hide her activity. She tried to hide 
that she worked for the NGO, due to the distrust of the NGO whileshe worked 
for the villagers in contrast. There was not the same spontaneous trust with 
outsiders, even members of NGOs claiming to want to help. Eventually Vanida 
resigned from her job at the NGO and simply helped villagers personally 
(Tantivitayapitak, 2008). At a certain point she became trusted, as if she was 
also a member of the village. 
Vanida was the best well-known activist in the protest against the 
project. She was involved with encouraging and to some extent coordinating 
Pak Mun villagers to act against the dam project. In her interview with a 
magazine, she summed up the situation as to why she felt moved to become an 
activist, because the Pak Mun villagers were facing unfair implementation of 
20 Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 




                                                   
infrastructural development by the state authorities, and the dam project had 
brought inestimable suffering to them. Moreover, she was also particularly 
motivated to do something, because when the villagers had rejected the plan 
the Thai Government had proposed, as they had the right as Thai citizens to 
do, the Thai Government still nevertheless illegitimately used the authority of 
the state to dominate the villagers, and ignored their voices (Suthisakorn, 
2007).  
The period during which this research was carried out, in 2008, was a 
few months after Vanida had passed away. Thus, during the fieldwork all of 
the informants continually kept mentioning her support for them. This was 
unusual as she was an outsider. But the Pak Mun villagers realized that 
Vanida had devoted herself to the local people as a member of a Pak Mun 
village. She had become a trusted member of the developing civil society. 
Poh Somkiat22 said that some NGOs had initially tried to lend a hand, 
but when they found the conflict might become too serious, and importantly 
that it might involve having to confront state agencies, they withdrew their 
support. So there had been no lasting support from anyone from outside, 
apart from Vanida. So, he (Poh Somkiat) and other villagers believed in 
Vanida’s intention, and she was given charge over some issues, even though 
she was an outsider. Importantly, it was because she did not belong to any 
NGO or state agency.23 
Vanida had an assistant (Nanthachote), who was also an outsider, and 
he also came to be trusted. Nanthachote continued Vanida’s work after she 
died. For this research, the researcher met Nanthachote personally during the 
fieldwork. According to Nanthachote’s role, he had supported the Pak Mun 
villagers, as he was Vanida’s assistant throughout the dam conflict, even 
though he only joined Vanida after the conflict between the villagers and state 
had already arisen. He said the villagers liked (and trusted) both Vanida and 
him because they both kept their roles as consultants only. They did not direct 
the villagers. They did not exert any power. According to Nanthachote, the Pak 
Mun villagers needed encouragement in terms of the way to respond to state 
power. They knew that being local people, and especially having no education, 





                                                   
was what had until then led them to simply accept all the government’s 
commands without any disputes. When the villagers realized this they saw the 
value of the help that Vanida and Nanthachote were offering. 
According to Nanthachote24, as they were disadvantaged by limited 
education, the villagers had been abused by state agencies, which had more 
power and were much more sophisticated. For example, some traders tried to 
buy land at very low prices. They used the propaganda against the villagers to 
take advantage of them. The naïve villagers were easily fooled by the traders, 
which led the villagers to even greater suffering. The villagers missed out on 
getting compensation from the government at the end of the project due to the 
lack of tenure.  
The pressure from the state created distrust between stakeholders, in 
this case the government, state agencies and villagers. In particular there was 
less trust between villagers and the people who were likely to get benefits from 
the situation, including NGOs. As a family of Pak Mun25 mentioned, there had 
been some people from NGOs who offered to help, but then tried to convince 
the villagers to move, without making the villagers consider what would 
happen after they moved, or helping the villagers get jobs after losing their 
livelihood through moving. It was this that showed the villagers that those 
people who offered help were in fact just working for the EGAT. 
So, Vanida and Nanthachote were believed to be helping them 
deliberately, because they both always gave good advice concerning the 
villagers’ benefits (livelihood) and cared for the villagers’ safety first. This was 
in contrast to others who appeared good at the beginning, but then turned to 
take the state agencies’ side, so as to get some benefit later from the situation 
themselves in some way.26 
However, Nanthachote27 insisted that the Pak Mun villagers came to be 
a civil society with no outsider intervention or instigation. Vanida and he 
supported the villagers only as consultants, particularly in relation to guiding 
those who lost homes and livelihoods and became depressed. These villagers 
24  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008) and Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani,    
      June, 2008).      
25  Informal interview at dinner with Sithong’s family (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June     
      2, 2008). 
26  Fieldwork (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 




                                                   
experienced state pressure on them as suffocating. It was a very dangerous 
situation, as when the villages got repressed in such a way they were liable to 
do illegal, unwise activities. Based on that kind of pressure on the villagers, as 
outsiders, Vanida and Nanthachote were needed to stand by the villagers to 
encourage them to be confident as Thai citizens who have rights the same as 
other Thai people do.  
Although the mutual support of the Pak Mun grassroots was based on 
trust, which derived from the local culture, in addition there were some other 
stimuli and factors that caused the villagers to react more critically to the dam 
project. A 67-year-old female villager of Pak Mun28 told the researcher that it 
was because they cared for each other. In fact, she and her family were about 
to move to Yasotorn province, but she decided to join with the others to 
protest about the project, being aware of the pressures put by the government 
on other villagers.    
Pak Mun community cultural aspects 
The culture aspects were found to be one of the key underpinning factors for 
the emergence of Pak Mun civil society. Generally, cultural aspects were 
considered to include all that indicates the beliefs and perspectives of the 
grassroots, as it shaped the various aspects of their lifestyle and actions. Thai 
local people basically live according to a traditional style, with their 
livelihoods based strongly on the antecedents proven reliable through 
generations, and shared social relations, in particular.    
Social relations were a very important factor of social capital in the 
village. Generally, in Ubon Ratchathani province is annual droughts. The local 
people there are generally known as ‘Khon-E-Sarn’; they live mainly by small-
scale farming and hunting, because the area is unsuitable for more extensive 
cultivation. Villagers who live near rivers, such as the Khong and Mun rivers, 
were fishermen. The exchanging of foods and some household stuff s was also 
available, rather than through formal trading. For instance, a villager said29, “I 
used to catch fish and I then gave some to others, and they gave me some rice 
28  Interview with Mae Charean (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 




                                                   
and vegetables.” This is an example of the long-established sustainable 
traditions of reciprocity in trade developed for the particular environment.  
The traditional knowledge gave what can now be seen to be broad-
mindedness in relation to economic options. The broad-mindedness of local 
people initiated and maintained a culture of reciprocity. This was normal 
among locals. It was passed on from generation to generation as it worked and 
was adapted to the local environment. The Pak Mun villager, Mae Yai Lah30, 
told the researcher that it was a very good way to live, as they shared with 
others different things they had, because no one had everything necessary for 
life. She said, “I had land for farming but I did not have a boat, therefore I 
could get fish and friends could have food from my farm.”  
The feature of sharing resources in Thai culture also unavoidably 
relates to social relations. According to Poh Yai Loon31, the Pak Mun villagers 
had mostly associated as either family or as friends for many generations, so 
their thoughts and minds tended to be similar. So where there were additional 
local groups involved in relation to the dam issues, the villagers were able to 
continue to successfully interact with the increased diversity of types of 
member relationships. It was this similarity of their way of thinking that 
enabled the grassroots to keep unity among members.  
Moreover, the culture of Pak Mun valued social ties, both among 
internal and external villages and/or groups that reflected the same norms 
and levels of trust. According to Narong32, a 37-year-old villager, he was very 
young at the time the project started. “I just followed my family to the meeting. 
I did not really understand much about the disadvantages of the dam but 
surely, I trusted what my family was doing.” There was a tradition of respect 
for seniority in Thai culture. 
Another aspect of this is that the extended trust and relationships that 
developed through the project have not subsided. Tawin33, for example, 
revealed to the researcher that even though he joined the group of Pak Mun at 
the beginning because of the project, he continues to participate now even 
30 Interview with Mae Lah (Pibulmongsaharn, Ubon Ratchathani, June 3, 2008). 
31  Interview with Poh Yai Loon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
32  Interview with Narong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 




                                                   
though there is no more issue with the dam. He said, “I could not leave my 
friends to fight alone, they are all like a family from the Mun River.”  
 The cultural aspect affects the type of networks formed as well. For 
instance, local people who lived along the Mun River believe that to drink 
water from the same river implied a vow of motherland protection.34 
Interestingly, the villagers35 believed that the nature of the Thai nation is a 
deep devotion to the Thai Nation as motherland. Therefore, they see national 
networks as an extension of local relationships. However, in terms of the 
external networks in the Pak Mun Dam case study, the grassroots also came to 
realize themselves, within their own extended traditional network, that there 
were other roles taken by the state. As the key activists like Vanida36 and 
Nanthachote37 said, they came to join with the Pak Mun villagers after the 
problem with the state had already been formulated by the grassroots. Thus, 
the Pak Mun cultural aspect will be shown to be the key factor underpinning 
the emergence of Mae Mun Man Yean village. This is a critical aspect of the 
research framework, emphasizing the centrality of culture. 
The incentive or stimuli issues for emergence  
The issue of incentive has proven to be a vital factor which stimulated Pak 
Mun villagers to develop their power. The incentive issues in this study 
occurred in terms of the Pak Mun villagers’ surroundings that impacted on the 
villagers’ living and perspectives. Accordingly, the incentive issues appeared to 
be negative rather than positive and motivated opposition to dam 
construction. 
The various aspects of the issue of incentive (stimuli) are best seen in 
terms of conflicts, all of which impacted strongly on the grassroots. 
Consequently, analysis of the issue of incentives has required the crucial 
complement of focussing on what drove the grassroots to react strongly to 
certain events. The incentives were in all cases strongly felt reactions to events 
that brought conflict. 
34  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
35  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008) 
36  Sarakadee Magazine (2007). 




                                                   
Stimulus issue: Livelihoods affected  
The grassroots knew early on that the project of a large dam would change 
their lives. But it was only sometime later, due to diverse and continual 
problems that they knew in a way that led them to a reaction. The 
development of this type of knowledge emerged from the various incentives to 
develop civil society. In this regard, the common conflict involved for all of the 
various reactions was concern for their lifestyle. Even though this was the 
most stimulating issue for the Pak Mun villagers from the beginning, it took 
some time before it led to specific reactions.  
Firstly, having to move out from their motherland was a very upsetting 
point for the villagers. The research shows that the government made careless 
decisions in the villagers’ lives, and this led to reactions. The village leader5138 
explained that, initially, they thought it was a confusing idea that the 
government wanted them to move and leave their homes. While the 
government told them the new dam project was needed to produce more 
power, this was worthless to them because the dam would lead to the loss of 
their careers and destroy their livelihoods. Later on, the confusion led to a 
strong reaction. A villager39 put it this way: “The command showed that the 
government overlooked the essence of local unity, which is the accumulated 
worth of this place. The dam was washing away all culture: of living, eating 
and helping each other in our places.” 
An elderly lady villager40 described it in this way: “The government 
broke our kitchen.” She said initially she had no idea that her husband could 
not work as a fisherman anymore, but later described the situation saying, 
“How could we live if the pickle fish jar41 would be empty?” Likewise, Mae 
Tan42 spoke out that because her family grew rice to support her family 
members, her kitchen would be empty.” 
Secondly, the livelihood dispute also extended to the issue of the well-
being of the local society. Having to deal with the difficulty of moving, the 
villagers found that the dam project not only terminated the culture of 
38  Interview with the official village leader (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
39  Interview with Poh Yai Pokoon (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
40  Interview with Mae Yai Pa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
41   Pickle fish jar = Hai-Pla-Ra (ไหปลาร้า). 




                                                   
supporting each other in such a small society like Pak Mun, but that the 
building of the dam also indirectly broke the social ties due to forced 
relocation.43 Mae Onsa44, a 73-year-old villager, recalled her broken family 
that had once been a big family, as usual in native Thai culture. She 
mentioned that: “My son used to be a fisherman and his wife worked at home 
as a housewife. The daughter-in-law also had a small farm connected to my 
place. Unfortunately, he moved his family to Bangkok after they got money 
from the government and worked as construction laborers there. It was the 
pressure at that time.”   
The government pushed some locals to leave their homes to take up 
hopeless challenges. Mae Onsa also recalled how she mentioned to her son: 
“It is impossible to take money and start a new life somewhere without fishing 
because we live from generation to generation from the fishing skill we got 
from our ancestors.”  
Ultimately, her son and family just struggled for many years as poor 
people in Bangkok. Mae Onsa said, “We were born here so we know what is 
suitable for us, which never let us become poor.” 
In the same way, Putha45 talked about the story of his family who went 
to try and find a job in many cities during the period the dam was built. 
Finally, about two years later, he found that he had to bring his wife and two 
sons back to his wife’s family in Surin province, while he continued to move 
back and forth for many years to seek jobs. He also said, “The state gave us no 
choice. They (the government) gave us some money with an insulting 
intention; it was just to kick us out of our homes.”  
The significance of the incentives can be analyzed in terms of well-
being. The well-being of the villagers was inseparable from the cultural 
aspects, which are based on interdependent characteristics of helping each 
other, rather than a self-interested commercial style. Mae Boonsong46 
described her and her friends’ view about how the government overlooked the 
villagers’ way of life within their culture in this way: “At that time we had no 
43  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
44  Interview with Mae Onsa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
45  Interview with Putha (Varinchamrab, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008). 
46  Interview with Mae Boonsong from Pibulmangsaharn (Khong jiem, Ubon Ratchathani,  




                                                   
idea that, when looking to live in a new place, we could not help or support 
each other. We were not ready to change our lifestyle so that we must get 
everything by spending money.”  
The outside view from Nanthachote47 summarizing the plight of the 
villagers was that the main aim of building the dam was national economic 
growth, overlooking completely the way it would damage the way of life of 
local people in Pak Mun village. Even though the government offered to pay 
for the loss of their careers, it could not compensate for what was the real loss 
of the villagers. In other words, due to the fact that the villagers were 
concerned more about living than wealth, money could not buy them better 
lives. This was the essential conflict that proved to be the source of incentives 
for the emergence of civil society. It was the driving issue that led to the rising 
up in reaction to what the government was doing. 
The stimulus issue: Equality and rights 
Generally, Thais in the E-Sarn are thought to be tractable and kind. 
They were strong and empathetic due to the familiarity of the struggle for 
livelihoods, which usually involved difficult work due to the geographical and 
natural environment’s challenges. Local people, such as the Pak Mun villagers, 
habitually focussed on their living and were usually outside of political 
processes.48 Furthermore, some villagers49 thought it was impossible to be 
advantaged by participation in politics, especially if their opponent was the 
state. According to Prapas (1998, p. 23–28), Thais had an apathetic 
participation in politics before 1973, and even then involvement only grew 
slightly in the years until 1982. The villagers mostly had no idea about ‘rights’ 
at that time, and even now many know they are just something they can claim 
as a Thai citizen. As a result, there was at the time questioning of why they 
must accept the dam, because it was not needed. A villager Boonsong50, from 
Pibulmangsaharn, shared her memory with the researcher. She was 62 at that 
time and thought she should be the one able to choose what was best for her 
47  Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008). 
48  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
49  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 




                                                   
life, not the government, and if she could not, that meant she had no ‘rights’.  
This was the way she understood ‘rights’. 
In addition, Boonsong recalled the days she vowed to stay because she 
and her ancestors were born here as Mun River’s daughters and sons. When 
the government had a formal information session, Boonsong was the one who 
raised her hand in order to ask the government officer in the meeting why 
villagers had to leave their motherland for such a dam which they never 
wanted. The answer was that the dam project would be built to support the 
national development plan, that many other Thais could use more electricity 
for their businesses, and that it was part of developing the country. 
Poh Somkiat51, the leader of Pak Mun, said many questions had been 
asked of state representatives. The answers had been the same over and over 
again. He mentioned that all the answers were about other Thais who ran 
businesses. He also mentioned that the business owners were significantly 
overemphasized by all the government agencies. He summed it up by saying, 
“No money, then no rights.”52 So they realized it meant the local villagers at 
Pak Mun, who worked as farmers and fishermen, were overlooked by the 
government due to their not earning money to support the country’s 
development.   
In this regard, the government representatives’ responses inevitably 
built up the Pak Mun villagers to realise that the government treated them 
unequally as Thai citizens. So the issue of discrimination arose recurrently. As 
Mae Nang53 told the researcher, “We were told by the local government officer 
that it was the duty of Thai citizens to be selfless, and it was for our country.” 
In other words, the villagers should move out for the dam construction in 
order to show their spirit to the Thai majority. 
The thought of being discriminated against led to questioning by Pak 
Mun villagers. “Was it because we were poor so we did not have rights the 
same as rich people?” a member of Mae Nang’s family mentioned.54 On this 
point, the villagers generally gave similar comments, emphasizing the one-
sided vision of the state decision. They also kept complaining in the informal 
51  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 
52  No money, and then no rights = ไม่มีเงินก็ไม่มีสิทธ์ิ 
53  Interview with Mae Nang and her family (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 




                                                   
group discussion about the government never being concerned about the 
income level of people in a small village. A villager55 blurted out, “We were 
just shoddy people,” and remarkably the others supported that they shared a 
similar feeling deep inside.  
The inequity and sense of being exploited was entrenched among the 
Pak Mun villages. It was the main issue of dissatisfaction expressed by the 
villagers to the researcher throughout the fieldwork. As a downhearted 
statement by a villager56 summarized it: “Poor people must be the same as 
disabled people in the state’s eyes.” However, as the question of the 
discrimination issue had arisen from the original naiveté by the villagers, with 
silence being the initial unsatisfactory response, Mae Pa57 said, “We knew that 
we could not do anything, so we just cried.” Therefore the inequity and rights 
issues were just the beginning of the painful incentive issues.     
The stimulus: The dishonesty of state agencies    
The response of disobedience by the villagers soon after they were informed 
about the dam project was expressed by rhetorical questions such as, ‘Why do 
we have to move?’ This was the main way the villagers presented their 
dissatisfaction to the state representatives. The state agencies were no longer 
listened to. The villagers had become stubborn.58 
On the one hand, looking from the other side, the Thai Government 
needed to clear the area for the project, which had already been committed to 
the EGAT. The issue of rights sprung up unexpectedly, with the villagers’ 
reaction seen as stubbornness. As a result, there was some clarification of the 
needs for the dam by the government, which was promoted by state 
representatives through local government organization processes.59  
An officer60 in Khong Jiem district revealed that it was a common duty 
of government officers to undertake the top hierarchy’s directions, and 
directions based on state authority. He said, “I was working as a local 
government officer at that time. The official memorandum came down here 
55  Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 
56  Informal interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
57  In-depth interview with Mae Pa (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).  
58  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
59  Fieldnotes from the meeting with central government officers (Bangkok, Feb. 10, 2008). 
60  Interview with the local government officer (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 20,        




                                                   
for moving the villagers in the dam project area, which surprisingly was very 
difficult work. Even though I felt the impropriety of the state directive, 
nevertheless I hoped that the villagers would move if they understood the 
benefits of the dam project.”  
On the other hand, the explanation of the benefits of the project would 
never be accepted, due to the dam not being needed by the villagers. In other 
words, it was a wrong decision that the state had made autocratically for the 
villagers. As a result, to promote the benefits of the project was viewed by the 
villagers as propaganda from the state and EGAT, who definitely earned 
benefits, not the villagers.61  In doing this, the villagers had even more 
meetings and sought supporters in order to refuse the government and agency 
propaganda. 
Recognizing that the provision of information was propaganda also let 
the villagers recognize the state’s dishonesty. A villager62 said, “The promoting 
of the benefits of the dam was about the benefits for others, not us, but they 
told us about good things. In fact, they tried to cover our eyes by lying about 
the good things of the dam, but hiding the costs of it.”  
 Thus, there were a lot of villagers who had surrendered reluctantly 
because government officers had convinced them that: “it was better to accept 
the compensation offer because it was impossible to go against state power, as 
otherwise you might get nothing”63. But as will be shown later, this decision 
only brought further dissatisfaction and conflict later on.  
Furthermore, the most important stimulus issue that continually drove 
the conflict was that there was an agreement document that showed a list of 
villagers’ names. The document was to support the dam project. Mae Lah64 
recalled the shock she felt the day she found that her name and signature was 
on the dam project consent. She spoke out furiously: “My ID card labeled with 
the signature was just to get free dental service from the district health center. 
Some of us let it go, and were quiet, even though we knew what a painful fraud 
was carried out by the state.”  
 
61  Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 
62  Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
63  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 




                                                   
The stimulus: The ecological impact 
In fact, when the local villager group had begun in the early stages, the issue of 
ecological impact had hardly arisen. But this essential point developed to 
become an obvious concern later on through academic encouragement. 
Ultimately, after the dam had been operating for some time, there was 
evidence of negative ecological impacts. The ecological issue was studied 
empirically by local fishing experts joining with the scientists in Ubon 
Ratchathani University.65  
To raise the issue of environment and ecological impacts by local 
villagers, however, became seen as meaningless, due to there being no greater 
acceptable or scholastic or scientific knowledge than local knowledge, which 
came from personal experience, even though local scholars had been 
developing the empirical experience for generations.66 Accordingly, the Thai 
state insisted that the dam project would be implemented even though the 
villagers and environmentalists had collected 12,000 signatures in opposition 
to the dam. An appeal sent to the Bangkok World Bank office, the main 
financial provider for the project, and also sent to the prime minister, was 
rejected because the request to reconsider the project due to the concern of 
ecological loss was considered to be too late as the dam project was due to 
start just one month later.67 
Surprisingly, at least to villagers, local traditional knowledge had not 
been able to force a reconsideration of the project, whereas the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) process had supported the EGAT’s project 
documents. As Poh Somkiat68 said, “The local fishermen knew the Mun River 
of their hearts, they recognized all the good and bad things about taking care 
of the river, but I wondered why the EIA, made by the well-educated, 
overlooked the point of fish migration.”  
Nonetheless, the villagers thought the government was blinded from 
viewing the argument of local fishermen about the ecological loss due to some 
65  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008) and A working paper prepared for the World   
       Commission on Dams (2000). 
66   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
67   “Assembly of the Poor” (n.d.). 




                                                   
fish species possibly being affected, which might ultimately impact on fishing 
yields.69 
An interesting point was that even though there was lessened concern 
about the fisheries by local people, they still kept fighting for solving the 
negative consequences by sharing and integrating their experiences with some 
university scholars, even after the dam had been completed and had 
commenced operation. The study provided very useful information in order to 
facilitate compensation processes for the villagers. 
There were, however, significant negative consequences to the fisheries. 
The dam gate destroyed both fish populations and fertile riverbanks; for 
instance, Poh Sorn70, a 73-year-old fisherman, mentioned: “Fishing before 
and after having the dam was definitely different. I could not now catch 
enough fish even for just my family, while I used to have more than enough to 
also sell at the local market.”  
A university scholar71  told the researcher that: “The local villagers 
knew about the river ecology. They had learnt naturally that the river’s 
ecosystem was an essential source of foods for supplying their families’ dietary 
needs, and tried to prevent the destruction, but the villagers suffered from the 
mistakes of others at the end.”  
The issue of ecological and environmental impact became evidence to 
confirm that the state decision was wrong. Moreover, these interesting issues 
called networks into play, along with more supporters. So there was even 
more attention from NGOs used on environmental and human rights, engaged 
as specialist advisors once the dam project was completed and operational. As 
a result, the evidence from their coordination provided vital encouragement 
for proving that the villagers had been affected by the dam, and that the state 
must take responsibility.   
On this point, Nanthachote72 said, “Almost all of the villagers had given 
up because they had no idea of how to tackle the state, actually EGAT, 
anymore. They accepted the commission unwillingly, and tried to live their 
69  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
70   Interview with Poh Sorn from Pibulmongsaharn (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8,   
       2008). 
71    Interview with a University scholar (Ubon Ratchathani, June 10, 2008). 




                                                   
lives among the surrounding changes. However, with help from each other, 
both inside and outside Pak Mun community, the villagers also claimed for 
what they had lost. Even though they had failed to stop the dam and suffered 
for many years, they had nevertheless learnt how to struggle rationally”. 
 The stimulus issues also encouraged the grassroots to join together in 
order to struggle in the unsatisfactory situation. Moreover, the Pak Mun 
villagers had faced more grievance factors, which made the group of villagers 
become the state’s foe. 
The emergence of Mae Mun Muan Yean village: Grievance factors 
The Pak Mun villagers’ grievances accumulated throughout the trajectory of 
the Pak Mun Dam contention. According to Mae Sompong73, “Even though 
the grievances began to come ever since the first day we were informed by 
state that they would build the dam, nobody thought the troubles the dam 
would bring would be endless.” Comments from the villagers74 from diverse 
places and times have in similar ways all expressed that the dam is the symbol 
of the state’s hurting of people. Moreover, not only people, but also the 
environment; for example, in the words of Poh Somkiat75, “The Pak Mun Dam 
is the most shameful monument to the destroying of natural life.” 
Based on the ongoing experiences of dissatisfaction by the villagers, it 
is possible to interpret the painful situation of this case as the cause of the 
eruption of grassroots power. The eruption occurred soon after the 
government approved the project, even though the villagers had appealed to 
the government to reconsider the negative impacts. The project started just a 
few months later, and as a result, there were confrontations during the 
preparation for the dam site, as the EGAT began to remove rocks and started 
blasting rapids for the water channel. 
About four hundred villagers, mostly women and elders, occupied the 
dam site in order to interrupt the EGAT blasting. It was the undertaking by 
EGAT to blast rapids that highlighted the weak voice of villagers. It showed 
how the state agencies tried to brush off the villagers. Mae Sompong76, who 
73  Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008). 
74  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
75  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 




                                                   
was a dam opponent, recalled: “In fact, I had opposed the dam since the 
beginning by joining a rally with friends in order to ask about the real benefits 
of the project, whereas the state agencies had some local politicians, 
businessmen and local government officers to support them. It could be seen 
that the dam brought about community fragmentation right from the 
beginning.” 
But Mae Sompong also told how it was even worse on the day the dam 
opponents and the dam supporters fought. She said, “The government and 
EGAT were deaf and blind so we really needed them to hear us. We put 
women and elders around the machines and held hands together. Some of us 
sat down on the rig explosion. Even though the women were safe, some of the 
guys got seriously injured. It seemed that we were at death’s door. It was very 
sad because the killers were sons of Mae Mun River. They wanted to kill their 
families.” 
Moreover, the community talisman [ศาลเพียงตา] was destroyed at that time. 
Poh Thongjan77, a 78-year-old villager, mentioned how the blasting of the 
rapids wiped out the vital symbol78 of the Mun River area. He spoke out 
miserably that: “They (the persons who brought about the dam) destroyed 
everything, not only land and river, but also ruined our spirit that we had 
preserved for hundreds of years; many of the things that were a symbol of 
peace and of our unity.” 
The impact of the blasting of the rapids immediately and dramatically 
increased the villagers’ expression of dissatisfaction. The conflict was also 
intensified by the group of dam supporters who conspired with the state 
representatives. Nanthachote79 commented that it was tragic that the power of 
the state was insufficient to avoid the conflict, which the villagers understood 
as the state creating the fight deliberately. Due to this, the villagers lost all 
trust in the government and state agencies. He said, “The government either 
was closing one eye or backing up some villagers who supported the dam, 
while threatening the dam opponents, which ended up in violence. The 
discrimination brought conflict and created a deep social rift. Consequently, 
77  Interview with Poh Thongjan (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 
78  It calls Saan Pieng Tah  (ศาลเพียงตา).  It is the symbol of God of water or river. 




                                                   
the villagers who opposed the dam would come to need to protect their 
spiritual beliefs because it meant the way to keep their dignity”. 
Poh Somkiat80 said that, a few days later, the villagers gave up the 
protest due to a suggestion from well-known activist, Vanida. The villagers 
agreed with Vanida in that it was better that they seek to find another way to 
respond, otherwise the villagers would only get into further trouble by being 
charged with illegal acts against EGAT. Poh Somkiat also said, “Arjarn Mod 
(Vanida) and Arjarn Pui (Nanthachote) seriously warned us that we would be 
caught in their (the government’s) trap if we got arrested. It would mean we 
would lose some of the village members, which would result in the loss of our 
community power. So in response to that, we decided we needed to be calm. 
Although we could not stop the building of the dam, we could, however, come 
back and be ready either to attempt to show the negative impact of the dam 
and the result it has had on our lives, or at least to show that we were not 
wrong.” 
To be looked down on by outsiders as only having traditional 
knowledge was also very hurtful to the villagers’ feelings. A villager who 
worked as a fisherman and who was a local expert in Pak Mun revealed what 
was on his mind. It was that the state gave them no choice but to surrender 
until after the dam construction had been completed, at which point some of 
the villagers would come back to revive the argument in order to claim what 
they had lost. In his words, “We started to contact some scholars and finally, 
only after much dialogue, were they willing to help us. We learnt painfully 
about the perspective of outsiders; that the local scholars were not accepted as 
holding valid scientific knowledge. That was the unbelievable heartbreaking 
reason for the attitude of the people who were looking down on us.”81 
In brief, the original grievances of the Pak Mun villagers accumulated 
due to state and general outside ignorance. A lack of social acceptance became 
a discrimination issue for the Pak Mun villagers, and the painful 
dissatisfaction they felt was also exploited to allow violent reactions against 
them.   
 
80  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 




                                                   
The Development of the Pak Mun Civil Group 
To look into how civil society develops, in this section the components of the 
development phase of the research framework (Figure 3) are used as a 
guideline. To pave the way to illustrating how civil society has developed, the 
establishment phase of civil society in the previous section has presented the 
emergent features of the Pak Mun civil society, using the model for the 
complex dynamic of civil society outlined in Figure 2. The local civil society 
organization identifies as a civil group in this study because it appears a civil 
group relies on the civil society concept. 
Bearing this in mind, this section points out how Pak Mun civil society 
has been developed since the Pak Mun villagers came together after the dam 
construction was completed. According to the research framework, the 
development of grassroots civil society depends on its strength, which is 
determined by the structural aspect, actors, interactions and social capital, all 
of which also eventually lead to the sustaining of civil society, presented in the 
following section.  
Pak Mun civil group strengthening: From home to street and back 
to the village 
The previous explanation of the Pak Mun civil society indicated that at the 
beginning, the Pak Mun villagers constituted their own civil group informally. 
The villagers aimed to seize their rights as Thai citizens in order to protect or 
participate in developing their resources. They had continually attempted to 
raise their concerns with the Pak Mun Dam as a case study of human rights 
and environmental degradation needing to be solved by a policy process at the 
national level. As a result, the villagers had developed their own informal civil 
society organization to support a type of local movement, and then joined with 
other local civil society groups in order to place pressure on the state.   
At that time, there were many diverse groups of local civil society who 
joined together as a social movement, namely the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) 
or Samatcha Khon Jon. As Missingham (2003) stated, the AOP was a civil 
organization best called a ‘lobby-style organization’. Moreover, the AOP was 




and media. For example, the activists Suriyan Tonhnueid82 and Lah83 worked 
on the case of the state’s unfair projects for the local villagers. The AOP 
connects to NGOs such as the Human Settlement Foundation.8485 The 
involvement of many agents and actors, however, made the AOP complicated 
and required it to develop a formal organization.  
The AOP contained the local movements shaped by the grassroots civil 
society that all had developed informally in different regions. What united 
them was that they were involved with similar problems, all various kinds of 
state policy intimidation. Pintobtang (1998, pp. 71–98)86, however, added that 
even though the AOP mainly constituted local movements from all around 
Thailand, it was the impacts of large dam projects that were the one vital issue 
to drive the local movements to join with the AOP. For instance, some of them 
were groups of local people already affected by large dam projects already 
completed, such as the Nam Phrom Dam, Rasi Salai Dam and Pak Mun Dam, 
and some local movements wanted to protect themselves from the threat of 
similar large dams. The latter groups wanted to stop large dam projects and so 
were arguing for terminating some projects that were about to be 
implemented, such as the Pong Khun Phet Dam and Kaeng Suea Ten Dam. As 
well as groups involved in these various ways with large dam projects, there 
were also some local civil movements concerned about land tenure rights. 
Most others were involved with other aspects of the issue of environmental 
degradation, if not large dam projects.  
The AOP brought the afflicted local people’s issues from the villages to 
Bangkok, the capital city, through mass agitation (Baker, 2000). It was the 
grassroots’ opportunity to put rural politics into national politics, and 
moreover, the grassroots were also able to act collectively in order to influence 
state decision-making (Missingham, 1999). Consequently, the AOP became 
the most powerful lobby organization through the use of mass mobilization 
strategy, aimed at seeking equity and fairness in managing resources for all 
people. The mobilization of the AOP also aimed to put pressure on the Thai 
82  Phone interview with Suriyan (June 18, 2012). 
83  Phone interview with Lah (July 1, 2012). 
84  Assembly of the Poor (n.d.). 
85  See more Pintobtang (1998). 
86  Pintobtang classifies the local movements in different type; issues of problem, regions  




                                                   
state on the issue of free rights, participation and self-determination 
(Missingham, 2003, p. 39), in particular throught the 99-day demonstration 
in Bangkok from February to May 1997.  
Vanida, the most important supporter of the AOP at Pak Mun declared 
that the groups of local movements in the AOP had mostly known each other 
before coming to join with the AOP. They had started as a small group in their 
own villages and had participated together in common activities every month. 
Bringing them together took time and involved many collective actions. Thus 
the local civil groups had not just immediately arisen.87  
Notwithstanding this, the grassroots civil society still needed to be 
improved at the local level to become successful in the AOP because the local 
movements unavoidably contained too many diverse issues. So the grassroots 
civil society needed to focus the expression of their demands in order to show 
a collective strong opposition to the state. Because of this, the aspect of Mae 
Mun villageMan Yean, the Pak Mun civil group had formed. Nanthachote88 
commented that that was one strategy of local movements to keep directing 
their aims both ways; one being to move on the street to rise up against the 
problems, and the other to encourage civil movements’ members in their 
home areas in order to emphasize the problems. It was a kind of mobilization 
of villages with long-term protest. 
Similarly, Suriyan89 explained that apart from placing groups of the 
AOP in front of the parliament, there were also local civil groups protesting all 
around Thailand; for example, the group of Pak Mun villagers who had 
protested in the Khong Jiem district, Ubon Ratchathani province on June 23, 
2000. Placing the civil groups’ protest all around Thailand was a way to show 
the power of grassroots who were well organized both at the national and local 
level and came to be called the ‘Dao Kra Jaeye’ [ดาวกระจาย] strategy.90 
Although the Pak Mun civil group played an important role in the AOP, 
due to the case of the Pak Mun Dam conflict being a widely controversial issue 
87  Interviewed by Ornsom (March, 2007). 
88  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
89  Phone interview with Suriyan (June 18, 2012). 




                                                   
that was watched by people throughout the country, the Pak Mun civil group 
ultimately resolved to seek to settle their problem back at the village. 
Pak Mun civil group structure 
The Pak Mun civil group was informal at the beginning. It also developed 
informally once the villagers resolved to shape it into the Mae Mun Man Yean 
village. 
Poh Somkiat91 revealed that the Mae Mun Man Yean village was a part 
of the AOP at the local level. Most of the villagers came back to the village 
from trying to struggle in different ways of life after the dam construction had 
been completed and after receiving the migration subsidy from the 
government, only to find it was inadequate for temporary survival. In this 
regard, the returning of the villagers in order to join together in the Mae Mun 
Man Yean village indicates the aim of its formation. The common will to 
return constituted the informal resolve of the Pak Mun civil group without 
formal organization. 
The villagers gradually came back to the village. Some villagers came 
back shortly after the dam was completed, and some came between the time 
that the AOP was set up in 1995 and the end of the AOP meetings in 1997 
because they had no more money and could not find jobs.92 They started with 
their relatives or friends near the dam area. One of them, Boonlian93, a 70-
year-old villager who went away from his home with his family, came back 
alone to live with his relatives, whereas his wife continued to live with his 
daughter in Bangkok. He helped his relatives in the fields and earned an 
income for subsistence living. He said, “I had moved to live in Mae Mun Man 
Yean village even though it was set up as the place for fighting the state. I 
thought our living in a small village (Mae Mun Man Yean) would remind the 
state what they did to us.” 
To clarify the phrase of the ‘set-up’ place, Poh Somkiat94 explained to 
the researcher that Mae Mun Man Yean was a model of the Pak Mun village, 
which was destroyed by the state. This village was full of valuable resources. 
91  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008). 
92  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
93  Interview with Boonlian (Khong JiemJiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008).  




                                                   
Mae Mun Man Yean was created near the dam area. The village was not on the 
official map and census, so the location of the village could be 
decommissioned by the state; the village was not a stable place to live. It was a 
response to the state’s decision by the local people. “We set it up to be our 
fighting symbol in order to fight against the state,” Poh Somkiat said. It was 
the Pak Mun civil group’s circumstances that indicate the significance of the 
site for the village.  
Before the Mae Mun Man Yean village was set up, coming together 
along with friends to share and exchange ideas was common for the Pak Mun 
civil group. Most of the meetings then took place at Poh Somkiat’s house. The 
villagers met in a small shed next to the main house, which was also Vanida’s 
shelter. It was called the centre of community knowledge (Soon Kwam Ru 
Chum Chon)95, where sometimes they had about a hundred villagers at a 
meeting. As Nanthachote96 said, “Although the place was small and 
unfurnished, it was not only used for learning local livelihoods during 
ordinary circumstances, but it was also the place for supporting the activities 
of the Pak Mun civil group through meetings and planning. Many important 
decisions on how to respond to the state were made there.” 
Villagers came to the centre of community knowledge while the 
researcher was doing fieldwork, and group discussions took place in the same 
way they used to. The villagers said there was no official meeting process. 
They could sit on stools under the tree near the group meeting. Some of them 
even sat on the floor without any mats. The participants were happy with the 
casual style, which made them confident to speak up about the impacts of the 
dam because it was like talking to friends. Importantly they and everybody 
were free to talk and give their ideas. Moreover, they told the researcher that 
they could also have meetings anywhere else, even beside their paddy fields.97 
The operating feature of the Pak Mun civil group in terms of the 
meeting surroundings seemed to be more casual consultation, due to how 
most villagers knew each other. Significantly, they were willing to share their 
experiences, which came from facing the same problems. However, they could 
95  Soon-Kwam-Ru-Chum-Chon = ศูนย◌์ความรู้ชุมชน 
96  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 




                                                   
discuss what they considered to be the most urgent problems in order to have 
them considered as first priority. Apart from that, there were the ongoing 
issues being managed by a group of local people, of how to respond to the 
state in the case of dam construction and how to alleviate the consequences.98 
Looking into the Pak Mun civil group processes, the villagers’ activities 
were based on common aspects of Thai culture. The villagers revealed that 
they just followed the meeting resolutions, so it would be easy to participate 
with the group, which was full of respect for people.99 In this regard, the 
involvement of some elder villagers and traditional heads of the village shows 
that the Pak Mun civil group has strong respect for the elder people whom 
they called ‘mother’ or ‘father’ as ‘Poh Yai, Mae Yai, Poh and Mae’.100 
As noted, the Pak Mun civil group was comprised mainly of elderly 
members rather than people of working age. Using the snowball technique in 
the research method of this study, there were only two interviewees out of 
twenty who were younger than forty. Moreover, the participants in the group 
discussions were in the same age range. Likewise, a young village 
coordinator101  said, “It was easy sometimes to work with the group of old 
people because they had much experience. There actually have never been any 
problems. Thus I preferred to work with more people in the same range of age.” 
In terms of this, the researcher thinks that there are two points: firstly, the 
Pak Mun civil group comprises few young villagers; and secondly, the 
difference in age is not a problem for the Pak Mun civil group organization. 102 
(See the section on the Pak Mun civil group members (pp. 96–99). 
The association and participation of the Pak Mun villagers reflected the 
structural aspect of civil organizations, shown through such activities as 
meetings and coordination. These activities comprised the functions and 
processes of civil organizational structure. But the structural aspect of the Pak 
Mun civil group was clearly informal. 
98   Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
99   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, Junde, 2008). 
100  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June, 2008). 
101  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 




                                                   
Innovation and self-organization of Pak Mun civil society 
This research has also considered the development of civil society structure by 
looking into how the grassroots had recently improved in their association. 
This is relevant because civil innovation is a part of the civil society structure, 
both as a function and process. This required study of how the grassroots 
organized their own civil society organization.  
The innovation of the Pak Mun civil group can be seen most clearly, 
once the Pak Mun villagers had joined with the AOP and other local civil 
groups, by how they adjusted the form of their group. The association with the 
AOP caused the altering of the form of the Pak Mun civil group in order to 
develop the escalation of networks needed. To put this in context, according to 
Vanida103, the AOP was a forum for the poor and powerless. The AOP fought 
for the rights of farmers and rural people. Likewise, the Mae Mun Man Yean 
village was a group of disaffected villagers. The makeshift village aimed to be a 
symbol against the dam and other development projects. However, both the 
AOP and Mae Mun Man Yean village were linked closely by the Pak Mun civil 
group’s role. Consequently, the evolution of the Pak Mun civil group was also 
reflected throughout by the events and activities of both. 
The role of networks can be seen in the way the AOP was a social 
mobilization umbrella. Being part of it connected the Pak Mun civil group 
with other civil groups, which inevitably resulted in more complicated 
functions and processes. Consequently, the Pak Mun civil group needed to 
improve itself by developing more formal arrangements. Regarding this, 
because the main action of the AOP was definitely as a social movement or 
protest group, the AOP performances operated mainly in terms of a ‘mob’ 
(Pintoptang, 1998). As Poh Somkiat104 said, “In fact, it was not a problem, we 
just needed to be well prepared, such as who can come with the group or who 
should stay at home, because of their importance for our safety and existence. 
Importantly, if we go out of our place, it costs us more money, so we have to 
plan and work to follow the plan carefully.” 
103   “Assembly of the Poor” (n.d.). 
          See more http://www.duangjan.com/board/index.php?topic=127.0 




                                                   
Additionally, Poh Somkiat explained further on this point that, if it is 
necessary, the Pak Mun civil group sometimes had to adjust the number of 
members joining the protest group, depending on the budget and how 
important the event was. Therefore he had come to believe that the number of 
Pak Mun villagers in the AOP movement should be very high. They had 
carried out good arrangements for joining with the AOP 99-day march in 1997. 
He also said, “We went to join with as many as we could because they were 
important events. Marching with the AOP aimed to show our grassroots 
power, so we had to prepare everything in advance, such as food, members 
and budget. Moreover, we arranged some members to take care of the rest at 
the village as well.”  
Mae Charoen105 revealed that she was one who stayed at the village 
while the other villagers went to join the AOP in Bangkok. She said, “It was 
disappointing to me at the beginning because I really wanted to join them as I 
used to. But it was the decision from the meeting that they left me and some 
others to look after the village. Thus I thought it was a part of our job opposing 
(the state) to do so. We were like a backup team, which needed to be ready to 
support the ones who were working. Ways of supporting them was doing some 
of the work in the place of my husband, and helping friends as much as we 
could. Most important was food preparation because we didn’t know how long 
it would be.” 
Even though the Pak Mun civil group’s activities, while the villagers 
had joined the AOP, were managed by AOP organizers, there were other 
activities that also needed to be well coordinated. Nanthachote106 commented 
that the group of Pak Mun villagers had tried to rearrange their 
responsibilities. He said, “Actually, we were concerned about how to work 
with a lot of other people, but the villagers ultimately worked together with 
other civil groups harmoniously. In my view, it was because all the local 
people had similar character, culture and livelihoods that they worked 
together well. In the new organization with greater diversity there were a lot of 
problems, particularly when the long-term movement in Bangkok ran out of 
food.” 
105   Interview with Mae Charoen (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 




                                                   
The Pak Mun villagers, as a part of the AOP, had adjusted themselves in 
some of their work to fit into the AOP organization; for example, Narong107, a 
27-year-old villager, said, “I had a few roles when I was in the village, but I 
was set to be the leader of security for the group once I joined the marching.” 
In the same way, he also said that the Pak Mun villagers were chosen to work 
in suitable roles, such as being chefs and doing performances on stage. Apart 
from that, they just stayed with the group to make the power of a crowd. 
Interestingly, Nanthachote108 confirmed that as activists with many 
years experience, the Pak Mun villagers were an inspiration in terms of rights 
issues for other locals, and he certainly believed that the villagers of the Pak 
Mun civil group had participated in the most performances of all the AOP 
groups recently. However, as well as the rights issue, there were also other key 
factors that facilitated the development of the civil organization of the group 
of Pak Mun villagers. 
In May 1997, the AOP changed their action strategy from one of using 
large local civil movement power to challenge the state confrontation, to 
placing groups of local villagers around the country.109  So the local civil 
groups went back to their own locales and organized their civil movements by 
themselves, even though they had been protesting with the AOP at a national 
level in Bangkok for many years. In this regard, the Pak Mun villagers simply 
continued their group as a grassroots civil group, namely the Mae Mun Man 
Yean village.110 
In terms of the self-organized aspect of the Pak Mun civil group, it was 
based mainly on informal structures, which were explained accordingly in the 
previous section. Poh Somkiat111 revealed during the group discussion that all 
actions and activities were the group’s decision and responsibility, even 
though the group had no official organizational authority. This meant the 
group ran traditionally, without clear leaders. On this point, Nanthachote112 
commented that the Pak Mun civil group emerged out of a necessity for 
fighting inequality due to the state’s unbalanced attention toward economic 
107  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
108  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
109  See p. 83 
110   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
111    Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 




                                                   
development. The villagers113 realized they were poor and had no power, 
which was the most important reason to encourage them to keep the group 
unofficial, with little or no running costs. The group worked independently, 
outside of business and political support. Thus the villagers recognized that 
the civil group had been organized naturally because of Vanida and 
Nanthachote, who were neither from business nor political sectors. This was 
the argument used to confirm the independent organizational aspect of the 
Pak Mun civil group. 
In March 1999, the Mae Mun Man Yean village came to be center stage 
of the afflicted grassroots’ confrontation with the state, with the AOP as the 
main supporter and Vanida the AOP’s essential supervisor. Poh Somkiat114 
said the village became a center for those who suffered due to state policies. 
“There were a lot people who came from all around the country. And there 
were some students from universities, both in Thailand and overseas, some of 
whom were reporters and journalists who were really interested in our village.” 
Poh Somkiat as a key village informant, and Nanthachote as an in-
charge activist supporter, told the researcher in the same way that the Mae 
Mun Man Yean village had been organized by the villagers themselves. 
According to the villagers visited by the researcher both during group 
discussion and individually, when asked about the differences between the 
time before and time after the emergence of the Mae Mun Man Yean village, 
almost all of them said there were some AOP staff who had taken over their 
operational work. This had occurred due to the Mae Mun Man Yean village 
having a greater diversity of members, so they just waited for a call to order 
some coordination of their own networks, or to join the activities (and 
protests). Thus, even though operational works had been taken over by AOP 
staff, they were still willing to participate with the village’s activities because 
the village still contained the respected elders from their original village.115 
The Mae Mun Man Yean village became a forum of rural and poor 
people. Apart from keeping up the activities within the village, based on their 
own culture and the identity of the Mun River villagers, the village members 
113  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
114  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, Muarch 8, 2008). 




                                                   
also frequently participated with others from outside over the next couple of 
years. For example, they joined in the rally on the 10th anniversary of the Pak 
Mun Dam, which was set up by the AOP and the Department of Quality 
Development, which was part of a state institution. Additionally, there were 
five more Mae Mun Man Yean villages that became established at other dams 
around the north-east a year later (Wanlipodom, 2000). Consequently, the 
local civil group at Pak Mun Dam accepted role of Mae Mun Man Yean village 
#1. By then, the six Mae Mun Man Yean as villages had all been participating 
together as civil movements for some time.116 
The Pak Mun villagers had been working on their compensation for the 
damage caused by the dam continually during the first term of Thaksin’s 
government (2001–06). In this regard, most of the Pak Mun civil group’s 
activities were aimed at the reconciliation processes, while the number of Mae 
Mun Man Yean villagers was decreasing gradually over about four years.117  
Poh Yai Thong118 revealed, “All meetings needed just a small group of Pak 
Mun representatives for them just to be listened to.” Happily, the claim to 
open the Pak Mun Dam sluice gates was successful at that time, and the 
processes of compensation seemed to be in progress, which resulted in a 
government resolution to open the dam sluice gates for a year. 
In December 2002, the Pak Mun civil group returned to demonstrate in 
Bangkok owing to the unreliable nature of the state decision. The state 
reneged on the previous agreement to open the dam sluice gates. 
Consequently, the Pak Mun civil group used the mobilization of their 
members in a confrontation strategy to once again place pressure on the Thai 
state. Thus there were countless protests and mediation meetings all 
throughout Thaksin’s government from the year 2001 until September 19, 
2006. 119 
The Pak Mun civil demonstrations were supported significantly by the 
AOP as the issue of Pak Mun Dam had become a more complicated problem 
that pushed the villagers to need more networks to help them struggle to fight 
the state and EGAT. However, the Pak Mun civil group kept the heads of the 
116 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
117  Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
118  Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 




                                                   
villagers group, namely Poh Krua Yai [พอครัวใหญ]120, to work in the group’s 
participation processes, whereas staff from the AOP took responsibility for the 
group’s functions, such as the running of the administrative processes. The 
AOP staff were known as ‘Kan Nam’ [แกนนํา].121  
The main research fieldwork of this study was collected during 
September 2007 to June 2008, when Thailand was facing a chaotic political 
situation. This was shortly after the Thaksin Shinawatra government was 
dissolved by a military coup, and there were also constitutional amendments a 
year later.122  Nevertheless, the Phalang Prachachon party123 , which belonged 
to former Prime Minister Thaksin, won the Thai election in early 2008, and 
Mr. Samak Soontornvej became the prime minister. 
Meanwhile the researcher visited the Pak Mun case study site and had 
been asked to visit the Mae Mun Man Yean village by villagers (at an earlier 
time). I was, however, told that the Mae Mun Man Yean village had become a 
restricted area due to it having encountered persecution from the opposition. 
A similar story was told to me about how the village was burned twice, even 
though there was no mention of it in any media. Thus the interviews of some 
of the villagers’ opponents were the only possible information available to 
support the way of understanding of the Pak Mun civil group’s confrontation 
at that time.124 
It was noted in the research fieldwork from the period that not only had 
the Pak Mun civil group become less active due to the political contention 
during Mr. Samak Sundaravej’s regime, as he was accused of being a puppet 
for former Prime Minister Thaksin, but also most activities on behalf of the 
AOP had become related more to the political conflict at the national level 
rather than focussing on the claims for compensation. Some of the villagers125 
said, “We are proud of the way they had fought, even though the Mae Mun 
120  Poh-Krua-Yai = พ่อครัวใหญ่,  is defined as the elder villagers who represented the leader of   
         the villagers, who were in charge of political activites (Baker, 2000). See more   
         Pintobtang (1998). 
121  “Kan Nam” is defined as the leaders of the group carring out mobilization.  They can be    
         staff of NGOs, activists and villagers. See more Pintobtang (1998). 
122  Thailand has the new constitution on August 24, 2007 and it was the 18th Thai  
         constitution. 
123   Phalang Prachachon party = พรรคพลงัประชาชน 
124   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008). 
125   Group interview with the Pak Mun villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29,  




                                                   
Man Yean was gone.” One of them spoke out: “To fight for making demands of 
our rights to the state must be better than fighting for money, and Thai people 
would know that we had been protesting for rights not just to get money.”  
On the one hand, Poh Thongcharoen126, who was the Pak Mun civil 
group leader, as well as the group representative most of that time, said the 
Pak Mun villagers showed significant grassroots power for many decades. 
Even though the state and EGAT had engaged in some problem solving, the 
Pak Mun civil group, as poor people, would not give up their aim to change the 
state attitudes about poor people. On the other hand, there were some 
villagers who gave up on joining in the activities due to them thinking the 
group’s actions for a few years were aimed more to support politics. Also, if 
they received their compensation successfully, that meant the Pak Mun 
mission was complete. Nevertheless, the group of Pak Mun villagers still 
contained a lot of local people who were affected by the dam so they were 
willing to join the group’s activities regardless.127  
As well as the continuing effect of the dam, the reason given by some 
villagers who persisted in joining the group’s activities for as long as possible 
was due to them being unable to leave their friends to fight while they just 
watched. A 37-year-old villager128 said, “I knew a little bit about why the 
village leaders kept doing this in spite of how we got some money from the 
government and that we could not do anything with the dam, such as destroy 
it, but I was willing to join with our friends. I think we were like the same 
family so I won’t let them fight alone.”  
Talking to the villagers who decided to leave the civil group, most of 
them said they might return to join the civil group’s activities if they needed to, 
such as, if they got some new problems. Moreover, if the group leaders they 
had known asked for their help and gave them important and necessary 
reasons, they would do so. There were a few women, however, who said they 
would not, as they were too old now and they must instead take care of their 
descendants. Interestingly, there were also similar comments from a few 
villagers in terms of joining the activities lately, which seemed distant from 
126  Interview with Poh Thongcharoen (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
127  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 




                                                   
their needs. They thought that what they did was now overly commanded by 
the AOP.129 
In the year 2011, the researcher visited the case study site in Khong 
Jiem district. The Knowledge Community Centre was now empty. The key 
informants such as Poh Somkiat had gone elsewhere. A villager130 who used to 
join the research group discussion in 2008 said the centre of community 
knowledge had moved to a new location and almost all of them now worked as 
much as possible. He said, “There has been too strong a conflict between the 
political protests for many years lately. The red shirts, the group, which 
supports Thaksin, had very strong power. My friends and I don’t want to be 
taking that kind of side, even though we were not in the group of the red shirts. 
We had stopped joining the Pak Mun protest due to it having become mixed 
up with political protest, red and yellow shirts, which would never solve our 
problems.”  
The research fieldwork in 2011 took place through informal surveys, 
mostly through personally visiting informants from earlier periods. The 
researcher tried to go to the same places and meet the same participants as 
much as possible. Unfortunately, only six of more than thirty previous 
participants were available. Some of them were just out of work, but some had 
definitely moved out. It was possible, however, to talk to Poh Somkiat who 
was in the group of Pak Mun civil leaders, and also other leaders, on the phone 
several times. This provided details of the ongoing story of problems the Pak 
Mun civil group had been facing. The Pak Mun civil group had learned the 
complex political processes by putting their claims into the mediation process 
again and again, which took a long time with each new government.131 
Interestingly, the Pak Mun civil group was once again a major local civil 
group of a new mass movement organization called ‘PMove’ (Kabuankan 
Prachachon Phua Songkom Pentham).132 In fact, PMove emerged from the 
reorganization mainly of the AOP and almost all the local civil groups, which 
previously joined in movements. Lah133, an activist who replaced Vanida and 
129 Fieldnotes on the group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 29, 2008). 
130  Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 25, 2011). 
131  Fieldnotes (Bangkok and Ubon Ratchathani, June-July, 2011).  
132  Kabuankan Prachachon Phua Songkom Pentham = ขบวนการประชาชนเพ่ือสงัคมเป็นธรรม 




                                                   
Nanthachote, said she has been in charge as a consultant of PMove and that 
PMove had modified the organizational aspects in order to specifically match 
the local groups’ problems.   
In terms of the Pak Mun civil group, the issue of their claims focussed 
on their concern over the permanent loss of the local villagers’ careers in 
terms of fisheries, in particular, even though the villagers who had been 
affected, in the case of migration due to the dam, had been paid. AOP staff134 
said, “The villagers, however, still have a problem with long-term jobs due to 
the effect of the environmental degradation wrought by the dam, so that the 
villagers still need the state and the EGAT to open the dam’s gate. As a result, 
the suffering villagers came together to join PMove’s activities.” 
To sum up for the Pak Mun civil group, the formation of informal 
grassroots civil society of Pak Mun villagers had shown the initial innovation 
to establish civil society. The group grew strongly within the aspects of 
informal form and function initially. Moreover, the ongoing participation in 
movements by the Pak Mun civil group as an essential part of the AOP led to 
the adoption of AOP ideas, strategies and organizational structures, which was 
also one of villagers’ strategies to help the group organize itself effectively. 
And the Pak Mun group has also shown the same adaptive ability by joining 
PMove in the last few years. 
Actors in Pak Mun civil society 
This section studies the factor of actors in the emergence of the civil group. 
Specifically this section focusses on how the Pak Mun civil group had 
persuaded Thai people to pay attention to marginalized people’s rights along 
with other problems; to see different ways of understanding things, both 
positively and negatively, in the case of Pak Mun civil group in particular. The 
key question is how local villagers can present their limited power in order to 
fight against the state power, even though they have been classified as local, 
poor or marginalized people. 
In this regard, the actors in the Pak Mun civil group are understood to 
include whoever incited the group, such as local politicians, activists and 
NGOs. Nonetheless, people have different views about actors in civil society 




                                                   
organization and mobilized groups. And the NGOs would also mostly be in 
people’s thoughts as the key actor, who operated civil organization and 
mobilization. For instance, a minister of the Yingluck government135 said, 
“Thailand was not led by NGOs so development policies should be decided by 
the Thai state (government) not a group of protesters who were led by NGOs.” 
Similarly, the government officers136 who worked at a ministry 
focussing on people’s participation and development, told the researcher that 
the Pak Mun civil group came about due to the provocation of a few radical 
villagers. While some data refers to a local politician who was in charge in the 
formulation of the Pak Mun civil group at the beginning, it is interesting that 
this politician ultimately became an opponent of the Pak Mun group. 
So given the strongly held views of outsiders, the actors can be assumed 
to be one of the important key factors of the Pak Mun civil group. The key 
actors in the case of Pak Mun civil society related to the research framework 
are comprised of five main groups: community members, leaders, activists, 
supporters and advisors. The following sections address each group. 
Community members: The villagers as Pak Mun civil group members 
This study defined the community members of Pak Mun civil society to be not 
only the villagers who lived around the dam area, but to also encompass those 
people widely affected by the dam project. Moreover, due to the Pak Mun Dam 
case taking a long time and it being a complicated problem, the ways the 
villagers participated in the group’s activities varied. So the different ways 
they participated, together with the frequency of their participation, were 
considered when clarifying the status of a civil group member. These were 
considered to be more significant than geographical residence. 
Pon, a 50-year-old villager137 said he had joined the Pak Mun group 
when the dam project was first announced by the government and had 
decided to move his family to live in Khon Khan; however, he confirmed that 
he rarely missed the group’s activities. Pon said, “I think I am a part of the Pak 
135  Mr. Prodprasop on behalf of Puea Thai Party mentioned on the seminar of Thai political  
         party policy declaration for Thailand development reform.  The seminar was set by   
         Matichon Press for the declaration of visions, goals, implementing of the three main  
         political parties before the Thai national election on July 2011. (Fieldnotes, June 22,  
         2011). 
136   Interview with the regional government officers. (Nonthaburi, March 2, 2008). 




                                                   
Mun group because of the spirit of my homeland. I will always belong to it (the 
group) even though I may not be here.” In the same way, once any of the Pak 
Mun civil members went to join other similar local civil group activities, they 
were known as the villagers who came from the Pak Mun civil group (Pak Mun 
villager).138 
To participate with the group’s activities indicated membership. There 
were many ways and many times in which to participate, so the Pak Mun civil 
group membership has been defined as being indicated by either the type of 
the villager’s participation, or their regular participation. For example, the 
villagers participated in traditional activities such as Tam Bun139, which is a 
kind of regular participation. However, participation can be at the meeting of 
the civil group members for organizing the civil group. Also the civil group 
could be indicated by the collective activities aimed at claiming compensation 
from the state; for instance, the members of Pak Mun civil group joining 
marches or protests.140 
Undeniably, group membership was clarified by the collective aspects 
of the villagers’ participation. However, there were also Pak Mun villagers who 
were identified as members even though they didn’t actually participate in the 
activities of the group themselves. Mae Janta, a 72-year-old villager141, said 
she never joins any activities of the Pak Mun group. However, she insisted 
strongly that she was a member of the group. She also said, “I must stay at 
home to take care of everything in place of my husband and my son because 
they leave for the meetings, sometimes for months, to protest. I do not 
understand about how to be a member of the group. Someone used to ask me 
if I had participated in the group, if I was a member. I said I did not 
participate but I think my family already worked in the group instead of me so 
I should belong to the Pak Mun group too.” 
With respect to the membership of the Pak Mun civil group, the 
researcher linked this point to the group discussion, where the participants 
discussed what would terminate their membership. The villagers were 
138  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
         Note: Pak Mun villager = Chow Baan Pak Mun (ชาวบา้นปากมูล) 
139  Tam Bun = ทาํบญุ, 
140  Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 




                                                   
disinterested in the fundamental membership due to their belief that the 
group took place by the common spirit of the motherland, so the membership 
originated essentially from the villagers who were native to the Mun River 
area. 
In the group discussion, a villager142 said, “If I said I am a Chow-Baan 
Pak Mun (Pak Mun villager), it means I am definitely a member of the Pak 
Mun group who tried to protect my homeland.” Moreover, the participants in 
the group commented in the same way that the sense of the Pak Mun 
membership is common among the community’s members. It seemed the Pak 
Mun villagers were connected by the spirit of the motherland, which is usually 
presented by calling Poh (Father), Mae (Mother), Phi (older brother or sister) 
and Nong (younger brother or sister). In particular it is to help each other 
through that kind of feeling that leads them to think and act in the same way. 
As a result, if any one of the family were a member, then the whole family 
would be members as well.143 
To follow through inferences from the group discussion of the sense of 
the motherland being the important element underneath their membership, 
villagers argued that some of the villagers took the Pak Mun opposition side, 
even though they were also Pak Mun residents, due to their spirit of homeland 
having been destroyed and replaced by a new attitude based strongly on 
modernized development. The villagers helped each other to recall a case as 
an example, and then one144 said, “We believe that all of the Pak Mun villagers 
naturally loved the motherland. Those who took the opposition side just 
changed after they got benefits such as money or a political position. One 
politician who supported the opponents used to be one of the Pak Mun 
group’s former leaders.”  
Some aspects of Pak Mun membership are too personalized or too 
individual to be fully clarified beyond being related to broader factors, such as 
personal reasons, and other sectors in the emergence of the Pak Mun civil 
group in the previous section.145   
142  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
143  Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
144  Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 12, 2008). 




                                                   
All the Pak Mun members, both the villagers in the group discussion 
and the villagers who were interviewed by the researcher in the fieldwork, all 
had a similar idea of their membership developing due to the relationships 
among them, which resulted in particular in their respect and trust. According 
to a 21-year-old villager146, he grew up during the ‘oppose the dam battle’ 
period. He said, “I think I must join the group. It was definitely my 
responsibility to respect Poh (Dad), Mae (Mom), Puh and Tah (grandfathers) 
and Yah and Yay (grandmothers).” Similarly, a 24-year-old female147 who 
holds a bachelor degree in law talked to the researcher when she visited her 
hometown, saying that she is a Pak Mun member but had no chance to join 
the group. “I took care of my mom and uncle when they went to the protest in 
Bangkok. I tried to support them as much as I could because I believed they all 
knew their rights,” she said. 
To sum up, the consciousness of homeland was one vital fundamental 
factor for Pak Mun membership, even though their membership possibly 
ended for other reasons later on. Hence, the birthplace mindset of the 
members contributed to the sense in common, which resulted in group 
interactions and social capital of respect and trust.  
The Pak Mun civil group leaders 
In accordance with the informal structure of the Pak Mun civil group, the 
main leaders of the group were also traditional and unofficial. More generally, 
however, the leadership of the Pak Mun civil group consisted of all the local 
leaders, in other words, all the leaders of the communities affected by the dam 
construction problems. These included official as well as traditional leaders.   
The type of Pak Mun civil group leader can in principle be either civic, 
official or traditional. For instance, the official village leader called Pu Yai 
Baan, and the district official leader called Kam Nan, were both official local 
community leaders. At the same time the main leaders were traditional 
leaders. These were mostly the elderly people who had been respected and 
146   Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 12, 2008). 




                                                   
called Poh Yai (grandfather), Mae Yai (grandmother), Poh (father) and Mae 
(mother).148 
In the later stage of development of the Pak Mun civil group, all the Pak 
Mun civil group leaders were traditional leaders, but many of them had 
previously been some kind of official leader. Poh Somkiat149 said, “I used to be 
a head of the village (Pu Yai Baan) many years ago. For Poh Yai150 Thong, he 
was in this position many times.” The point is that the official head of the 
village is not really important for the Pak Mun civil group, which is an 
unofficial organization. The official head of the village held the formal position 
of leader in the line of state administration and was accepted as the link 
between the formal and informal as well as the link between people and 
state.151 
Poh Somkiat also said, “During the period of the Pak Mun conflict until 
now, the official leaders of the village were all young and definitely need the 
support of the traditional leaders like me. Some of them even came to ask for 
help from us. [He sat with other traditional leaders.] The important thing 
about being the leader here depends on whether or not the villagers will listen 
and respect.” 
Poh Yai Thong152 said that being a leader of the Pak Mun civil group 
requires respect from the members due to the group’s activities being very 
difficult. Moreover, to join the group did not require any payment and actually 
usually cost the members money and time. He said, “They (villagers) knew 
exactly that they would get no money from the leader like me and as long as 
the problem is still going on I might endlessly ask them to join the group and 
assist. In contrast to this, they knew they could have got money from some 
opponent leaders if they had followed them.”   
With regard to this, it was a consistent view expressed by the villagers 
that their respect for the leader came from their mind, and that no one could 
pay for that.153 
148  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
149  Interview with Poh Somkid (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
150   Note: the way to show the respect to other.  Due to  Poh Somkiat is younger than Poh Yai Thong. 
151    Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
152   Informal interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 18, 2008). 




                                                   
The leadership of the civil group reflected the degree of respect 
required in order to tie people together to also show mass power beyond the 
village, but there were also some differences. For example, Mae Sompong154 , 
who joined PMove as a representative of the leader of the group of the poor 
from E-Sarn, used to be a local leader of the Pak Mun civil group at an early 
stage.  She said that at first she was a Pak Mun leader, and the respect came 
from family and friends. She said this enabled her to develop to become a 
leader in a bigger group, which then had different relationships beyond family 
and friends, and also from other poor people in other groups.   
Mae Sompong also told the researcher, “It was very difficult to tie 
different people into one. There is the pressure from poverty produced by the 
state’s development policy that made villagers seek out anyone who could 
claim to lead them out of and help them to recover from the suffering of 
poverty.”  Importantly, she also commented that the leader is one who must 
sincerely help them, which then enhances respect for the leader. “It was due to 
how I have been fighting for the problem of the Pak Mun Dam effects for 
decades, with my own grievances experienced deep inside my heart,” she said. 
In terms of this, the leadership of the Pak Mun civil group came from the 
villagers, who shared sufferings together with others. The relationships during 
the suffering times made the villagers trust and respect each other. However, 
to respect the seniority system is significant for the leadership.155 
In terms of the focus on the informal aspect of leader, it was notable 
that the role of Pak Mun leaders worked smoothly through using the 
community’s ties. Poh Yai Thong, Poh Somkiat and Mae Sompong156 
commented in the same way that they led the Pak Mun group in ways which 
had dealt with a large number of villagers with the many different kinds of 
relationships, such as relatives and friends, but also employer and employee. 
With regard to this point, they all referred in particular to the necessary 
communication style. The Pak Mun civil group leaders had to communicate to 
other group members in a common way, by ensuring that contact was made to 
part of their family and/or friends. This was reflected in comments from the 
154   Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008). 
155   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 




                                                   
civil group’s members. According to the interviews with villagers157, the 
comments clearly indicated that they preferred to get directions from the 
unofficial leaders, based on how they felt a similarity in lifestyle and opinions, 
and that the goals and path being shared was the reason that encouraged them 
to follow the leaders’ directions. 
On the other hand, the Pak Mun villagers revealed that they felt 
uncomfortable dealing with the official leaders. The reasons are that, firstly, 
the official leaders had their official position authorized by the state. 
Consequently, all the official leaders definitely worked on behalf of the state or 
government, which usually represented some kind of power.  
Secondly, some of the leaders were not local residents, especially the 
local government officers, who needed to work with local leaders. Almost all of 
them had just graduated, or had otherwise moved from another area for their 
benefit within the bureaucratic promotion system. This was the main reason 
that made the villagers think there was a gap between official leaders and their 
own traditional leaders.   
Thirdly, the villagers gave an interesting reason that the political 
system manipulated some official leaders, because most had changed from 
initially being opponents to the dam, and had won the election by being voted 
in by the villagers themselves. In other words, they came to be leaders by the 
villagers’ encouragement and support, even though they then changed later, 
not long after being appointed as their leader.158   
Interestingly, there were also two similar comments from different 
sources. A comment from one villager159 was, “The official leaders keenly tried 
to be in the middle (sit on the fence), they just pretended not to take a side.” 
Another comment was made by an official leader160, who said, “It was a 
common thing to work honestly under the rules of the administration, even 
though I thought it was unfair for the villagers sometimes. However, I could 
not break the rules of my career.” These two comments confirmed that the 
aspect of the formal position of the leader was a main barrier to decreasing the 
gap between government officers and the villagers. It was this barrier and gap 
157   Interview with the villagers (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
158   Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
159   Informal interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 21, 2008). 




                                                   
which resulted in the villagers working with their own civil group instead to 
provide their leadership. 
Based on these reasons, the data illustrated that there was a gap 
between official leaders and villagers due to the villagers strongly thinking 
that the official leaders’ positions were on the opposite side to them. In 
particular, the official village leaders (Phu Yai Baan) from voting use this 
position to be involved more in politics.161 As the state representatives, their 
status tended to be on the side of state power. For the leaders who were 
appointed by the bureaucratic system, they were separated from the villagers’ 
attitude and thoughts that this kind of leader was a government officer who 
just came and went and who would not have anything in common, spiritually, 
with local people. Moreover, the villagers thought that the formal processes 
for setting up the leaders involved too much politics, which manipulated 
leaders to change and take the state’s side.162 
A comment from Nanthachote163, who worked closely with the Pak 
Mun civil group, provided further perspective. He revealed that the villages 
have real leadership ability. Although they have less education, they 
nevertheless had learnt how to use their capabilities to lead the group. He 
referred to Vanida, who also realized this through recognizing the advantage 
of the poor local group in terms of their ability to admire and respect each 
other without any conditions or business motives. Additionally, Nanthachote 
explained how Vanida had tried to build up the Pak Mun group leaders in 
many ways by encouraging this ability. 
Nanthachote and Poh Somkidt164 both told the researcher how Vanida 
had tied the villagers together. In other words, they had united Pak Mun civil 
group members based on the network of relationships in the Pak Mun 
community, such as families and neighbors. The existing relationships among 
the villagers were the essential thing needed by the Pak Mun leaders. 
Consequently, Vanida had encouraged older villagers around the Pak Mun 
community to become involved. Later, these became leaders who would build 
on and tie together their own network with each other. For example, Poh 
161   Group interview with the former leaders (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008). 
162   Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
163   Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 




                                                   
Somkiat said, “Poh Yai Thong had led the group of his family, friends and 
friends’ family. They were mostly local fishermen. For Poh Yai Pokoon, he led 
his group of farmers and Mae Prasit, she led her housewives group.” 
Nanthachote also gave a supportive comment that: “There were more 
leadersthan we mentioned. They, however, usually met at Poh Somkiat’s place 
as the centre of the Pak Mun group. Above all, Vanida had tried to build the 
Pak Mun group by putting the attention significantly on the group of leaders 
rather than on an individual leader. So we would see that the Pak Mun group 
had many leaders, and everyone was important to the group.” 
In summary, the data based on fieldwork indicates that, to be the 
leader of the Pak Mun civil group, it was nesessary to show that the leaders 
were dedicated to the group’s benefits rather than personal interests. And it is 
because of this aspect of the Pak Mun group that the organization ran without 
an official leader. It was due to the focus on the strategy of relying on villagers’ 
bonding that helped the villagers’ relationships develop smoothly beyond their 
own traditional ties, which were based on the respect for the seniority system. 
The group’s relationships were also assisted by pressure in the group being 
minimized through not being shaped by a leader whom the villagers thought 
of as boss. Also, the leaders’ ability appeared during the time that the villagers 
were sharing suffering. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group had been 
associated for many decades with the same leaders, who had been involving 
the civil group actions and activities since the beginning. 
The activists in the Pak Mun civil group 
To follow the research framework, the next step is to consider activists, as one 
of the key actor types who play an important role in the case study. However, 
according to the research framework, the activist in this study needs to be 
identified in a very specific way. Here, they are defined as the actors who 
worked independently for the grassroots civil group, rather than working as 
representatives of, or on behalf of, any external organization. 
The research framework has separated activists who work on behalf of 
the organizations from the activists who work independently as individuals. 
This is because working with personal aims rather than with organizational 




processes. As a result, in this study, the activists from organizations are, for 
clarity, defined as external actors within group interactions, and so are 
covered in the next section rather than in this section.  
The two main and essential activists in the Pak Mun civil group have 
already been introduced. The first, with the widest reputation, is Miss Vanida 
Tantivitayapitak (Mod). The second is Mr. Nanthachote Chairat (Pui). Both of 
them are presented as providing dedicated support to the Pak Mun villagers 
throughout the whole trajectory of the Pak Mun contention. Nonetheless, 
there were also some other activists who played lesser but related roles in the 
case study who are also referred to in this section.  
Owing to the Pak Mun Dam being a well-known, controversial case, 
Vanida was also inevitably very well known. Significantly, Vanida (or Mod) is 
recognized as the most important activist and the most powerful actor to 
strongly influence the largest mobilization of villagers in Thai history 
(Downing, 2010). Some of Vanida’s roles have already been presented in the 
previous section, as she was involved with the group of Pak Mun villagers 
right from the beginning. So analysis of her roles is pertinent to various 
aspects of the research framework in this study. 
In an interview Vanida165 said that she was initially an activist who 
worked in a development foundation, which was a type of NGO.166 Her work 
related to several groups of local people who were affected by state policies, 
particularly in relation to the inequity for local people in terms of tenure rights 
and access to resources.167  While doing so, she worked around the north- 
eastern area where there also emerged many conflicts around environmental 
issues, such as the case of Kaeng Suea Ten Dam and Pak Mun Dam. After a 
few years of work to help several groups of poor people, Vanida decided to 
leave her work as an activist within the NGO, in order to independently join 
the group of Pak Mun villagers.  
165   Interview by Suthisakorn (2007).  
166   In 2003, there were more than 100 NGOs in North-Eastern area (Chaipan, 2003, p.54).   
         Thus, there were any number of NGOs in that period. 
167   Thai NGOs (North-Eastern) have been classified according to the issue of the affliction of  
          local people, to be one of 8 different groups of network; 1) Alternative Agriculture  
          Network, 2) Resources and Environmental Network, 3) Child Network, 4) Aids Network,  
          5) Women Network, 6) Human Rights Network, 7) Community Business Network, and  




                                                   
Poh Somkid168 told the researcher that the villagers called Vanida 
‘Arjarn169 Mod’ even though she begged to be called only by her name because 
she was just a normal woman who did not need to be highly respected.  
He said, “We could say she was the heroine for the Pak Mun villagers 
because at that troubled time, there were some activists from the NGOs who 
seemed to be very keen to help the Pak Mun villagers seek a way to solve the 
problems brought by the dam, but because the issue seemed very difficult and 
hopeless, some of them changed their minds and gave up helping us, except 
Arjarn Mod.”  
He also said, “Arjarn Mod was willing to help us dedicatedly. She left 
her job. She lived with us like with a family, had local foods in rural society 
even though she had choices to work for a high salary. She could have been 
comfortable and had a good life in a city like Bangkok instead of living 
awkwardly with local villagers in the countryside.”  
Importantly, one of the strongest impressions of the Pak Mun villagers 
of Vanida was that she denied being a leader and did not hold any positions. 
In this regard, Nanthachote170 told the researcher, “Vanida tried to be 
more of a supporter rather than the leader of the villagers. It was in order to 
encourage the villagers to learn the way of finding their solutions, by sharing 
their concerns and enabling them to make their decisions by themselves. 
Otherwise the villagers would possibly have become dominated by others.” 
Moreover, Nanthachote’s memorial speech states: “Phi Mod171  did not 
fight for the poor, but she let the poor fight for themselves.” This initiative of 
Vanida clearly resulted in the Pak Mun civil group self-organizing with no 
specific leader. She supported the villagers to build leadership by learning 
about empowerment in the group. Significantly, Nanthachote172  revealed to 
the researcher that Vanida told him that to fight together with the villagers 
was the most worthwhile thing; that it was what made the villagers respect her, 
and that hopefully it would be useful social capital in order to be able to 
continue to support the group of Pak Mun villagers to reach their goals. Social 
168  Informal interview with Poh Somkiat, (Ubon Ratchathani, 13 May 2008). 
169  Arjarn is a Thai word means teacher or master who full of knowledge. The persons call  
         Arjarn are respected.    
170  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008).  
171  Pe is the word in Thai langue means older sister or older brother.   




                                                   
capital emerged among the Pak Mun villagers in relation to Vanida in terms of 
social relationship, especially trust, which tied the villagers (and activists 
Vanida and Nanthachote) together.  
Nanthachote, as an activist himself, strongly agreed with Vanida’s idea 
of how to ensure that their support strengthened the group of Pak Mun 
villagers. He also disclosed that Vanida reminded him to keep on working as 
supporting actor rather than becoming a leader. It was consistent with what 
was written in her cremation book and in interviews. Vanida had a vision of 
letting the villagers learn to understand their rights in relation to participation 
in state decision-making which affected them. 
According to Poh Yai Thong173, “The reasons why the Pak Mun villagers 
respected Vanida and Nanthachote so much was because they worked on the 
difficult jobs that involved dangerous situations. Mod was charged by the 
police because of helping us fight the state. The state said she was a criminal 
and that what she was doing was illegal and bad for the country.” 
Poh Yai Thong174 explained that he, however, knew nothing about 
Vanida’s ever breaking any laws, thus he and the Pak Mun villagers believed 
that it was out of great kindness and selflessness that Vanida did what she did 
for the villagers: while she aimed to fix the problems brought by the dam, to 
help the poor to have a better life, the state just ignored them. He said, “Mod 
had a very good heart and always cared for the villagers, and her heart might 
be stronger than some men because she was never afraid of any dangers when 
helping us.” He also related, however, that Vanida said, “I am not a self- 
sacrifing person, I just want to do what I can.” Nevertheless, she also revealed 
to him that the consequence of helping the poor contributed to her becoming 
an enemy of the state, which affected her life in many ways, so that: “I even 
was threatened to be killed. The opponents tried many things in order to 
discredit me, such as spreading rumors of having affairs with others’ 
husbands.” Nanthachote also mentioned that Vanida was harassed by 
malicious spreading of rumors of affairs, and that “the scariest harassment 
was that her life was threatened, but she never worried about it”.  
173  Informal group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 




                                                   
The case of a malicious rumor about an affair in order to try to blemish 
Vanida’s reputation revealed two features of the villagers’ beliefs about Vanida. 
Firstly, they believed that Vanida was ‘clean’ because she did not have secret 
personal benefits. This was regarded as special because the dam project had 
contributed such beneficial outcomes to some stakeholders that it had made 
conflicts among the stakeholders inevitable. So whereas it would have been 
easy and probably successful to raise the issue of self-interest in relation to 
many stakeholders, it could not destroy Vanida’s reputation. Because Vanida 
was so completely ‘clean’ in relation to having any individual interest, all that 
could be tried to discredit her was an attempt to create a malicious rumor 
about an affair, which was also unsuccessful.  
Poh Somkiat175 stated, “There were some activists who had previously 
come to join the Pak Mun group. They tried to help us for just a few months, 
and then were gone. One of them quit their activist role, and another one tried 
to convince the villagers to give up the protest. We knew later that they got a 
lot of money from the opponents.” 
Secondly, the villagers trusted Vanida’s dedication to the interests of 
the poor, due to how Vanida had devotedly supported the Pak Mun villagers in 
order to fight the encroaching state, in particular in relation to the inequity of 
resource access. Poh Yai Thong176 said, “She recently stayed side by side with 
us, even when it was very dangerous, involving serious conflict with state 
power. She was very brave.” 
According to Poh Yai Thong, the fact that Vanida had stayed side by 
side with the Pak Mun villagers was the masterpiece of Vanida’s work, for the 
villagers felt they faced discrimination by the state. He said, “We are poor and 
have no knowledge. Nobody cared about us, especially the government, which 
was always only concerned for its own interests, whereas a small girl like Mod 
cared deeply about our suffering even though she only got bad things for 
helping us.”  
Vanida faced the difficulties together with the Pak Mun villagers. One 
important case that made the villagers appreciate and adore Vanida is how she 
was prosecuted by EGAT in the case of being the leader for the invasion and 
175  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 




                                                   
occupation of the EGAT area. Poh Somkiat177 said, “She was not wrong 
because we (villagers) just wanted to talk to anyone from EGAT who could 
make a decision. Mod was a Pak Mun villager’s representative, which was 
most appropriate because she was educated, unlike us. Unfortunately for her, 
she was seen as having become a leader of a group of poor, demanding 
protesters and got prosecuted for it.” 
The role of Vanida to support the Pak Mun civil group was, however, 
just as an advisor. She denied all positions as a leader when working with the 
group. Thus she was a person who is recognized as strongly developing the 
Pak Mun civil group. Through conversations with villagers, the researcher was 
also told in the same way that her (Vanida’s) role was mostly as the ‘thinker’ 
for the civil group, particularly in terms of thinking up the villagers’ reactions 
to the state. Nonetheless, the researcher noted that as playing the role of 
thinker, Vanida became the informal leader of the Pak Mun civil group.178 
 For instance, Mae Prasit179 said, “Once I felt I could die to protect my 
homeland, but Mod told me and other villagers who tried to block the 
bombing for the dam construction that we have to keep our lives safe 
otherwise they (the opponents) could do anything with our homeland. It 
would be easy for them if we died.” 
An old lady villager180 also said, “She gave us more alternatives in order 
to fight the state. Actually, we had no ideas other than to just die for our 
rights.” For Poh Thong,181 Vanida was like a promoter of him and other Pak 
Mun leaders. He said, “It was because I am just a villager who had no 
education that made it a bit difficult for me to deal with the state. Mod always 
reminded me to be confident, as I am a Thai citizen. I have rights. Moreover, 
she said that what I have done would be a collective benefit.” 
Similarly, Mae Sompong182, who presents herself as one of the leaders 
of the Pak Mun civil group, talked about how Vanida encouraged the women 
in the village to participate in the civil group. Generally, Thai females view 
their duties as domestic work rather than joining in the same work as the 
177  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
178  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
179  Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 
180 Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 
181  Group interview (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 




                                                   
males. She said, “In the past, culturally, Thai women must stay at home. Mod 
was the first person to bring us into the public arena.” 
Even though Vanida was not the Pak Mun civil group leader, she was, 
however, an advisor and promoter for the Pak Mun group. Her role was 
difficult due to it being unclear in its details, as well as depending on the 
villagers’ perspective. However, Vanida’s comments on it provided insights. 
She said she accepted that she was best as an advisor even though she could 
have been a leader of the Pak Mun civil group.183  
Nanthachote184 explained, “Phi Mod was the best teacher for me, and 
definitely my model, even though I don’t think I could work half as well as her. 
She told me that the one thing I always keep in my mind, especially when I 
feel like giving up working with the villagers, is that she has no theory for 
doing her work, but only that she puts her heart and soul to think as if she 
were one of the Pak Mun villagers. So we must work on at it like we are facing 
it by ourselves: we must fix it because it is our own problem.” 
Vanida told Nanthachote that to continue to work on helping the Pak 
Mun villagers was not only her thought about people’s rights, but that it was 
also to support the poor, that they were the same as her family. 
Nanthachote185 told the researcher that Vanida always gave very good support 
by positive speeches. He said, “I worked as Phi Mod’s assistant at the 
beginning. Her work style was deeply kind due to it coming from her very 
good mind and heart. I think this is the reason that made the villagers trust 
her so very much.” However, he commented repeatedly that trust between 
Vanida and the villagers had also been supported by her sharing of their 
suffering, together with them. He said, “It is very hard to know that people 
have a really good mind. Some people pretend to be good just because they 
want something. So the Pak Mun villagers took a long time to trust people 
outside their group. But Phi Mod and I had shared good and bad things with 
them, and they watched us every day in how we lived together with them. So 
we are not activists or NGOs and not outsiders, but we are part of Pak Mun 
villagers’ family.” 
183  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
184  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 




                                                   
Nanthachote186 confirmed that trust is the most important factor for 
contributing strongly to the existing group. He explained, “Owing to the Pak 
Mun civil group aiming to be against dam construction, this group shared a 
strong goal in order to fight with the state. Consequently, it was interesting 
how the group could be so strong and keep fighting for so many years. For me, 
I believe strongly that it was because we trusted each other that we have the 
same goal that made the group work so well, and contributed to the group’s 
strengthening.” 
Nevertheless, Nanthachote also added other critical comments related 
to the point of the Pak Mun group’s strengthening; he said187, “It was very 
hard to unite the group. More people are more difficult to tie together. 
Especially, they experienced sensitively the pressure put on them by the 
opponent’s power. The attempt to somehow build the group of villagers’ 
harmony would be the toughest job for me.”  
He explained his opinion that the activists’ role includes sometimes 
that of bringing reconciliation if the group had some disagreements. 
Consequently, an aptitude for psychology is needed in order to facilitate the 
work.   
Significantly, contributing to the civil group’s bonding was the most 
essential role in order to strengthen the civil group, while also getting more 
members and extending networks. It was a strategy of Vanida that she had 
planned for the Pak Mun group. She said,188 “The number of civil group 
members who joined the protest reflects the quality of the civil group.” Based 
on this, the quality of the Pak Mun civil group can be clarified. It can be 
defined in terms of the strength of the unity of the group, which showed in 
terms of number of members participating in the group activities.  
In this regard, the researcher considers that the roles of the activist are 
particularly important in terms of developing the quality of the civil group. 
This is due to the trust formed between the group of villagers and the activists 
on account of the roles of the activists, based on their relationships. Moreover, 
the activists played their roles by using the trust of the villagers to tie the 
186 Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
187 Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008). 




                                                   
group members together in order to strengthen both the group members’ 
participation and to attempt to get wider networks. Consequently, at Pak Mun 
the activists are possibly the key factor driving other factors, due to how they 
keep the civil group together. However, the role of trust between the activists 
and the villagers is the focus of the social capital section of this study. 
As explained previously, an insightful aspect of Vanida’s roles in terms 
of being an activist in Pak Mun civil society was as a close advisor without 
knowingly using any methodologies. Even more interesting was that for other 
activists to successfully work in this civil group in the later years, they had to 
keep following and practicing techniques based on Vanida’s role. After Vanida 
passed away in December 2007, Nanthachote stepped in to replace her in the 
Pak Mun group, by following her approach. Unfortunately, Nanthachote died 
in a car accident in April 2008, during the period that data was being collected 
for this project. It was after this that the Pak Mun civil group started to get 
bogged down. 
The researcher also collected data from April to July 2008 and found 
that the Pak Mun civil group had a vacant period in terms of activists 
supporting them. The work on interviews and focus groups with the Pak Mun 
villagers revealed that there were no new activists who approached or 
associated with the Pak Mun civil group.189  A villager190 said, “We are so sad 
but we must keep on fighting for our land even though we lost Arjarn Mod and 
Arjarn Pui. This is a hard time to move on and we hope we can get more good 
people (activists) to come to help us willingly.”  
In addition, Poh Somkid191 gave his opinion about losing the important 
key supporters, which had a vital effect on the group of Pak Mun villagers. 
“Honestly, I think no one can replace them (Vanida and Nanthachote) really. 
It is because they shared happiness and suffering with us for their whole lives. 
However, it is better to have someone to help us sincerely like them. At the 
moment, Lah is the only one in my head,”, Poh Somkiat said. 
Somparn Keundee (Lah) was Vanida and Nanthachote’s colleague. She 
was in the car accident with Nanthachote, which resulted in her being in 
189 Fieldnotes (March–May, 2008). 
190 Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 




                                                   
hospital for about a year. During this period of the research fieldwork, the Pak 
Mun civil group had less activity than during the previous years. It was 
because the Pak Mun civil group was faced with uncertain status by suddenly 
not having the encouragement of an activist. The Pak Mun village civil group 
leaders, such as Poh Yai Thong and Poh Somkid, mostly stayed home to help 
their families work in order to earn some income. Fortunately, Poh Somkid 
with his strong leadership took the researcher to visit some of the Pak Mun 
civil group leaders and members who lived around Ubon Ratchathani during 
this period. While the female leader Mae Sompong went to Bangkok to live 
with her daughter to take care of the grandchildren, other Pak Mun female 
leaders and members stayed home to be housewives. In this regard, the 
researcher noted that the Pak Mun villagers had some good experience for 
leading the group after Vanida and Nanthachote. However, they seemed to 
have less confidence to continue their activities without the activists’ 
support.192 
Unfortunately it was while the Pak Mun villagers experienced the lack 
of the activists’ support that the Thai Government of Prime Minister Samak 
Sundaravej announced the relaunching of the mega project on Khong-Chee-
Mun International Water Management. In this regard, the Pak Mun civil 
group was actually under pressure through the threat of getting more state 
policy invasion from the megaproject, just as they had less support. Poh 
Somkid193 said, “Even though Arjarn Mod and Arjarn Pui had taught us about 
standing on our own legs, and we have managed our group by ourselves so far, 
the Pak Mun villagers nevertheless undeniably feel weak due to losing them.” 
At this point of the narrative, showing the trajectory of the Pak Mun 
civil group, presenting the Pak Mun civil group as an issue of environmental 
conservation has to be replaced by a situation of political chaos. This was due 
to the beginning of the mobilization of the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) that came to be known as the ‘yellow shirts’. The Pak Mun civil group 
began to overlook the local aims of their group in order to join the civil 
mobilization at a national level.194  
192  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
193  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 




                                                   
In relation to the change that occurred, Poh Somkid195 told the 
researcher: “We thought what the Thai Government was trying to do through 
the Khong-Chee-Mun project reflects the general ignorance of them to the 
poor, and that they had not learnt from the Pak Mun case. And so the protest 
was needed in order to make it right for our children in the next generation.” 
Importantly, he told the researcher that it was nevertheless an idea he 
had learned from Vanida and Nanthachote: “Mod and Pui guided the poor and 
uneducated people, like Pak Mun villagers, to learn many things from the past, 
but the Thai state does not appear to have anyone to guide them to do the 
right thing; governments never learn any lesson, especially from their 
mistakes.” 
In the following years (2009), the Pak Mun civil group struggled to 
protect the dam opening time agreement they had won through their fight. 
The EGAT always appeared to look for the opportunity to close the dam sluice 
gates in order to generate the power. Once, in 2009, Poh Somkid, on behalf of 
the Pak Mun civil group as its leader, was interviewed, and he accepted that 
the group of villagers was weak. However, Poh Somkait 196 told the researcher 
in the following year that the civil group still had a few activities, though with 
fewer members. He said, “It has been a few years without Mod and Pui, and 
there have only been some new activists who came to visit us perfunctorily. So 
we have had to fight in the best ways we can, mostly by trying to tell the truth 
about the dam effects through the media, and through outsiders like you (the 
researcher).” 
The researcher also asked him about Lah, who he had previously said 
could perhaps replace Vanida and Nanthachote. Poh Somkait answered, “Lah 
has tried to work for us but the Pak Mun civil group has changed lately and 
our goals have changed. It was in order to reach the new goals that the ways to 
support the group have also had to become different. Now, Lah and some of 
the villagers are connected to some of the NGOs, and I think now there is 
nothing wrong with the support she can provide through an NGO.” 
 Once the AOP (Assembly of the Poor) had changed its name to PMove 
(2011), the Pak Mun civil group joined national protests on behalf of a group 
195  Phone interview with Poh Somkid (October 10, 2008). 




                                                   
of poor villagers from Pak Mun, led by Lah. Accordingly, Lah’s role is better 
presented in terms of the framework in the section addressing interactions. 
In summary, the role of activists who supported the Pak Mun civil 
group was very significant. For the Pak Mun civil group, Vanida and 
Nanthachote played an essential role as activists, which was to establish and 
develop the feeling that they were both Pak Mun villagers themselves who 
shared the same ideals and aims as the villagers in the civil group. After losing 
Vanida and Nanthachote, the Pak Mun civil group faced a feeling of insecurity 
due to the lack of encouragement provided by the type of leadership provided 
through the activist roles of Vanida and Nanthachote. Ultimately this led to 
the goals and operation or the leadership of the civil group having to change if 
it was to be sustained. As this occurred the activist role became replaced by 
interactions established with outside organizations and participation in 
national mobilizations. 
Pak Mun civil group’s advisors 
This study defines the advisors for the Pak Mun group as actors outside the 
civil group. Mostly, the advisors play their roles either by the Pak Mun group 
asking for help or they possibly involve the civil group for their own purposes. 
Moreover, the advisors interacted with the Pak Mun civil group with both 
formal and informal contact. Thus, to examine the advisors of the Pak Mun 
group considers roles that resulted in significant advantage for the Pak Mun 
civil group. 
The nature of the Pak Mun civil group’s advisors are difficult to identify 
specifically, so this study classified the advisors in this case implies to the 
academic advisor in this case into those engaged with the Pak Mun group 
personally and those who had the responsibility of working as commentators 
or information providers. Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat197 told the researcher 
that there were some academics who helped the villagers in terms of 
integrating local fisheries knowledge with academic research in order to prove 
the negative effects of the Pak Mun Dam construction. 
Academics from Ubon Rachathani University advised the Pak Mun civil 
group independently on the issue of fisheries degradation, and the Pak Mun 




                                                   
civil group needed to prove that to claim compensation, and also to manage 
the times of closing the sluice gates to help to recover the ecological system. 
This happened in 2001 under the Thai state’s negotiation process, and the 
academics were part of the tripartite committee at that time. In this regard, 
the academics in the committee had taken the Pak Mun civil group’s side. 
Thus, the relationship between the academics and the Pak Mun civil group 
appeared to be encouraged.198 
Poh Somkid199 told the researcher that there were many academics 
keen to study the group of Pak Mun villagers; however, they played less 
important roles, apart from the role of consultant in 2001. Consequently, the 
Pak Mun civil group thought that academics were useful for helping them 
spread the aims of the Pak Mun civil group to the public. In particular, the Pak 
Mun villagers needed the academics to clarify the oppression as the state 
encroached on their livelihoods by constructing the huge dam, with the aim of 
focusing on development ideology and related policies. 
Nanthachote200 talked about the advisors of the Pak Mun group, saying 
that in fact the subsistence of the Pak Mun civil group grew rustically. Vanida 
and he were in charge of the consultancy, and other academics involved with 
the villagers in academic research (Vi Jai Thai Baan)201, including the 
tripartite processes with the Thai Government and EGAT, also came from 
Vanida and Nanthachote’s connections. 
In addition, one important academic, Arjarn Prapas202, revealed that he 
saw that Nanthachote always consulted some academics who were top well-
known academics in Thailand; in other words he called those academics the 
‘Think Tank’ of Thailand. Arjarn Prapas also told the researcher that there 
were two main issues for consultation: first, the analysis of state actions and 
reactions, and second, planning the strategies or means to respond to the state 
actions. Moreover, he thought that the rest of the academics or researchers 
beside the ‘Think Tank’ had insufficient power to advise the Pak Mun villagers 
because the villagers would rather listen to Vanida and Nanthachote.  
198   Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
199   Interview with Poh Somkid (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
200  Phone interview with Nanthachote (February 10, 2008). 
201   Vi Jai Thai Baan = วิจยัไทบา้น 




                                                   
Nevertheless, the researcher noted villager group discussions about 
actors who gave the Pak Mun villagers suggestions in terms of how to operate 
the civil group. The discussions showed the academics had played a small role 
even in terms of giving knowledge to the villagers. The academics were mostly 
known by the leaders of the Pak Mun civil group, such as Poh Somkid, Poh Yai 
Thong and Mae Sompong, otherwise the rest of the villagers or the members 
of the Pak Mun civil group would never have consulted those academics 
directly.203 
The researcher also noted that the relations between the academics and 
villagers appeared to be perfunctory, particularly the academics or researchers 
who had no connection to the political processes. For instance, one of the 
academics from Ubon Ratchathani University joined the Pak Mun local 
fishermen in order to support knowledge integration in 2001. He was the only 
one to indicate that the Pak Mun villagers gained benefits from civil 
organization. Most research related to the Pak Mun civil group had not 
influenced political decision-making and was still just a draft or blueprint.204 
Accordingly, this study determined that apart from the small group of 
well-known academics who had a close relationship with Vanida, Nanthachote 
and the leaders of the Pak Mun civil group, such as Poh Somkiat, Poh Yai 
Thong and Mae Sompong, the academics were ineffective as advisors, 
particularly in the case of sharing knowledge. 
Furthermore, the academics as advisors to the Pak Mun civil group 
rarely stood up for the civil group in terms of supporting the local knowledge 
to be accepted publicly. Importantly, the Pak Mun civil group’s advisors gave 
political action advice but there was no evidence that the advisors provided 
advice to the civil group in terms of organizing and developing, or the 
existence of the civil group at all.205  
To summarize the advisors of the Pak Mun civil group, this study 
approached the academics or researchers who were involved with the civil 
group both in formal and informal roles. However, the roles of academics as 
the advisors illustrated the need for their knowledge to be transmitted 
203  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 1 and June 4, 2008). 
204  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 4, 2008). 




                                                   
through the civil group activists and leaders. Moreover, the key academics 
provided guidance in order to support the social mobilization strategies rather 
than the development of the civil society organization, while the academics 
who were involved with the Pak Mun civil group as researchers had less 
influence and were of little benefit to the Pak Mun civil group.  
The Pak Mun civil group’s funding support 
This section provides the Pak Mun civil group in relation to the questions: 
‘How has the local group been able to survive?’ and ‘What are the sources of 
their funding?’ On this point, the situation of Pak Mun civil society is clarified 
by the aspect of civil society in which groups operate as non-profit 
organizations, leading to the explanation we see in this study that the funding 
appears to be unrelated to the benefits or political interests of commercial 
groups in a significant way. The funding support of the Pak Mun civil group 
appeared definitely in terms of the villagers’ fundraising. Moreover, to argue 
that the Pak Mun group earns revenue as a mercenary ‘hired gun’ – through 
being hired by others to join protests – is not credible.206 With regard to this, 
in the opinion of Vanida207 it was impossible that anyone could afford to 
illicitly finance the huge number of villagers in the protest, and it is not 
without problems to attempt to ‘hire’ protesters in the belief that all activities 
can be funded in this way. There is not a convincing argument that the group 
of protesters could be hired, particularly the group of villagers who joined the 
AOP (Samatcha Khon Jon). Regardless, the aim of this study is to consider 
carefully the case study of the Pak Mun civil group as a local civil organization, 
so the Pak Mun civil group has excluded the AOP from consideration even 
though some of their activities were related. 
 Generally, as in the nature of a civil group and its type of work, the 
survival of the villagers’ group was made possible by the members themselves. 
The villagers208 told the researcher that they supported each other in the same 
way in terms of supplying food and providing places for the group’s meetings 
and activities. Poh Yai Thong209 stated, “We need just a little more than 
206  “Pak Mun coorperative paid 1000 Baht to each protester”, Matichon, December 18, 2002. 
207   Suthisakom (2007).  
208   Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008).  




                                                   
everyday subsistence. It is just that sometimes we have more friends come to 
visit and never think of attaching a cost.” For Mae Tha,210 she told the 
researcher that she prepared food and drink for the meeting, saying, “They 
usually bring food, and sometimes there is a lot of food left over after the 
meeting.” The villagers think the work of the civil group, while it operated in 
the village, imposed almost no additional cost to their normal living.211 
Additionally, Poh Somkiat212 noted, “Actually, food and living expenses came 
from our ways of livelihood that are being destroyed by the dam. Even though 
they are diminishing, we want to save them (rice, fish and food).” 
In this regard, the Pak Mun civil group operated as an informal 
organization, existing through voluntary contributions and assistance, which 
is consistent with what the researcher found from fieldwork: that the 
resources in terms of places, food and human resource for the organizers were 
provided by group members and partisans. The places for the group’s 
activities were mostly for meetings or informal talks, which involved the group 
leaders, where food and drinks were needed sometimes and supplied 
voluntarily. 213 
On the other hand, work on increasing activities of the Pak Mun civil 
group inevitably required more funding, especially the work relating to 
activities outside the group. The members of the Pak Mun civil group 
consequently used cultural activities as a channel for getting funds. 
Nanthachote214 explained to the researcher that the funding of the group was 
sometimes received through Buddhist festivals. Traditionally, the monks in 
the temples organized the Buddhist festivals, which unite villagers in their 
local areas. Poh Yai Thong215 stated, “The activities, such as meetings in the 
village, incur just a small cost, but when we go out we need money for other 
expenses like transportation or buying food. One way to get money is Tam-
Boon (receiving donations through the temple).” 
210  Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
211   Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 
212   Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 8, 2008). 
213   Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
214   Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
         Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 




                                                   
Poh Somkiat216 spoke more about the donations through the temples, saying 
that it was through the monks associated with the villagers. He said, “The 
temples in this area are actually small and would not raise much money from 
Tam Boon. The Tam Boon, it is based on the Buddhist calendar, which 
prescribes events about two to three times a year; this is the best we can do.” 
Regarding fundraising, the manner of raising funds by the Pak Mun 
civil group was through cultural and traditional means; this also links to the 
aspect of the Pak Mun group being self-organized as outlined in the previous 
section. Thus the activities of the temple events are a tool for getting 
donations for group funding. In addition to this method, funding similarly 
came from types of public donation. For example, Tod Kra Tin217, Tod Pha 
Pa.218 However, from these donations the villagers must give some money for 
‘Tam Boon’ to the temples.219 
Additionally, the Pak Mun civil group worked to gain a subsidy as a 
Non-Government Organization. The researcher found that the Pak Mun group 
representatives traveled widely in order to solicit funds. For example, the first 
meeting with Nanthachote in Bangkok was on the occasion of a trip that 
Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat took to Suan-Ngern-Me-Ma.220  Also, many 
times the researcher made contact with them by telephone and found they had 
traveled to this place. However, when the researcher was carrying out 
fieldwork afterwards, around the dam area, from talking to the villagers, the 
researcher found that they mentioned their leaders, such as Nanthachote and 
Poh Somkiat, had gone to Bangkok together in order to meet with the funding 
sponsors. The researcher noted that the primary sponsors of the Pak Mun civil 
group must be the persons related to Suan Ngern Me Ma.221  
Some of the supporters’ names and the amount of funding are 
unidentified yet; both Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat referred to the Suan 
Ngern Me Ma and The Royal Project Foundation, and The Habitat Thailand 
216   Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 
217   Buddhist activity calls Tod Kra Tin = ทอดกระถิน 
218   Buddhist activity calls Tod Pha Pa = ทอดผา้ป่า 
219   Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
220   Suan Ngern Me Ma (สวนเงินมีมา)) is a group that aims at support voluntary activities     
          in Thai society. It is linked to the big and well-known foundation; Sathirakoses-   
          Nagapradjpa Foundation (SNF) = มูลนิธิเสฐียรโกเศศ-นาคะประทีป.  




                                                   
Organization was also mentioned by Mae Sompong in the same way. They 
noted in a similar way that in order to get funding from organizations, there 
are formal procedures, and there have been a lot of other candidates also 
pursuing support. Consequently, they needed to talk in person to the staff in 
charge of the funding approval in such organizations. In this regard, the 
researcher considers accordingly that these personal connections must have 
resulted in successfully receiving support.222 
According to Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat223, lately the Pak Mun civil 
group has experienced unstable support and funding, and therefore the 
budget for their activities has also been limited. From the researcher’s point of 
view, it affirms that it has been the efficiency of the Pak Mun civil group in 
organizing itself which resulted in the group’s ability to struggle, yet survive 
with limited funding, particularly with the outstanding ability to arrange their 
resources through social capital and reciprocity224 in terms of culture-based 
opportunities in order to acquire funding and support. 
In the same way, the limitations and constraints on support forced the 
Pak Mun civil group to develop viable funding arrangements and effective 
preparation of their resources while the Pak Mun civil group joined the 
protests in Bangkok. Poh Somkiat and Mae Prasit225 spoke about having 
joined the protest in Bangkok. At that time, they carried as much food with 
them as they could because it would be a way to save money, enabling them to 
use money for other needs, such as drinking water. In addition, they revealed 
that some funding had been received from the AOP, but they insisted that the 
AOP paid for supporting the local activities, not hiring them.226 
In summary, sharing between members and public donations are the 
main and essential sources of support and funding for the Pak Mun civil group, 
in addition to some subsidies from private foundations. Although this study 
found that the Pak Mun civil group supporters and resources were scarce, the 
study concludes that the Pak Mun civil group has demonstrated the capacity 
and ability to manage their resources efficiently rather than relying on an 
222  Fieldnotes (April-March 2008). 
223  Interview with Nanthachote and Poh Somkiat (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
224  See p. 29-32. 
225  Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 5, 2008). 




                                                   
increasing amount of support, which encouraged the Pak Mun civil group to 
develop and employ the strategy of organizing their support and funding 
productively.   
Pak Mun civil group interactions 
The research framework of this study expects interactions to be one of the 
main factors influencing the development of civil society. The study 
consequently examines the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group with others 
outside the group, and does so by looking at interactions as the various 
aspects of the activities and communication occurring in both horizontal and 
vertical ways. 
The horizontal interaction of the Pak Mun civil group 
The horizontal interactions in this study are considered within the context of 
the region in which Pak Mun exists and is furthermore focussed. The 
particular horizontal interactions are mainly concerned with how the Pak Mun 
civil group communicates to other civil groups, local NGOs and local 
government officers operating at the local level in the region. The horizontal 
interactions focus on the type of activities in which Pak Mun civil group 
participation and/or coordination resulted in benefits to the Pak Mun civil 
group. 
A first point of overriding significance is that the Pak Mun civil group’s 
participation with other civil groups was continuous. This was because the 
other Thai civil groups emerged in similar ways and hence with similar 
trajectories, as explained in the previous emergence section (p. 83). In 
particular, however, the launching of the dam projects by the Thai state 
triggered the emergence of civil groups. Therefore the various civil groups 
emerged at about the same time and due possibly to this similar genesis; as 
they have been concurrently developing they have been helping each other. 
Poh Somkiat227 explained it this way: “We had been sharing a similar suffering 
since the state control us repressively. And we think that we can understand 
and help each other better than people who have never faced the same 
problems.” On this point, the researcher noted that the Pak Mun civil group 
and other civil groups participated reciprocally in their activities.  




                                                   
For instance, the old lady named Yay Hi 228 229 who represented the 
villagers afflicted by Huey La Hah Dam. She joined the Pak Mun civil group 
even when she was actually in the other civil group. This indicated that the 
connections forming the interactions could be due to similar dissatisfactions. 
Moreover, Nanthachote230 revealed that the participation of other 
villagers outside Pak Mun village, in other words, coordination of the other 
civil groups became the vital strategy of the Pak Mun civil group. It was a 
strategy that provided huge numbers of civil group members to give more 
power to the activities of mobilization or protest. The mutual benefits of an 
alliance of the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups meant that they 
must to a significant degree participate in each other activities. 
In this regard, the researcher’s view is that the key to success of this 
horizontal interaction strategy was the informal aspect of the civil group 
structure. To share members paradoxically turned weakness into strength. 
Even though such civil groups are categorized as marginalized groups which 
have just a small voice in Thai society, the informality of being marginalized 
enabled civil groups to form strong alliances through sharing experiences with 
common understanding, as well as sharing actual members, particularly the 
experiences they used to respond to the state.231 
The civil groups’ horizontal interactions, however, not only enabled 
them to develop the civil group through the exchange of experiences and 
through the civil groups’ network, but also enabled them to sustain the civil 
groups as a part of linking a civil group network (pp. 135–38). This was 
indicated precisely by a comment from the Pak Mun villagers232 that civil 
groups need to participate with each other because to fight individually would 
result in group weakness that would ultimately endanger the civil group.233  
In general, the Pak Mun civil group’s beneficial horizontal interactions 
involved participating in activities and sharing experiences with other civil 
groups. In particular it took forms that included other local features of civil 
228  Yay is the Thai word calls grandmother or old ladies in the same age range. 
229  Interview with Yay Hi (Ubon Ratchathani, June 6, 2008). 
230  Interview with Nanthachote (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, March 28, 2008). 
231  Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
232  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008). 




                                                   
society. Poh Yai Thong234, the Pak Mun civil group leader, and Mae Yai Pha235, 
who was the Sirindhorn Dam civil group member, both said that fundraising 
for their civil groups involved using Buddhist traditions, and that it was one of 
their essential interactions. However, this particular interaction was also 
coordinated between civil groups to avoid setting up the use of temple 
activities at the same time. The civil groups took turns in raising money 
through this traditional interaction. Therefore, as well as culture having a role 
in the emergence of civil society, the Pak Mun civil group’s interactions to 
both develop and sustain civil society are also related to culture.236 
Another feature of horizontal interactions during the development 
phase of civil society was that the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group also 
developed, resulting in the continuing enlarging of the civil group network. 
The other civil groups located nearby to Pak Mun village and in the E-Sarn 
region became increasingly connected through activities, in both direct and 
indirect ways, to the Pak Mun civil group. The benefits of the increasing 
interactions were mutual. Some of the other E-Sarn civil group 
representatives237 concurred that to interact with the Pak Mun civil group 
supported not only the Pak Mun civil group to get a stronger and louder voice 
for themselves, but that their interactions also helped other small civil groups 
raise their issues and bring some issues, that would otherwise have stayed 
hidden, to the attention of the state (and public), and hence into the 
conciliation processes, together with the Pak Mun group’s issues.238  
Secondly, in the case of interaction with local NGOs, according to Poh 
Somkait239, the group of Pak Mun villagers found that at first they were taken 
advantage of by NGOs, so they learnt that they had to be careful when 
contacting people outside their civil group, and later on they managed to 
establish successful interactions also with NGOs. However, the researcher 
believes that the ability to establish these successful interactions with NGOs 
was due to the Pak Mun civil group involving the best-known activists in 
234  Interview with Poh Yai Thong (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, May 16, 2008). 
235  Interview with Mae Yai Pha (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2008). 
236  Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
237  Interview with the representatives of local groups in the meeting ran by the Department  
         of Environmental Quality Promotion (Bangkok, March 4, 2008). 
238  Fieldnotes (Bangkok, March 2008). 




                                                   
Thailand, namely Vanida and Nanthachote, who involved other NGOs at a 
higher level than local NGOs. Consequently, it was the support wrought by 
Vanida and Nanthachote that brought the Pak Mun civil group to be able to 
jump over the local NGOs, who were experienced at taking advantage of them. 
They had already jumped over them to the national and international level. 
The Pak Mun civil group never established interactions with local NGOs.240 
Finally, the interactions of the Pak Mun civil group with the local 
government appear to be a source of vulnerability, but nevertheless 
unavoidable. Right from the start, the local government was recognized as 
being in opposition to the Pak Mun civil group’s view, with the local 
government always standing by the state’s side. In particular, local 
government took the role as the state agency in the dam construction, which 
historically caused the grievance, leading in part to the emergence of the Pak 
Mun civil group. Therefore the local government was known to be in 
opposition so the civil group managed not to be taken advantage of by it. With 
regard to this, the Pak Mun civil group avoided interacting with the local 
government right from the start. Thus the form of the Pak Mun civil group and 
local government interaction mostly relates to the ways of their 
communications, such as to inform the state (and also the EGAT) of their 
claims and other communication and activities involved in the reconciliation 
processes.241   
In short, the horizontal interaction of the Pak Mun civil group 
presented the bonds of the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups by local 
cultural aspects, and it was the common feeling based on their similar 
experiences that persuaded them to interact in each other activities. 
Conversely, their experiences led them to be careful when interacting with the 
local government, and to learn to be careful with the local NGOs, but 
nevertheless to harness the benefits of the organizational capacity of NGOs at 
a higher level (national and international), including the power of activists to 
help with their own their self-organizing capacity.  
240  Fieldnotes (March-June 2008). 
241   Fieldnotes and interview with the local government officers (Khong Jiem, Ubon  




                                                   
The vertical interaction of the Pak Mun civil group 
The vertical interactions, similar to the horizontal interactions studied, 
focussed on the connections that brought benefits to the Pak Mun civil group. 
The horizontal and vertical interactions are, however, to some degree 
interrelated, because even national NGOs and central government are 
focussed on the broader and higher networks of vertical interactions, but they 
are still involved implicitly in the horizontal interactions with local 
government and NGOs as well.242  
As explained previously, the horizontal interactions of the Pak Mun 
civil group occurred with other civil groups at the local level. Thus the 
extending of the Pak Mun civil group network not only developed widely on 
the horizontal level, but also the civil group’s interaction in the vertical 
dimension developed to the extent that any of the other civil groups were also 
interacting in the vertical dimension. Also, vertical interactions led to 
horizontal interactions of wider scope. The Pak Mun civil group interacted 
with other civil groups outside its area and had interactions at the national 
level with them. For example, Korn-uma243, the Bor Nork civil group leader, 
revealed that both the Pak Mun and the Bor Nork civil groups had 
participated in some events of the state mediation process. As a result, they 
had been connected in terms of sharing their experiences and the ways to deal 
with state agencies in particular.  
Interestingly, there were other civil groups connected with the Pak Mun 
civil group through national interactions, such as the Tung-Yao community 
forestry civil group, which was located in the north of Thailand, and the civil 
group representatives of Pattani province, which contains the local fishery 
networks around the south of Thailand. Those representatives244 told the 
researcher that they all, along with yet other civil groups, frequently met at the 
reconciliation events at national level. In this regard, this study agrues that the 
horizontal and vertical interactions of the Pak Mun civil group were related 
242  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
243  Interview with Korn-uma in the meeting ran by the Department of Environmental Quality       
         Promotion (Bangkok, March 4, 2008). 
244  Interview with the representatives from province civil groups in the Political  




                                                   
mainly by the participatory opportunities of the civil groups rather than by 
geographical features.245  
In the case of the interaction of the Pak Mun civil group with national 
NGOs, the interactions clearly illustrate they were a key civil group member of 
the AOP and, later on, of PMove. This occurred because the activists of the 
Pak Mun civil group linked both local and national NGOs together. 
Notwithstanding, the interactions between the Pak Mun civil group and 
national NGOs, such as the AOP and PMove, have also gradually deteriorated. 
The reason appears to be the loss of involvement of the nationally significant 
activists (Vanida and Nanthachote), who established the linkages. According 
to Poh Somkiat246, “The Pak Mun civil group participated in the AOP 
mobilization but we are not included by the AOP,” and he refused to join some 
activities since the AOP became PMove. Furthermore, Arjarn Prapas also 
commented247 on this point, that the Pak Mun civil group had less interaction 
with PMove due to the reorganization of PMove, which resulted in having 
different ideas from the PMove leaders, who are no longer activists seeking to 
help the Pak Mun civil group. 
Similarly, the Pak Mun civil group assumed that interaction with 
central government would be a mistake due to the opposition they received 
locally from the central government officers, who were commanded by the 
state. However, the Pak Mun civil group also tried to deal with central 
government diplomatically in order to promote the civil group’s benefits, once 
again with the assistance of the nationally significant activists helping 
them.248 Nanthachote249 told the researcher that the Pak Mun civil group and 
government officers in many departments interacted mainly in the events of 
the reconciliation process, but that he and the Pak Mun villagers agreed that 
the outcomes were never useful because the government officers in fact could 
not make final decisions. 
Regarding this, the researcher’s view is that there was actually a big gap 
rather than any relationships between the Pak Mun civil group and the Thai 
245  Fieldnotes (Bangkok, March 2008). 
246  Phone interview with Poh Somkiat (July 10, 2011). 
247  Phone Interview with Arjarn Prapas (June 20, 2013).  
248  Fieldnotes (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 




                                                   
state, and that the attempted diplomatic interactions led to further breakdown 
in the possibility of interactions. The events of the mediation became a battle 
of two sides – the Thai Government, which held political power as the state, 
and the Pak Mun villagers, who fought for their own rights as Thai citizens. To 
consider the outcomes of the interactions between them does not reveal any 
beneficial outcomes, so the attempts at establishing vertical connections only 
indicate that such attempts result in ineffective solutions. From the 
researcher’s point of view, enmity is the important factor that produced the 
significant features of the failed interactions at national scale in particular.250  
 In brief, the vertical interactions by the Pak Mun civil group showed 
that widening the network of interactions beyond the local scope involved 
vertical interactions. The broadening interaction network emerged through 
the coordination of the civil groups in the network involving both horizontal 
and vertical interactions. Likewise, the interaction with national NGOs 
appeared as interactions themselves developed from initially unbeneficial 
local interactions, and leading ultimately to a period when the Pak Mun civil 
group interacted with NGOs at the national level. This was unable to be 
sustained due to the loss of nationally significant activists facilitating the 
connections. Additionally, the interaction of the Pak Mun civil group with the 
government at national level seemed to be very weak. This was because state 
or government representatives were identified by the Pak Mun civil group as 
the opponent or enemy, irrespective of particular personal interactions. And 
what ultimately mattered was who had the power to make decisions. This is 
the exact opposite to the developed and sustained horizontal interactions, 
which was precisely the interpersonal feelings facilitated through local culture, 
along with shared experiences and understanding of being the common 
victims of the same state enemy. The relationship between the vertical and 
horizontal interactions involved, in complex ways, both the beneficial and 








                                                   
The social capital of Pak Mun civil group 
This study considers social capital as a vital factor for the development of civil 
groups. According to the research framework, the relationship of social capital 
to civil society has paradoxically two opposing directions, but nevertheless it 
makes a recursive whole, namely, that not only is social capital caused by civil 
society but also that social capital is itself the cause of civil society (Figure 2).  
Until now, this study has mainly emphasized the first direction of how 
social capital is caused by civil society, through the exploration of how civil 
society becomes established. So in this section the emphasis shifts to consider 
the aspects of Pak Mun civil society that created social capital. To set the scene 
for the study of this reverse direction, it is helpful to recall that it has already 
been found that the development of civil society is illustrated by the operation 
of Pak Mun civil society as an organization, which produces social capital in 
two different ways: social capital emerged internally within the Pak Mun civil 
group; and there were external factors causing social capital by connections or 
linkages to the Pak Mun civil group. The way in which social capital emerges 
from civil society is also the way that social capital causes civil society. 
Internal factors of social capital within the Pak Mun civil group 
At civil group development stage, social capital appears to be an aspect of civil 
organization. The collective factors related to social capital will be the focus 
rather than a feature of individuals within the civil organization. There was, 
however, a shift towards it being more clearly an ability of individuals to 
participate in civil groups within later phases, once civil society has become 
established. The shift to the abilities of individuals is able to be seen and 
analyzed in terms of how social capital comes to be related to values and 
norms held by individuals rather than structural features of organizations. In 
particular, this result is shown at the local level where social capital is seen to 
be the cause of the growth of civil society.  
According to Mae Sorn251, being a Pak Mun group member was a great 
honour. She said, “There were two young people who said thank you to me 
once when I carried a Pak Mun poster in the mobilization of the AOP.” She 
explained that it was in admiration of her for all the fighting of the difficult 




                                                   
battles until that point. Likewise, the Pak Mun villagers revealed that joining 
the group pushed them to think more about the future. Furthermore, the Pak 
Mun civil group leaders252 mentioned in the same way that the organizing of 
the Pak Mun civil group gave them ideas of how to deal with different kinds of 
people. Most importantly, being part of the civil group encouraged people to 
acknowledge and value their local knowledge and livelihood.  
Additionally, Nanthachote253 said, “It was really very difficult to get rid 
of the conflict among the villagers, but they did come to learn to think of the 
common benefits more than just for themselves, and to become proud of 
doing so.” Based on his point of view, together with the various Pak Mun 
villagers’ perspectives254, the researcher noted that the Pak Mun villagers were 
proud of their civil group growth. They saw that the activities of their group 
reflected the consciousness of the protection of their birthplace. Moreover, 
working together revealed the significant value of the unity of local people. 
 As previously mentioned in the establishment phase section about the 
cultural and social aspects of the Pak Mun civil group, this study found that 
the establishment phase showed clearly the reciprocity within the Pak Mun 
civil group. In this phase, the reciprocity also appeared more obvious at the 
individual level and even among small groups of members in the Pak Mun 
group. However, according to Mae Prasit255, there was also less support for 
each other in the group because of the extended period of fighting. Everything 
seemed scarce and weak. She said, “We have inadequate food and money, and 
even time for meetings. Most of us were busy working for our own careers in 
the last few years.”  In this regard, the Pak Mun civil group experience also 
revealed, however, just how strongly the surrounding phenomena 
nevertheless influenced the capability and limitations of the Pak Mun civil 
group in order to produce social capital within the civil group. 
From the researcher’s point of view, the study shows how social capital 
within the Pak Mun civil group is related closely to social relations in the 
group. Generally, the Pak Mun civil actors were bound together by trust, as 
present in the reciprocity, which then established the civil group, producing 
252  Interview with the leaders of Pak Mun (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008). 
253  Interview with Nanthachote, Bangkok (April 4, 2008). 
254  Group discussion, Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani (June 27, 2008). 




                                                   
social relations and ultimately earning the value of generating the 
development of the civil group. To participate within the Pak Mun civil group 
made the villagers proud of their actions. It was because they succeeded in 
fighting with the agents of the state, even though they were just a small group 
of people who held little power in Thai society. Being in the Pak Mun group 
gave the courage and commitment to be self-sacrificing.256  
In this regard, the researcher noted that the point of the Pak Mun civil 
group being able to be selfless was due to the villagers basically having the 
same lifestyle, which formed the basis of social bonding. Their livelihood was 
based on using natural resources in order to get income, and so the way of 
their reciprocity was well established with them, as it was also how they used 
common natural resources. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group expected that 
they would themselves benefit through the processes of maintaining and 
developing the civil group and their collective interests. The Pak Mun civil 
group therefore valued the priority of collective interests, and this became an 
implicitly held social norm for the Pak Mun group.   
External factors enhancing social capital within the Pak Mun civil group 
The development of the Pak Mun civil group in terms of social capital was 
related to external factors because social capital is a vital factor in maintaining 
the social network. Consequently, the growth of social capital within the civil 
group inevitably involved civil group social networks, both within and outside 
the civil group. In other words, external factors, in particular in terms of the 
social network and connections of the Pak Mun civil group were also an 
essential means to build social capital within the civil group. 
At the Pak Mun establishment phase, social capital was the essential 
factor for civil group emergence and it continued to be significant. The need to 
fight against state power also led to the development (and sustaining) of the 
Pak Mun civil group. The fight against state power created the unity of the 
group, which is the key value of social capital. The elements of social capital 
within the civil group, such as trust, reciprocity, values and norms, pave the 
way for the development of social networks, especially the role of activists. 




                                                   
Arjarn Prapas257 told the researcher that Thai people currently seemed to 
understand and sympathize with the Pak Mun villagers’ affliction. Most 
people then received information about the Pak Mun villagers through the 
networks of academics, which were mostly connected by Vanida and 
Nanthachote. He explained that Thai people trust and understood better what 
the Pak Mun villagers were facing. Importantly, there were a lot of academics 
and media on the Pak Mun villagers’ side. 
According to this, the researcher takes the case of the villagers’ network 
and connections to show the building of internal social capital for the Pak 
Mun group social networks. The trust in Vanida and Nanthachote produced 
social capital within the Pak Mun group at the beginning, along with the trust 
of local networks, which can be identified as external social capital. It can be 
seen that social capital components – trust, reciprocity, values and norms – 
worked together through the social networks and connections.258  
At first the Pak Mun civil group evidenced intensive social capital 
generation. Due to the conflicts that arose out of mass mobilization, social 
capital came to break down. Nanthachote259 revealed that Pak Mun faced 
insufficient support from other organizations due to a lack of trust from 
outsiders. There was initially the commonly held view by most Thai people 
who assumed that the Pak Mun villagers were a group of lazy and demanding 
people. This perception was overcome by the ability for social capital to be 
generated through the networking that Vanida and Nantochote connected. 
The group of the Pak Mun villagers’ leaders260 mentioned that to continue to 
connect to the outside after losing both Vanida and Nanthachote became more 
difficult.  
The Pak Mun civil group later came to face the lack of trust from other 
networks due to the loss of Vanida and Nantochote. Moreover, the Pak Mun 
civil group also experienced the loss of social networking on account of the 
political mobilization conflict, namely between the Yellow and Red Shirts. In 
respect of this, four reasons were found from fieldwork information261: firstly, 
257  Phone interview with Arjarn Prapas (June 20, 2013). 
258  Fieldnotes (June 2008). 
259  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
260  Interview with the villager leaders (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 7, 2008). 




                                                   
political mobilization made more opponents because the civil group could 
make more enemies from taking neither the Yellow nor Red Shirts’ side; 
secondly, the conflict between Yellow and Red Shirts needed more support 
from grassroots so they propagandised villages in different ways, which 
brought the conflict to the civil group and destroyed the civil group unity; 
thirdly, this situation caused some of the group members to leave the civil 
group in order to join the political mobilization, for various reasons, such as 
national politics being seen as more important than local politics262; and lastly, 
national politics led some networks to act in ways different to the aims, in 
relation to the problems of the Pak Mun villagers or the dam project.  
For these reasons, this study conceded that the social capital 
components of the Pak Mun civil group were negatively affected by the 
conflict of Yellow and Red mobilizations. The conflict interfered with social 
capital, as some members supported the Red Shirts, some the Yellow Shirts, 
and some neither. According to the participants’ comments, too many 
complications arose for them to be able to trust in people, even those in their 
group. Any actions could be due to political interest related to the Yellow 
Shirts or Red Shirts. So they had to be careful how they thought, talked and 
participated with others.263  Importantly, the NGOs also attemped to get 
villagers involved in national politics, which led some villagers to leave the 
civil group because of the NGOs’ control and intervention. As a result, there 
was less reciprocity, which caused a breakdown in the social relations and 
networks, particularly the fundraising processes. Importantly, this situation 
also affected the aims of the Pak Mun civil groups. For instance, the Pak Mun 
civil group leaders264 said they had to leave ‘group benefit’ behind. The Pak 
Mun civil group’s goals were interrupted and group unity broke down.  
In brief, the social capital of the Pak Mun civil society operated 
successfully at the development phase. The social capital components were 
generated inside the civil organization and then extended to work widely 
outside the civil group. However, the different elements functioned in 
262 Interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2011). 
263 Group interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 26, 2011). 
        Phone interview with a villager (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, July 2, 2012). 
        Phone interview with a villager (Varin Chamrap, Ubon Ratchathani, July 2, 2012). 




                                                   
different ways and degrees, as both internal and external factors. In relation to 
internal factors, the role of activist leaders is essential, particularly to build 
trust. In relation to the external factors of social capital, values and norms 
were negatively affected by political division. As external social capital 
weakens, reciprocity and trust with other civil groups and also within 
networks also decreased. 
 The Sustainability of the Pak Mun Civil Group  
In the phase of sustaining civil society, adaptation becomes the key concept to 
analyze data. Adaptation occurs through linkages, which can be either vertical 
or horizontal. Associated with both is the continuing role of social capital, but 
analysis also builds on the components associated with the strengthening of 
civil society, namely structure and actors, including the role of leaders.    
The Pak Mun civil group linkages 
Linkages in this study refer to the ways in which civil groups maintain 
connections to other organizations. The connections also identify the civil 
groups’ interaction, bonding and participation with external social capital. To 
form linkages is, however, not sufficient as they are just connections; also 
necessary are the ways in which connections are maintained as structures; for 
example, the role of coordination within the organization. 
The horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group 
The aspects of horizontal linkage of the Pak Mun civil group can be seen in 
terms of how the civil group cooperated with other groups at the same level, 
which has been mentioned previously. However, the linkages in this section 
look in particular at sustaining the effectiveness of the civil group’s 
connections. 
The horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group formed relatively 
recently by the role of Vanida, who seemed being the part of national NGOs, 
only with the development of the group. Therefore NGOs in horizontal 
linkages of the Pak Mun civil group had the same organization as the vertical 
linkage. For example, the linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the 
national NGOs, such as the AOP, were begun by Vanida and Nanthachote 




group interaction at the development stage supported the ability to obtain 
wider linkages. For the Pak Mun civil group, the linkage with the AOP, which 
had been built continually due to Vanida.265 Therefore, for the linkage aspect 
of the Pak Mun civil group and the AOP, it appears rather that they were a 
part of each other. 
In Thailand, local NGOs also belong to national NGOs, so the vertical 
and horizontal linkage of NGOs could not be analyzed separately. 266 In terms 
of this, the researcher believes that any aspects of group interactions that 
emerged and grew together form an essential base for further development of 
the linkages. In particular in the case of linkages between the Pak Mun civil 
group and the AOP, the linkages encompassed all the recent interactions of 
the Pak Mun civil group and the AOP, such as the individual connection by 
Vanida and Nanthachote. The interactions emerged while joining with the 
AOP to march to Bangkok with other civil groups. They then joined in other 
activities afterwards267 and thence became connected into the civil groups’ 
network. Eventually, the network connections facilitated the Pak Mun civil 
group to link to the AOP and PMove later without any difficulties.268 However, 
the linkage with the AOP failed at the end when the conflict of the Red and 
Yellow Shirts occurred. 
For instance, with the connections by Vanida and Nanthachote, the Pak 
Mun civil group joined other civil groups, such as agriculture networks, 
forestry networks and the river basin development networks, that they had 
been connected with before linking officially to the AOP in 1995.269 
Nevertheless, the linking to the AOP generally just maintained similar aspects 
to the other Pak Mun group interactions, though participation in the AOP 
involved wider and more diverse networks, which led eventually to the Pak 
Mun civil group becoming more formal in both function and form, as 
explained previously in the Pak Mun civil structure (pp. 83–87).  
265  Fieldnotes (Ubon Ratchathani, June 2008). 
266  Fieldnotes (March-June 2008). 
267  Interview with the Pak Mun villagers (Ubon Ratchathani, June 27-28, 2008). 
268  Phone interview with Lah (May 29, 2013). 




                                                   
According to Nanthachote270, the linking of the Pak Mun civil group 
with the AOP provided the Pak Mun villagers with the capability to work with 
other civil groups in the AOP. It gave them the opportunity to share their 
experiences. Apart from that, all the linkage activities had been organized by 
the AOP supervisors. Therefore the researcher, in the first place, questioned 
the value of linking with national NGOs, as the AOP was making the Pak Mun 
civil group lose their own civil group leadership.  
Interestingly, the kind of sharing of how to be a civil group leader was a 
useful way to organize the civil groups’ network through linkage with the AOP. 
Leaders from each civil group were working together as the group of AOP 
leaders.271 With regard to this, it can be seen that the Pak Mun civil group had 
adapted their own informal leadership style through the AOP linkage. Even so, 
they still maintained their own organizational aspect, which was related to the 
ability to develop functional adaptations by the Pak Mun civil group. The Pak 
Mun civil group integrated the use of formal and informal leadership styles. 
Moreover, this civil group also showed adaptation of their leadership by being 
a horizontal coordinator through their managing of the civil groups’ network 
within the hierachical leadership style of the AOP’s linkage.272 
On the other hand, although the adaptive capability of the Pak Mun 
civil group seemed productive, the group suffered some challenges and 
difficulties on the way through linkage-building. As mentioned previously, the 
Pak Mun civil group had faced problems that arose due to the political conflict 
between the Yellow Shirts and Red Shirts, especially as it was also after the 
death of Nanthachote, who had maintained the linkage up to that point. 
However, the linkage with the AOP led them to connect to the Pak Mun again 
in 2011 under its new name, PMove.  
As to the linkage between the Pak Mun civil group and PMove, this 
study found the difficulty faced by the Pak Mun civil group to adapt could be 
contrasted to the building of the original informal AOP linkage. Firstly, the 
form of the civil group had to change to become a formal organization when 
linked to the PMove due to the Pak Mun villagers having to formally connect 
270  Interview with Nanthachote (March 28, 2008). 
271  The group of AOP leaders = Pu Nam Ruam Moo (Pintoptang, 1998). 




                                                   
in the linkage. The Pak Mun civil group therefore had to become clarified as 
one of the Thai NGOs. Secondly, the group had to establish more and wider 
goals. Lastly, some of the Pak Mun civil group members refused to join NGOs.  
To explain, the altering of the informal form to become part of the 
national NGOs led the Pak Mun civil group to need more management skills, 
owing to the increasing of size of the civil group combined with other groups, 
which also resulted in having more complicated procedures. For example, 
fundraising and organizational management ability became necessary factors 
in order to support the adaptation of the group in both form and function. 
According to Arjarn Prapas273, who studied how the Pak Mun civil group 
operated together with other civil groups during the mass mobilization in 
Bangkok organized by the AOP, the villagers274 revealed that AOP staff were 
the supervision team for the coordination of the mobilization. They also 
accepted that there were a lot more regulations in the AOP that the civil 
groups network left for the AOP team to inevitably work out, instead of doing 
it themselves. 
The linkage with the AOP consequently expanded the wider structure 
of the organization, which contained the network of civil groups and thus the 
diverse aims of each group. To deal with the issue of many groups’ specific 
aims brought about concerns to increase the efficiency of conciliation efforts 
between groups and the state. As a result, further difficulties have emerged 
due to the question of how to incorporate the issues of each civil group into 
the general processes of confrontation with the state. This is an example of the 
barrier which arose because of the adapted form of the Pak Mun civil group; 
reorganization due to the linkage to PMove brought an inflexible structure 
with limited functions. 
Furthermore, the researcher also determined the adaptation of the Pak 
Mun civil group’s form; after it had linked to the AOP, it had more formal 
form and functions. As Lah275, the PMove leader said, PMove has only similar 
features and goals to the AOP, thus there were some previous key members 
who left PMove because they were dissatisfied with the changing 
273  Pintoptang (1998). 
274  Interview with the villagers (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchani, June 8, 2008). 




                                                   
organizational style of PMove. A Pak Mun villager revealed that PMove had a 
different leadership style, with its formal hierarchy. This only showed up later 
as a difficulty with the linkage.   
According to Arjarn Prapas276, the AOP used the style of groups 
supporting each other as the leadership style. This is the kind of leadership 
that fits well with being distributed among the group of leaders, called 
‘collective leadership’ (Pu Nam Ruam Moo)277. Regarding this, the researcher 
believes her study illustrates that there were also leadership aspects of the 
AOP which appeared to be different to the leadership of the Pak Mun civil 
group. Yet the hierarchical leadership of PMove was in stark contrast and 
most definitely showed the dissimilarity to the informal leadership feature 
that was related to many of the other factors of the Pak Mun civil group, in 
particular the cultural basis of the group.  
The vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group 
The conflict over the Pak Mun Dam has been problematic for both the state 
and the Pak Mun villagers. Their relative positions appear to be diametrically 
opposed. Their interactions have therefore been difficult; nevertheless, this 
study attempts to explore the factors that undermine linkages between the Pak 
Mun civil group and the Thai state.  
The Thai state is understood as the main foe of the Pak Mun civil group. 
In particular, grievances that occurred during the history of the Pak Mun Dam 
construction broke the relationship between the state and the Pak Mun civil 
group. As a result, the Pak Mun civil group was denied interaction with the 
state at all levels. Poh Somkiat278 revealed that the reason the Pak Mun 
villagers had not recently joined state projects279 was because those projects 
were set up in a perfunctory process in order to present the state’s position. 
He referred, for instance, to the then Prime Minister Thaksin, who had 
previously promised sympathy to the Pak Mun villagers, but when he became 
the prime minister, he set up a committee which took the EGAT side and used 
the polls to support the decision instead of using academic research.    
276  Pintobtang (1998, p.99). 
277   Pu Nam Ruam Moo = ผูน้าํรวมหมู่ 
278  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Ratchathani, June 2, 2008). 
279  Fieldnotes from the meeting set by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment  




                                                   
Communication with the state seemed ineffective because it involved a 
kind of one-way communication. Mae Sompong280 said, “The state never 
listens to us because we are poor. We sent many letters to the government, but 
that was useless.” For Poh Somkiat281, he even spoke out sarcastically about it: 
“We wondered who the state is. We have never seen, never talked to him/her; 
is that why the state does not know that we suffer?” According to this, the 
researcher believes how the displeasure of the Pak Mun civil group 
accumulated due to there being many different representatives who took 
responsibility to contact the group of Pak Mun villagers, but nothing improved 
afterwards. Moreover, neither problems nor demands had been solved or even 
considered in the decision-making process. All together, the state’s 
unresponsiveness led the Pak Mun civil group to think that the state ignored 
their problems deliberately.  
The Pak Mun civil group also experienced the meetings with the state 
as avoidance, with processes involving insincere conversations due to the state 
in fact never making any commitments. Nanthachote282 told the researcher 
that the meetings with state representatives were a state strategy to leave the 
problems behind or leave them out of the decision-making processes. 
Therefore, the state kept up this kind of process as an excuse to the Pak Mun 
villagers that those problems were still in the process of consideration. 
Moreover, the state broke promises given to the villagers, such as once Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra committed to the Pak Mun villagers on the issue 
of the dam operation timing; in contrast, the cabinet confirmed, instead, a 
decision to close the sluice gates in a different way.283 
The aspects of state projects and the state’s reactions seemed to be far 
removed from the Pak Mun villagers’ needs, and this is why they could not get 
any results or solutions. Consequently, the lack of state responses led the Pak 
Mun civil group to think that the state’s lack of concern was behind it all. 
These actions and conclusions emphasized the weak connections and how 
state action became a stimulus factor to add a further layer of conflict. 
280  Interview with Mae Sompong (Bangkok, March 9, 2008). 
281  Group discussion (Khong Jiem, Ubom Ratchathani, June 1, 2008). 
282  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 




                                                   
To build the vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group seemed highly 
problematic. However, there was at least one state institution that did take 
responsibility in the Pak Mun case – the National Economic and Social 
Advisory Council (NESAC). NESAC is a state institution comprising the 
committees of the professions’ group representatives. NESAC emerged 
accordingly to the Constitution of Thailand 1997. NESAC works independently 
in order to provide advice to the government and state institutions. The 
committee works as an agent to link the state and people together.284 
NESAC appeared to be the one possible channel to facilitate linkages 
between the Pak Mun civil group and the state. Unfortunately, there seemed 
to be little hope of building linkages. As Surapon285, one of the NESAC 
committee, disclosed, the issue of the Pak Mun conflict had been difficult due 
to them having been involved several different governments, and 
commitments were thus changeable. Importantly also, NESAC had no power 
to influence or responsibility to be involved in the decision-making.  
In summary, the horizontal linkages of the Pak Mun civil group had 
previously grown, in terms of its networks, at the development phase. 
Connection to external networks afterwards developed ultimately into the 
linkage with the AOP and PMove. This undermined the Pak Mun civil group 
structure, which was reorganized on account of the civil group’s linkage, 
weakening the ability to adapt. For the Pak Mun civil group, vertical linkages 
to the state appeared to be inefficient as there was a broken relationship in the 
first place. Importantly, the state delayed seeking solutions, and the arrogant 
attitude had frustrated the Pak Mun civil group to further prevent the link 
between them. So the Pak Mun civil group undeniably had an unsuccessful 
linkage with the Thai state.  
Social capital and the sustainability of the Pak Mun civil group  
This study views social capital as a vital factor in order to examine the 
trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group. In charting the end of the trajectory, this 
research considers the features of social capital within the sustaining phase in 
284  Fieldnote (June 20, 2011). 




                                                   
terms of collective action because the Pak Mun civil group developed a more 
formal civil organization.  
It has been traced out in previous sections how the adaptation of the 
Pak Mun civil group produced social capital. This section considers how social 
capital could be the key factor for sustaining civil organization. Regarding this, 
the aspects of social capital arose due to the activities and outcomes of the Pak 
Mun civil group. The social capital of the Pak Mun civil group eroded through 
the move to follow the rather diverse aims and means of the civil organization 
as first the AOP and then PMove contained many civil groups in a network. To 
deal with the complications of this move, the individual social capital of the 
Pak Mun civil group members described in the previous phases needed to 
change to become more of a kind of collective social capital. 
The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group as shown in the early part of 
this study was based on the traditional cultural social bonds of the Pak Mun 
residents. The Pak Mun villagers mostly trusted the people they knew. 
However, they learnt to also trust Vanida and Nanthachote, more so than 
others who worked within NGOs when the civil group was established. The 
Pak Mun civil group developed different types of trust during the adaptation 
phase. This was indicated by how the Pak Mun civil group connected with 
other civil groups later on, so their trust must be so as to relate to the 
surrounding people in the network. This was a different type of trust, because 
it would be difficult to get social bonds, such as friendship and kinship, 
throughout the wide social network. Consequently, the aspect of social capital 
understood in terms of trust had to be modified. The Pak Mun civil group 
leaders revealed this by stating that to build connections to other civil groups 
they had to approach it by considering the civil groups’ aims rather than 
looking at personal relationships. For example: “We can work with others 
because we shared the same outcomes even though we had never known each 
other previously,” one of the Pak Mun civil group leaders said.286  
In this regard, the researcher noted that the connection of the Pak Mun 
civil group to other civil groups resulted in using less social bonding provided 
by kinship, friendship and neighborliness for operating the civil group. The 




                                                   
aspects of social capital therefore became based on the relationship to the 
other civil groups rather than on individual or personal relationships. The Pak 
Mun civil group appeared to trust more in NGOs, such as the AOP, which 
developed yet further when they joined PMove. It was due to the Pak Mun 
civil group looking instead at the aims of NGOs, which had been supporting 
several civil groups.  
Furthermore, owing to the wider connections of the civil network, there 
developed a greater diversity of members. A result was that the aspects of 
social capital analyzed in terms of norms and values transformed to become 
collective features. For instance, they became a formal organization after the 
Pak Mun civil group became assimilated into PMove. This required them to 
accept the idea of having a leader and therefore to be less concerned with 
maintaining a traditional leadership style. It can be seen that this kind of Pak 
Mun civil norm became necessary for the adaptation of the civil group, even 
though it caused them to lose some members.287 Nevertheless, the Pak Mun 
civil group adaptation brought about new norms with the values of formal 
organizations, including the accountability of the civil group, which was 
supported by PMove representatives.  
In brief, it can be seen that the Pak Mun civil group developed their 
social capital from a personal or individual level to a collective level. To 
become a member of the civil group networks, such as the AOP and PMove, 
the Pak Mun civil group developed their collaborative skills based on their 
social capital, such as social bonding, trust and reciprocity, by adapting it to 
become a kind of collective social capital. Moreover, the emergence of 
tolerance in the Pak Mun civil group also sustained the Pak Mun civil group’s 
existence.   
Discussion and Conclusion: Pak Mun Civil Group 
Analysis of the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group involves data from the 
1990s until 2013, with most data collected between 2008 and 2009. Pak Mun 
villagers were affected by a dam construction project and formed a group 
when grievances, cultural aspect and the social capital factor were combined 
287  Interview with Poh Somkiat (Khong Jiem, Ubon Rathchathani, June 26, 2011). 




                                                   
to initiate the group of villagers into a form of civil society. Since the launching 
of the dam project in 1989, the civil group began to emerge out of traditional 
collaborative meetings at the villagers’ homes in Pak Mun village. The 
meetings were led by traditional leaders and elderly villagers of the Pak Mun 
community. They were, however, an innovative outgrowth of traditional ways 
of meeting and discussing. The group’s methods were based on traditional 
cultural ways of thinking and acting. There was concern for protecting the 
motherland. 
During the initial period, the Pak Mun civil group developed their 
group in order to appeal for their tenure rights, while the Thai state never 
stopped looking on their group as an impediment to the development of the 
Thai economy. The Thai state never sought to take a proactive approach to the 
establishment of the civil group by providing incentives for supporting the 
emergence of the civil group. Ultimately the Pak Mun Dam was completed, in 
1994, even though there were many confrontations between the Pak Mun civil 
group and the government throughout the period of the project construction. 
Moreover, the consequences of the dam construction stimulated the Pak Mun 
villagers to continue to operate as the Pak Mun civil group even after the dam 
had been completed. 
However, some NGOs were aware of the disruption to the villagers and 
they sought to assist. One of the NGO’s activists, Vanida, came to realise that 
the assistance provided by NGOs was not adequate, and problematic because 
of a lack of trust between them. The villagers also recognized this and 
distanced themselves from NGOs. Then Vanida left the NGO in order to help 
the villagers directly. This resulted in activist guidance to the villagers and 
sowed the seeds for the emergence of non-traditional development of a civil 
group. The Pak Mun civil group members learnt through this to organize 
themselves in order to respond to the Thai state. Once the civil group became 
established, due to the villagers’ grievances and the cultural aspects of the Pak 
Mun community, social capital development in terms of trust, social bonding 
and reciprocity in the Pak Mun community also came to be factors facilitating 
the development of the civil group.  
The Pak Mun civil group developed during the period the government 




universities, and other civil groups to build support. The civil group not only 
survived but also grew bigger, and established horizontal linkages to other 
groups. They marched to Bangkok to show the power of the civil groups 
network, with Pak Mun as the leader of the civil network organized by the 
NGO, the AOP. Their cause became a national issue, with the whole country 
now challenged by the villagers’ activities. This local civil group informed the 
city people of local village problems. 
Unfortunately, Vanida passed away at the end of 2007 and her main 
assistant, Nanthachote, died a few months later, in 2008. Afterwards, 
Thailand also faced a difficult national political situation of conflicting mass 
movements, between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, which took center 
stage. The local civil group retreated back to the village, due to the issue of the 
Pak Mun Dam having become, by that stage, just a minor conflict. However, 
the AOP survived, in altered form, and another assistant of Vanida and 
Nanthachote – Lah – tried to continue to guide the civil group as the AOP 
reorganized to become an NGO called PMove.  
The joining of the civil group to PMove, however, cut some of the 
traditional bonding of the Pak Mun civil group members. The Pak Mun civil 
group only had representatives in PMove, and the Pak Mun representative 
needed to follow the formal civil organization of NGOs. With that the 
leadership style changed because of the adaptation of function and form 
required to fit into the more complicated structure of an NGO network of civil 
groups. The formal style of how PMove operated as an NGO required 
adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group. As a result, some of the Pak Mun civil 
group members preferred to leave the group, while some of them joined 
PMove as the representatives of other groups, and so the civil group became 
smaller as participation declined. Thus, even though the Pak Mun civil group 
still survived, according to the definition of the aims of civil groups, the Pak 
Mun civil group underwent extensive changes, such that both the form and 
functions changed to be in accordance with NGOs.  
The Pak Mun civil group trajectory has resulted in development and 
changes over a long period of time. This study emphasizes the complex 




group. These can be analyzed according to the phases of the civil group 
context. 
The establishment phase of the Pak Mun civil group 
The Pak Mun civil group emerged out of a group of local villagers. The 
villagers were bound together according to the Thai local style of social 
bonding, by reciprocity and trust. During this initial stage, the Pak Mun civil 
group clearly revealed the presence of social capital through the social 
bonding of relationships between individuals, such as kinship, friendship and 
neighborliness. Beside these various aspects of Pak Mun social capital, there 
were also essential tools facilitating the formation of civil groups. 
The emergence of the civil group was triggered, however, by the 
pressure of the conflict between local people and the state. The villagers’ 
grievances initiated the emergence of the civil group. The grievance occurred 
because the Thai Government used the power of the state to drive the country 
to industrialization. The local villagers fought to protect the culture of their 
motherland and used their social capital to adapt. Moreover, trust between the 
villagers’ due to their social capital enabled the emergence of reciprocity at 
higher levels, which also occurred in the civil group. It can be seen that social 
capital components were the vital factors that facilitated the establishment of 
the Pak Mun civil group. 
Briefly, the civil group emerged in the space between state and local 
livelihoods, by generating social capital with culture and some stimulus 
factors. Social capital, in terms of trust and reciprocity, worked to support civil 
group social bonding and relations.  
The development phase of the Pak Mun civil group 
At the development phase, the civil group of local villagers was strengthened 
by the innovation of a new identity, namely Mae Mun Man Yean village. This 
model village showed how they could create and organize a group of local 
villagers in terms of local civil society. These villagers worked using local 
knowledge and culture, which resulted in integrating the informal functions 
and form into the Mae Mun Man Yean village. The flexible functions and form, 
along with the self-organization of the Pak Mun civil group, indicated the 




civil group adjusted its structure to support joining the AOP, which escalated 
networks and improved the civil group organization powerfully.  
Significantly, social capital played a vital role in strengthening the Pak 
Mun civil group. Firstly, trust and reciprocity maintained the informal civil 
group structure, in both the innovation and self-organization of the civil group, 
without the support of the business and political sectors. Secondly, the actors 
in the Pak Mun civil group employed trust and reciprocity in order to bind 
together the civil group members, activists and leaders. Thirdly, trust also 
connected the Pak Mun civil group with other civil groups and NGOs, in both 
horizontal and vertical interactions, even though there was a lack of trust for 
the vertical and horizontal interactions with the state. 
It can be seen that social capital involved all components for 
strengthening the Pak Mun civil group. Nonetheless, this study examines two 
different aspects of social capital at this stage. The internal factors of social 
capital within the Pak Mun civil group developed the consciousness of home 
place through social relations. The generating of social bonding, trust and 
reciprocity produced the unity of the group, which ultimately appeared in the 
aspect of the values and norms of civil organization. In terms of the external 
factors of social capital, the social capital elements within the Pak Mun civil 
group are the grounding for social networks. However, the external social 
capital is weakened by the political confrontation brought by mass 
mobilization. 
 
The sustaining phase of the Pak Mun civil group 
The Pak Mun civil group’s sustainability emphasized civil group adaptation 
through linkages. Horizontal linkages focussed on how the civil group 
associated with other groups. Regarding this, this study found the adaptation 
of the Pak Mun civil group developed when the Pak Mun civil group connected 
to PMove. The Pak Mun civil group adaptation showed in terms of changing 
the traditional style of organization from informal to formal, damaging unity 
and social capital. 
Moreover, the group established more and wider goals with other civil 
groups in the PMove network, although some of the Pak Mun civil group 




vertical linkages between the Pak Mun civil group and the Thai state were 
insufficient. Their broken relationship at all phases pushed the Pak Mun civil 
group to connect through horizontal linkages and ultimately led to mass 
mobilization. In terms of the vertical linkages of the Pak Mun civil group, 
connections to state institutions were insufficient due to having a broken 
relationship from the beginning. There was one channel to encourage the 
linkages of the Pak Mun civil group and the state, namely NESAC, but it has 
not been useful recently. 
In the case of social capital, this study examines how social capital 
within the development phase produced the key factor for the Pak Mun civil 
group adaptation. The Pak Mun civil group developed their social capital from 
a personal or individual level to a collective level. The experience of trust in 
personal relationships became trust in the organization’s value. The link to the 
other civil groups with the AOP showed the wider social network, while 
indicating that the personal bonding needed the value of a group or an 
organization to confirm their trust.  
This study uses the phases of civil society framework in order to clarify 
its practical form and function, and also to examine the ways to develop and 
sustain Pak Mun civil society. In this regard, the study portrays the possible 
consequences of the Pak Mun civil group dynamic, which relates to developing 
appropriate and realistic roles for local civil organizations.  
Firstly, the Pak Mun civil group emerged as a civil organization through 
the mindfulness for the protection of their motherland. The civil group 
successfully developed through their social capital, which shows how self-
organization of local people established a civil organization. It successfully 
countered the belief that the destruction of their livelihoods was pushing the 
local people to become out of control and violent. 
Secondly, social bonds provided trust and reciprocity, assisted by the 
confidence provided by the citizens’ rights in the Thai constitution, which 
served as an incentive. Regarding this, the new form of local people as a civil 
group developed through social networks. The strengthening of social capital 
was a good grounding in civil adaptation in order to support the linkages 
within social networks. Thus social bonding that is too tight appears to be the 




formal management aspects, even though this study also found limits to the 
strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group. Social bonding was defective 
because most of the group members and leaders were the elder villagers, and 
they seemed to lack any new civil members from the younger generation.  
Thirdly, to sustain the civil group according to the civil society model, 
the civil group needed to adapt. In this case, the Pak Mun civil group 
associated with other civil groups in terms of the civil group network and 
finally, joined to PMove, which required adaptation. This link resulted in the 
loss of civil group identity and self-organization.  
Fourthly, the study nevertheless argues that vertical interaction at the 
development phase could be possible and provide a chance to reduce the gap 
between state and local people. At the very least it could deal with the specific 
problems of each case and so be a good opportunity for reconciliation 
processes to be successful. It is more likely that this would occur if individuals 
in the civil group interacted themselves to address their specific issues rather 
than through group representatives or NGOs at the national stage.  
To examine civil society in the Thai context, this study examines two 
civil groups in the second case study. Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 






The Case Study of Baan Krut  
and Bor Nork Civil Group 
 
“We will protect our birthplace from exploitation by the state and we might 
suffer in prison or death.” (Charoen Wat-agsorn)1 
 
The Background of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged locally from two groups of 
villagers in the face of ongoing threats that industrial development would 
occur in the region. In 2008, a threat arose from Sahaviriya Steel Industries 
PCL (SSI), which planned the largest fully integrated flat steel plant to be 
established at Bang Sa Parn, near Baan Krut. Villagers at Bang Sa Parn are 
also being supported by the civil group network which emerged and developed 
from the Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant project conflicts. The 
regional civil group networks are not affiliated to any NGOs and are 
successfully sustaining themselves in order to continue to address issues as 
they arise. The civil group network remains under complete local control and 
leadership. 
 The civil groups started as an activity of the local village of Bor Nork, 
where the first coal-fired station was planned. A young local villager, Charoen 
Wat-agsorn, emerged as leader of the civil group. He was not a formal local 
village leader, but the group he established got support from the local village 
leaders and some local government officers. He had learnt from the civil group 
activities at Pak Mun, and then he invited Vanida (Pak Mun advisor) to be a 
Bor Nork consultant. Unfortunately, he was killed after he took charge of 
opposition to this project. However, his wife, Korn-uma (Krarok), took over 
and continued to be the leader, guided by Vanida (Vanida passed away from 






                                                   
cancer in 2007). Afterwards, the Bor Nork civil group became linked to the 
Baan Krut and other civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan province. 
 The Baan Krut civil group and Bor Nork civil group emerged about the 
same time, and also in the face of pressure from the coal-fired power plant 
project, planed by the Thai state with the state agency EGAT (see the section 
on the background of the case study, pp. 45–46). The Baan Krut villagers 
formed a civil group, which used the close social relation with the civil group 
at Bor Nork and also used Vanida. The two leaders of the two civil groups 
knew each other, which resulted in them being able to support each other in 
terms of protecting their home villages in particular. However, they both 
worked independently, and a network was established that grew to include six 
other local civil groups as well.2  
 In this case, the civil groups had faced sophisticated responses from the 
government and EGAT, who tried to push the projects through the public 
hearing legitimately, even though it was a deceptive process organized by state 
agencies. They formed a tripartite committee and many reconciliation 
processes were instigated by the company, which was also hired by state and 
EGAT (Confederation of Consumer Organization, 1997). Both Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork had also learnt from the Pak Mun civil group lesson, which resulted 
in them successfully strengthening and sustaining themselves without losing 
their civil groups’ identity, in particular. 
 The Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant projects, even 
though inhibited by the local civil groups, could be constructed because they 
were on Thai Government contracts. Consequently, the local civil group in 
Prajuab Kirikhan has been looking out for their home village continually. 
Furthermore, the civil groups network had recently shown their strength in 
terms of helping each other. Specifically, they showed the ability to build civil 
group networks. Also, this civil group could survive even without a leader 
when the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana, was imprisoned for alleged 
trespass onto the areas of the company when leading resistance to the building 
of the coal-fired power plant in 2011. 






                                                   
 Jintana was released from prison after four months. She has been 
continuously leading the civil groups in order to look after the Baan Krut 
community to prevent harmful environmental consequences until now. 
Similarly, the widow of the former leader of the Bor Nork civil group, Korn-
uma, has been working as the leader of the civil group with a lengthy and 
persistent struggle of other members of a group called ‘Love Bor Nork group’. 
Later, in 2013, the case of the murder of Charoen Wat-agsorn was finally 
denied by the appeal court because there was not enough evidence to support 
his murder case. 
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had built their network. Six 
civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan emerged in terms of environmental 
protection, in 2008, and they increased to be eight groups in 2011. However, 
the number of these civil groups is flexible due to the informal aspects under 
the civil society concept. Thus Baan Krut and Bor Nork are still the main civil 
groups; in particular, both civil groups have supported not only the other civil 
groups in provincial and regional areas, but also the wider network of the 
other civil groups around Thailand. They connected to many civil groups, such 
as the civil group in Kra-bi and Nakorn-Sri-Tammarat provinces in the south 
of Thailand. Significantly, they are the key main civil groups, which were 
fundamental to the national civil groups network in terms of Thai energy 
reform.  
 The network of civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan province has strong 
unity. One civil group initially involved decided to take funding from an 
external business agency but was then expelled from the civil group network 
in 2012. Moreover, Baan Krut and Bor Nork had independent linkage to the 
national mass mobilization in 2013, which showed their liberated organization. 
In this case, national mass mobilization opposed the Thai state in the form of 
the Yingluck government. Consequently, reforming energy management in 
Thailand was an issue raised by the group of the mass mobilization leaders in 
order to get more local groups to oppose the state. Nevertheless, the Baan 





Civil Society Establishment of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
Villagers 
The two civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, are well known widely as the 
communities that are concerned about the environmental preservation of 
their home villages. However, this study examines the trajectory of both civil 
groups in order to seek out the roles of the grassroots as civil society 
organizations by using the research framework previously developed. The 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are described in detail on the frame of 
establishment, development and sustaining phase. 
The emergence of grassroots civil society: Baan Krut and Bor  
Nork Civil Group 
As previously mentioned, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged 
about the same time. According to Anan3, a group of Bor Nork villagers began 
uniting into a group after hearing that the coal-fired power plant would be 
located in their home village. Government information released also pushed 
the villagers to get together in order to discuss the destruction of their 
livelihood. The call for the announcement of a meeting of the local 
government officer was interesting for a lot of villagers.  
 At that time, Anan, who was a primary school teacher in Bor Nork, 
seemed to be the leader for raising questions about the project in the meeting. 
After the official meeting by the local government, the Bor Nork villagers 
started having informal group discussions. At the beginning, they met at 
school, otherwise at the temple. Sometimes the meetings took place at some 
villagers’ houses. It was a flexible arrangement at first for their meetings.4  
 Similarly, the Baan Krut civil group emerged shortly after the Bor Nork 
coal-fired power plant project was announced. The case of Bor Nork also 
reminded the Baan Krut villagers about the effects of the project, in the same 
way as the Bor Nork villagers had learnt from the lesson of Mae Moh coal-
fired power plant in Lampang province, known as an environmentally 
degraded area. 
3   Interview with Anan (Bor- Nowk, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 






                                                   
 Jintana5, the leader of Baan Krut civil group, revealed that the group of 
villagers in Baan Krut emerged because they were concerned that the coal-
fired power plant project may harm their livelihoods. Afterwards, the Baan 
Krut villagers investigated and continually examined the progress of the 
project. For instance, they were watching the rushed purchase of large plots of 
land and estates around the Baan Krut area. Moreover, they connected to 
some NGOs and academics in order to get more information relating to the 
project. The Baan Krut civil group mostly used Jintana’s house as a center as 
her house was the grocery shop where the villagers could sit and chat. 
 Even though the projects were halted as a result of the disapproval of 
local villagers, the projects were still on a state contract and could be restarted 
at any time. This situation sparked the villagers in both areas to watch their 
homes before it was too late. Nevertheless, there were some violent 
confrontations, particularly in terms of mass mobilization and the case of the 
killing of the Bor Nork civil group leader, Mr. Charoen Wat-agsorn. The group 
of Bor Nork villagers worked together to oppose the coal-fired power plant 
project, and the group of Baan Krut villagers also attempted to protect their 
community in the same way, and both groups connected to NGOs.  
 The NGOs played a role for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups as 
supporters. Sureerat6, a local NGO leader in Prajuab Kirikhan, revealed an 
experience she had with local civil groups in this province, and both Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork in particular. She disclosed that the local people in Prajuab 
Kirikhan province seemed very keen to respond to the state and the state 
agency by themselves. Consequently, the NGOs had just assisted and mostly 
provided information, on an ongoing basis. The enthusiasm of these civil 
groups is shown in many kinds of actions from their beginning in 1997 until 
now. The Bor Nork civil group was known as Group Rak Thongthin Bor Nork7, 
while the Baan Krut civil group was named Group Anurak Baan Krut.8 
However, the researcher uses the terms Baan Krut civil group and Bor Nork 
civil group for this research. 
5  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
6  Interview with Sureerat (Tub Sa Kae, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 20, 2008). 
7  Group Rak Thongthin Bor Nork = กลุ่มรักษท์อ้งถ่ินบ่อนอก 




                                                   
 In this section, the study examines the related factors of the emergence 
of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, and considers the social capital in 
terms of culture, incentive and grievances in both cases. 
Social capital in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
At this stage, the explanation of social capital outlined by the research 
framework will be presented. Social capital factors are essential fundamental 
factors of civil society development and sustaining phases. Social capital 
provided social bonding for the groups. Moreover, social relations in the case 
also brought about the social capital factors such as trust and reciprocity, 
which were activated primarily through the networks. 
 Both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged informally, 
which related significantly to the social relations in their groups. Korn-uma 
(Karok)9 told the researcher that she and her husband (Charoen)10 joined the 
group of villagers, which was supported by Anan and other villagers. All the 
original small group members were Bor Nork residents and they were mostly 
connected by friendship. Anan11, who was known as Kru-Tui, revealed that the 
group of villagers started as a small group of friends and their families. He 
said group discussion took place at the morning market, which was where they 
usually exchanged information. The coal-fired power plant project was a 
serious issue that caused the Bor Nork villagers concern about their 
livelihoods. Consequently, this project became the key issue that motivated 
more Bor Nork villagers to get together in order to deal with its imminent 
effects.  
 Anan and a few teachers took charge of arranging the meetings the first 
few times. Although he denied that he was the leader of the Bor Nork civil 
group, he also said, “I guess the villagers think me and the other teachers were 
educated so we seemed to be the leaders inevitably. At that time, we tried to 
contact anyone who could provide information about the coal-fired power 
plant project, including the ongoing Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project 
9   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 23, 2008). 
10 Charoen Wat-agsorn was the leader of Bor Nork civil group. 






                                                   
in Lampang … we started to contact friends and family. We hoped at least they 
could help …” 
 The Bor Nork meetings at the beginning were run by Anan and friends, 
and they initially used the connections of friends and families. In this regard, 
the Bor Nork civil group showed that social bonding in this community 
underpinned the civil group formation. At least it facilitated the civil group to 
get members and seek information in order for the group to continue 
operating. 
 At that time, the group of Bor Nork villagers also used their social 
relations for wider communication. Anan said that he and a group of teachers 
gave a newsletter to their students. It was about the coal-fired power plant 
project and it was like an invitation to the civil group meeting. Anan said, “I 
was pretty sure that the parents love their children. The information would 
make them concerned about their kids’ future, so my students brought their 
parents to meetings.” The Bor Nork villagers built more connections through 
their relationships. Social bonding in the community seemed to be a channel 
for forming the civil group, particularly through parent and teacher 
relationships.    
 Similarly, social relations also played an important role for the 
formation of the Baan Krut civil group. Jintana12 told the researcher that the 
group of Baan Krut villagers had gathered before the official announcement 
from the state. They knew about the project through the Bor Nork case. The 
villagers guessed the project would come to Baan Krut. As a result, they 
started to discuss the project at her place, which was a local convenience shop. 
It seemed to be the center of information for customers, which included both 
friends and others. 
 Arpichart13, a Baan Krut villager, revealed that the coal-fired power 
plant project seemed to be just a rumor at first, but there were some friends 
and families who helped to find out about this project. He asked his friend’s 
cousin, who worked at the Energy Department, to check on the possibility of 
this project. Also, Jintana said that she and some villagers found information 
about an offer to buy a large area of land, which they supposed was for the 
12  Informal interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008). 




                                                   
project. Afterwards, Jintana’s house became a place for meetings and group 
discussion for the villagers. Even though the meetings started with a few 
villagers, it got a lot more villagers in the next few months. She said, “The 
villagers’ relationships in our community were strong; even though we are not 
real siblings or definitely in the same family, we were willing to help each 
other, especially for our hometown.”  
 Social relations in these communities were not the only key factor for 
building social networks and connections in the civil groups. Social relations 
also brought about social bonding in terms of social capital factors, such as 
trust, values, norms and reciprocity. For example, some villagers trusted Anan 
and the group of teachers because they taught their children. Chaleaw14, a Bor 
Nork villager, told the researcher that: “Kru15 Tui (Anan) was the only 
educated person among local villagers once we were in the meeting with the 
government officer. Besides, he is an educated person, I believe that Kru must 
be a good person otherwise he couldn’t teach students. So I and other villagers 
were willing to join the meeting that he arranged afterwards.”  
 He also said that joining the meeting should be a way to help the Bor 
Nork community to get rid of the coal-fired power plant project. Importantly, 
the group of teachers who created the meetings had to have a good vision for 
the village. Consequently, it was reasonable to follow them. In the same way, a 
villager, Sanan16, said that he and his friends had been coming to the meetings 
since the beginning because they thought the teachers must know that the 
coal-fired power plant project would impact badly on the villagers’ livelihoods. 
And he and his friends believed that the group meetings involved business 
interests.  
 Accordingly, the researcher17 concluded that the beginning of the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups came through using social relations in a kind 
of friendship and kinship network for forming their groups. Moreover, the 
case of the Bor Nork civil group also showed social capital in terms of trust 
which emerged through social relations, such as friends and families, and the 
relationship of Anan and his students, while the building of trust was based on 
14  Interview with Chaleaw (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan , April 3, 2008). 
15  Kru = ครู means teacher 
16  Interview with Sanan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008). 




                                                   
his acknowledgement of a good teacher. Likewise, Korn-uma18 commented 
that the group of Bor Nork villagers seemed to get together easily because they 
trusted in their friendship due to living in the same village. She said, “I’m sure 
that we have the same feeling and are concerned the project will destroy our 
homes … I love my birthplace and we must have the same feeling that brings 
us together. I trust the love we all have for our birthplace, so that is the reason 
why we trust each other easily.”   
 Thus the civil groups indicated that social capital, in terms of trust, 
relied on social connections or social bonding. The villagers seemed to believe 
or trust in their families, friends and whoever identified as Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork residents. In particular, to trust the villagers who lived in the same 
communities seemed to be a loose bond but it also appeared to be a key tool 
for the civil group forming, the same as the other kinds of social bonding.  
 For instance, Samran19, a Bor Nork villager, and Pra Wichit20, a monk 
in Bor Nork temple, told the researcher that they are the older brothers of 
Charoen Wat-agsorn and they have worked for the Bor Nork civil group since 
the beginning, while La-aong21, Tanomsak22 and Pratiew23 have also worked 
with the group, even though they knew each other as just villagers who lived in 
Bor Nork. Similarly, Jintana’s husband Itsara24 worked hard to support his 
wife as a leader of the Baan Krut civil group. Whereas Narong25 and Somdej26, 
Baan Krut villagers, came to join the group as villagers concerned about their 
hometown.  
 On this point, the researcher27 believes that there was a similar kind of 
social bonding in both civil groups in terms of a loose bonding aspect apart 
from the social bonding as family. The loose bonding aspect appeared in terms 
of the civil group members being less concerned about kinship than friendship 
or neighborliness. According to Anan28 (Bor Nork) and Jintana (Baan Krut)29, 
18  Informal group discussion (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
19  Interview with Samran (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
20  Interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
21  Interview with La-aong (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
22  Interview with Tanomsak (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
23  Interview with Pratiew (Bor Nork temple, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
24  Interview with Itsara (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
25  Interview with Narong (Baan Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008). 
26  Interview with Somdej (Bann Krut, Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008). 
27  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
the groups started with many kinds of relationships, and family connections 
were helpful tools for the group progressing. Thus all connections were tied to 
trust among the villagers. 
 In other words, the civil group members were less concerned about 
kinship than friendship or neighborliness. Social relations were the vital factor 
for the group forming, thus social bonding was not necessarily tight. As 
Jintana30 said, “We don’t know or care much about whether whoever wants to 
join the group would be our families or not, but we believe that we all love and 
wish our birthplace would grow sustainably.” And Anan31 said they had less 
concern about how close the member relationship was, “… even though a close 
relationship, such as a family member, is helpful for communication in the 
group. However, we trust one thing – the Prajuab Kirikhan residents’ 
character. We have known as southern Thais (Khon Tai)32 a kind of sincere 
and strong people … so we simply trust each other.”  
 The researcher33, moreover, noted that both civil groups trust in their 
neighbors. Almost all the participants in these civil groups for this research 
are friends rather than families, and they easily trust each other as residents in 
the same area. Regarding this point, this study concluded that the forming of 
both civil groups comprised simply trust, which emerged through loose 
bonding. Loose social bonding came from having the same social 
characteristic of southern Thais, called ‘Khon Tai’. However, the most 
important aspect of this point was that simple trust, from a loose bonding 
among the villagers in both civil groups, appeared to be the most significant 
key support for the wider alliance of the civil groups and could enable the civil 
groups to get more villagers to join the groups. 
 Sureerat34, an activist in Prajuab KiriKhan province, commented on 
this point, that trust among the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups appeared in terms of the southern identity, which perceives Khon Tai 
as strong, trustworthy and sincere. She also commented that trustworthiness 
usually appears in local culture, particularly in a society where people need to 
29  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008). 
30  Interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008).    
31  Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
32  Khon Tai = คนใต ้
33  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April, 2008). 




                                                                                                                                                 
support each other. Consequently, this led the study to rely more on social 
capital factors, which significantly related to culture. 
 As mentioned previously, social capital contains several factors that 
support the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups forming. Both Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork civil groups claimed the group of villagers seemed to have great 
confidence in their southern identity. Songsak35, a Bor Nork villager, told the 
researcher that Bor Nork villagers are strong and brave to act on what they 
believe. Moreover, he said that the villagers are proud of their southern 
identity, with its down-to-earth character. “I have been in the group for many 
years. Khon Tai must be very earnest. Especially the case to protect our 
hometown from this project so we won’t let it happen to us, like Mae Moh 
villagers, because they are just too kind.” 
 A central government officer36 told the researcher about her experience 
with civil groups noting that the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups have strong and straightforward characters. She said, “These villagers 
have the Khon Tai style which is intrepid and brave. They won’t care about 
anything if they think they’re right. It is easier to deal with other villager 
groups.”   
 Both civil groups seemed to be proud of their character, which also 
brought them together to resist the projects. For example, a villager of Baan 
Krut, Chartchai37, talked about his confident pride in southern people and 
said it must be a common feeling of the Baan Krut villagers generally. He said, 
“Opposing the coal-fired power plant project needs our dedicated people, such 
as Khon Tai, who are very brave same as us. You will see the megaproject 
could be built at many places around Thailand, but not in the south.” Based on 
this, the villagers in both groups believe that the southern identity has specific 
value to them. This could produce trustworthiness that bonds them together 
and builds unity.  
 Furthermore, the groups of villagers in Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
appeared to be confident in terms of having good quality livelihoods. 
35  Interview with Songsak (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
36  Interview with central government officers (Bangkok, February 11, 2008). 




                                                   
According to the Bor Nork villagers38, they are basically independent. The 
villagers mostly have their own land and careers, such as pineapple farm 
owners, asparagus farm owners, and some of them own boats for the local 
fishery. Likewise, Jintana said the Baan Krut villagers mostly have their own 
land and businesses. She said, “Fortunately, the villagers won’t worry much 
about leaving their jobs to participate in protecting our home place. To own 
farms does not require them to work every day, and the production is quite 
definitely stable.”   
 Some government officers39 also said that they think well-being is the 
point that supported the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities to be strong 
communities, so that it is difficult to negotiate with them through money. In 
terms of this, the researcher views that both being confident in their southern 
identity and having good livelihoods gives a strong grounding to the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups so they are committed to creating groups 
without state agency intervention, such as resources offered, or any 
propaganda. Likewise, a villager40 in Bor Nork revealed that he refused an 
agent who tried to buy his land, which was supposed to be for building the 
coal-fired power plant. The agent also wanted him to convince his cousins, 
who owned the land around his, to sell their land too. 
 Similarly, a villager41 in Baan Krut said that there was a guy who asked 
him to convince other villagers to sign a letter that supported the coal-fired 
plant project. He said, “The offer was he would pay 1,500 baht each and I 
could get 500 baht each too.” He refused that offer and said, “It was too cheap 
to buy me and I think I will earn much more than that if I and Baan Krut 
villagers protect our land.” Other villagers as well told about the coal-fired 
power plant project agents coming around to convince the villagers. The 
agents said that the coal-fired power plant would support the Baan Krut 
villagers to get good jobs, because more than 3,000 workers would be needed 
for the project. Nevertheless, the villagers refused all kinds of offers as they 
had confidence in their own lifestyles and careers.  
38  Group interview with villagers (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
39  Interview with government officer (Prajuab Kirikhan, March 24, 2008). 
40  Interview with villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
 Accordingly, the researcher42 considers that these civil groups were 
formed by groups of villagers, possible due to their self-esteem and confidence. 
Moreover, the villagers’ self-esteem and confidence also related to the factor of 
trust in relation to their connections through social ties in the villages. 
Consequently, this study examines the self-esteem and confidence of the 
villagers, as significant supporting factors for facilitating social capital and 
building civil groups.  
 In the case of social capital, reciprocity was also important to both civil 
groups forming. Female Bor Nork villagers 43 told the researcher that the 
villagers supported each other in many ways by encouraging the meetings. For 
example, some of them left their children together while the parents went to 
the meeting. In the same way, Panya44, the Baan Krut villager, said he even 
took turns to look after farms with his friends, so he could follow the progress 
of the civil group.  
 The reciprocity that occurred in both civil groups at this stage seemed 
to be loose because there has unexpected in helping each other or exchange. 
The reciprocity of both civil groups occurred together with other social capital 
factors. The reciprocity aspect consequently appeared along with social 
relations, and mutual trust and confidence of the villagers. For instance, as 
Panya said, “… helping each other is the good thing we usually do for people 
around us. However, to help others depends on how close the relationship is.” 
In the same way, Jintana said the villagers are confident: “Khon Prajuab (or 
Khon Tai), we don’t like to ask for help if it’s not necessary … and there was 
nothing serious in terms of the need for support for the group meeting. I think 
it was done individually.” Nonetheless, because social capital factors are 
related, so the reciprocity of both civil groups would appear in other issues of 
the research framework. 
 Again, the framework of this study finds that social capital for the 
emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups was closely related to 
cultural aspects. Moreover, the incentive and grievance issues also 
significantly impacted on the forming of these civil groups. 
42  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
43  Interview with villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
Baan Krut and Bor Nork community cultural aspects  
Cultural aspects were the key factor for the emergence of the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork civil groups in term of the social capital component. Thus the 
examination of cultural aspects and social capital are inevitably related.  
 This study looked into the lifestyle of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers, 
together with their traditional circumstances, which motivated and/or 
encouraged the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers to form civil groups. 
Regarding this, the study determined that social relations are also related to 
the cultural aspect due to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork livelihoods and 
lifestyles being based strongly on their ancestors. The Bor Nork village 
leader45 said, “Most of the villagers in Bor Nork community have lived in this 
area a long time, many generations. We know each other by name, otherwise 
by the parents, so we can ask who is your dad or mom or your grandad?” The 
researcher thinks that the kind of long-term residence showed in the strong 
social bonds and social relations by sharing community ancestry, and it 
resulted in terms of kinship.  
 From the Bor Nork village group discussion46, the villagers commented 
in the same way on the cultural aspect, in terms of respect for ancestors, that 
it was based on spending a long time building up theirfortunes. They thought 
that all properties, and land in particular, came from the sacrifices of their 
parents. A villager47 said, “We know that our family faced a lot of difficulty in 
order to get this land ready to farm, so it is very valuable and honors our 
ancestors.” Similarly, the Baan Krut villagers48 told the researcher about their 
parents’ stories. One villager who owned a local fishery revealed that: “The 
coal-fired power plant could give us work as staff but it won’t be worth it at all 
if we replace our career with that job. Our career is like the traditional 
inheritance from our grandparents.” Moreover, the villagers believed that all 
traditional lifestyles must be respected and they should keep them as long as 
they can. 
 Accordingly, the villagers presented their culture in terms of having 
strong respect for their ancestors. Based on this, the farms and properties 
45  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
46  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
47  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
given by their parents became the motivation for protecting their homeland. 
Similarly, a villager49 revealed that her family boycotted one of her siblings 
because she sold part of her land to the agent. “We are proud of keeping our 
land to farm, same as our grandad and dad have done in the past.” She also 
revealed that her sister sold the land to the agent of the coal-fired plant project.  
It was very shameful for her and other family members: “… because people 
here (Bor Nork) know each other well, so to sell the land seemed like my sister 
betrayed our parents because her sister would be the one who let the project 
come to destroy our hometown, while the others wanted to protect it.” 
 In the case of the Baan Krut community, the villagers have almost the 
same lifestyle. The villagers respected their grandparents strongly due to the 
inherited kinds of careers, such as agriculture and fishing. Moreover, the 
protection of their homeland was taught to the next generation. For instance, 
a 24-year-old villager50 told the researcher that he believes in his parents 
enough to keep the local lifestyle. He said, “I am a young man in a young 
generation and I definitely love technology, but I think developing my 
homeland by building the coal-fired plant must be wrong and will destroy 
what our grandparents have done. If I have to choose, I of course choose to 
continue my parents’ idea.”  
 In this case, the researcher51 notes that these comments about the 
parental respect of the local villagers became the cultural-based aspect for the 
villagers in these communities. This kind of respect also showed the 
traditional perspectives, which are based on belief in the ancestors and 
through their livelihoods, in terms of careers such as farming, on their 
homeland and the local fisheries.  
 Thus the villagers also indicated that parental respect built up the 
villagers’ appreciation of local livelihoods, which was enhanced by social 
bonding such as kinship. However, the parental respect perspective also 
became the villagers’ inspiration for protecting their homeland. This was Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork’s common view, which ultimately integrated the local 
49 Interview with a villager (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
50 Interview with a villager (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008). 




                                                   
people in these communities together in terms of the environmental groups, 
namely ‘Group Anurak Baan Krut’ and ‘Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork’. 52 
The incentive or stimuli issues for the emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil group 
The incentive issues for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ formation 
appeared to be based on the villagers’ perspective in terms of protecting their 
birthplace. According to both Baan Krut and Bor Nork group discussion53, the 
villagers said that the need for keeping the local lifestyle, which is based on the 
homeland, and their vacations were the most important reasons that led them 
to oppose the large project. However, the incentive issues in this case 
appeared obviously in terms of the stimulus factor in relation to the 
environmental degradation and state dishonesty. 
The stimuli issue: The environmental degradation concerns 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired power plant projects were on the Thai 
national plan for industrial development. There had been similar projects in 
the places they had provided to lessen the negative effects on these civil 
groups; for example, the Mae Moh coal-fired plant project in Lampang 
province. 
 In this regard, Anan and the Bor Nork villagers54 told the researcher 
about the beginning of the Bor Nork civil group meeting and that the Mae 
Moh project had been discussed as a previous awful case. At that time, there 
was less information about the effects of a coal-fired power plant. Thus Anan 
and some teachers in Bor Nork school attempted to find out more about how 
the Mae Moh community was affected by the coal-fired power plant project in 
different ways; for example, he contacted a friend who works in the Energy 
Department in order to learn about the definite effects of this kind of project. 
 Similarly, Jintana55 revealed that the Baan Krut villagers also learnt 
from the Mae Moh lesson, particularly in the case of the impact on local 
villagers’ health. A power plant could prove lethal to the villagers, and she said, 
52   Fieldnote (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
53   Fielnote on Baan Krut and Bor Nork group discussions (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1-2,  
       2008). 
54   Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
“Importantly, both the Thai state and the state enterprise EGAT ignored that 
the coal-fired power plant has been killing the villagers in Mae Moh 
community, and we won’t let it come to kill us.” 
 In the case of the Mae Moh coal-fired power plant project, it has been a 
controversial case in terms of the slower pace of development by the Thai state. 
The Mae Moh community was plagued by contamination as the Mae Moh 
coal-fired power plant released large quantities of waste water continuously. 
Additionally, several lawsuits had been brought against the project owner, 
EGAT, in the case of crop damage and impact on health.56  
 In the case of the Bor Nork villagers, they thought the project was 
unnecessary. A villager57 said, “We need to keep our homeland clean, and the 
power from the project wouldn’t help our farms.” Thus Korn-uma said that 
the group of Bor Nork villagers was classed as a barrier to development: “Once 
the state representatives came to convince us, and my husband was the leader 
who talked to them. They told us that our country needs more power for 
economic development. If we oppose this project it means the Bor Nork 
villagers are selfish and oppose development as well.” 
 Additionally, Korn-uma58 (Bor Nork) and Jintana59 (Baan Krut) told 
the researcher that there were some meetings with government officers. The 
meetings explained the need to produce more electricity, and importantly, the 
presentation showed the coal-fired power plant projects are absolutely clean. 
Korn-uma said, “We know the power plant’s capacity could support just one 
department store so it is not worth it to develop it instead of our valuable 
home.”  
 Both Korn-uma and Jintana thought that the meetings were the way to 
let them support the government on political interests. The large projects were 
not needed but they actually support the business groups, and local villagers 
affected would be of no concern to them. Korn-uma60 also said, “If the coal-
fired power plant projects are clean or won’t have any bad effects, let them 
56  Green World (1994). 
57  Interview with a villager (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008). 
58  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
59  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 




                                                   
build them in their (the person who said the power plants are clean) home 
place.” 
 In the case of environmental degradation, both civil groups attempted 
to expand this issue into related organizations. For example, Jintana lead 
more than five busloads of villagers to meet a head of the department of 
marine sciences at Kasetsart University. The meeting was to ask the marine 
specialists at the university to study the Baan Krut coast area because the 
villagers thought that area possibly had good coral reefs and needed to be 
preserved. The villagers wished to get the specialists to come and survey it, 
and study it seriously. For the Bor Nork civil group, the Bor Nork villagers 
were concerned with a similar issue. They publicized pictures of whale sharks 
and Bryde’s whale near the Bor Nork coast. As a result, Bor Nork raised the 
issue of preserving the Bor Nork coast as a conservation area.  
 This study regards environment degradation concerns as an important 
incentive issue, which called the villagers in both communities into action, in 
terms of the civil group, from the beginning and these civil groups also kept 
this issue as a reason to oppose the projects and maintain unity.  
The stimuli issue: Dissatisfaction with the state response 
The plans for the coal-fired power plant project faced strong resistance from 
Thai people, especially local villagers. The issue of the negative impacts of the 
projects seemed to be in question. The information presented to the villagers 
was unclear. Importantly, the villagers had found different information from 
that which the state provided.61  
 The villagers62 revealed that they believed the state was insincere and 
extremely encouraging towards building these projects, even though the issue 
of environmental preservation was the essential point of concern.  
Consequently, they also believed that the state and its agents had to try many 
ways to carry out these projects. For instance, the state agencies attempted to 
brainwash the villagers. As Anan63 said, “There were some confrontations in 
Bor Nork as we (Bor Nork villagers) needed clearer information about the 
negative impacts of the coal-fired power plant, while the state agent took some 
61   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
62  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
local politicians and villagers to travel overseas in order to brainwash the 
villagers. Of course, they brought our friends to show just the good side of the 
coal-fired power plant.”  
 He also revealed that it was fortunate that the propaganda trip was 
unsuccessful since almost all of the villagers who traveled with the agent were 
still in opposition to the coal-fired power plant project.  
 The Baan Krut villagers complained that the plan of building this 
project was not indicated the concerning of the Thai state in the impact on the 
local villagers. The Thai state was also deceitful, using political propaganda to 
support the project. According to the researcher attempted to find out that 
why the coal-fired power plant project in Baan Krut called ‘Hin Krut’ even 
through this area called ‘Baan Krut’, a Baan Krut villager64 explained to the 
researcher that the name ‘Hin Krut’ referred to the submerged rocks along the 
Baan Krut coast. The response to the villagers argued that this area was 
useless, but well suited for the project. 
 Jintana and the group of Baan Krut villagers65 complained about the 
state agency attempting to mislead villagers and other Thai people by saying 
that the Baan Krut coastline has too many reefs and it is a worthless area so 
the state agency set the project’s name ‘Hin Krut’, which means ‘reef’. It made 
people confused so people might think the coal-fired power plant can use this 
area productively. It was the aim of the state and its agency that needed to 
working on the project by cheating Thai people. Jintana said, “The state 
doesn’t care that the project would ruin the natural resources or what bad 
things would happen to us. The state really needed to build the coal-fired 
power plant so they would do anything, even lie to the world.”  
 At the beginning, the villagers joined together, just to find out more 
information about the projects. They then found hidden information, which 
stimulated them to keep going to find out the facts about the coal-fired plant 
project. During the formative stage, both civil groups faced several kinds of 
state actions. The state reactions mostly aroused more villagers to oppose the 
projects.66 As Anan67 talked about the story of Bor Nork civil group, “In fact, 
64   Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
65   Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
the group at the first meeting was just less than ten villagers, but it got more 
villagers, such as Charoen, after the government cheated on us.” 
 Significantly, the villagers68 believed that the state response seemed to 
look down on the local people. Sawin69, the Bor Nork villager, said, “The 
government thinks we are such local villagers and must be stupid so they tried 
to wash our brains.” Whereas, Waree70, the Baan Krut villager, said, “The state 
agents think their money can buy us.” Moreover, Korn-uma revealed that the 
government had a budget to let the local leaders attend their seminars, which 
were the negotiation process. However, she also said, “Even though we are 
local and low educated, the local villagers could see through a trick of the state, 
and the worst thing the Thai state did to the local villagers who opposed the 
coal-fired power plant was to incriminate us. The state and the IPP pictured 
themselves as the developer while the local villagers were framed as hindering 
the development.” 
 Similarly, Jintana71 said the Thai state used aspects of the democratic 
process surreptitiously: “The government asked the local villagers to use the 
democratic system so we tried many ways to work on the right track, such as 
sending a million documents through the formal system under the 
bureaucratic processes … but what we did seemed to be meaningless so far. 
Importantly, the information we have studied on environmental issues went 
wrong at the end even though we studied with academics, specialists and 
NGOs, while the government accepted the EIA result without transparency.” 
 Anan72 also told the researcher that the villagers thought Thai 
democracy was flawed due to the actions of the government. The government 
asked the local villagers to respect the democratic system, but some processes 
showed that the democratic system went wrong in practice. He said, “We 
know that to follow the rule would be the right way to find a solution for both 
sides (state agency and villagers), but it was very stupid, wasn’t it? If the 
people who went to the public hearing mostly were not the Bor Nork residents 
… we need a fair democratic process.”  
67   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
68   Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
69   Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
70   Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
71    Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                                                                                                                 
 Regarding the issue of the villagers’ dissatisfaction with the state and 
confrontation, the researcher believes that state reactions appeared to be the 
vital factor in provoking the villagers in both communities. State reactions, 
such as using political propaganda or manipulating processes for 
confrontation between the state and the group of local villagers, stimulated 
the villagers to expand the group more widely. 
The grievance factors of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
At the beginning, the situation of both civil groups was fine. The villagers 
came to the meeting just for sharing what information they knew. However, 
the situation became worse after the state and the groups of villagers had 
many confrontations. Both civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, kept 
following the progress of the projects because of their serious concerns that 
the projects might begin immediately and it might be too late once they were 
under way.73 
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers had fought to protect their places 
from the coal-fired power plant projects. Nevertheless, the projects showed no 
sign of stopping; consequently, there were about 20,000 villagers who 
marched to the city center of Prajuab Kirikhan province in December 1998. 
The villagers comprised a big group of protesters who blocked the main road 
to the south. Unfortunately, there was a violent confrontation between the 
villagers and hundreds of policeman.74 Anan75 recalled that it was a serious 
situation because the local villagers were considered a kind of terrorist. He 
said, “The small group of villagers had held meetings continually, but the 
projects were still going on, so we decided to show our standpoint that we 
definitely don’t need the coal-fired power plant. Not only the Bor Nork 
villagers came to the protest, the protesters came from everywhere in Prajuab 
Kirikhan. Sadly, the government ordered the police to attack us.” 
 Pra Wichit76 revealed more about the confrontation in 1998; he said at 
that time some of the villagers could not stay at home or even at the temple, 
73  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
74  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
75   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
which was usually the place for group meetings. Samran77, as well, said that 
his brother Charoen was in danger because he played a very important role as 
one of the Bor Nork leaders at that time. The Bor Nork villagers78 told the 
researcher that the rising up of the locals occurred inevitably because the 
villagers were taken advantage of by the government. Prasert79, one of the Bor 
Nork protesters, said, “We did everything in the hope they would be the right 
ways in the democratic process. What we have done proved useless so we 
came to protest because the government never listens to us. If our country is 
under the democratic system then the government must listen to us, but the 
government responded to us violently.” 
 The rising up of the local villagers ended with a compromise. A public 
hearing for both projects was set. Nonetheless, the villagers were disappointed 
the government responded violently to them.80 
 The villagers81 said that both public hearings were done dubiously with 
no Prajuab Kirikhan residents. However, the coal-fired power plant projects 
were ultimately approved by a cabinet resolution. Afterwards, the state agency 
attempted to call the villagers to promote the advantages of the coal-fired 
power plants that the villagers had perceived conversely. As a result, the 
reconciliation process became more deception for the villagers. There were 
frequently rough confrontations between the state agency and the villagers. 
Moreover, the villagers strongly showed that they opposed all the state agency 
conciliations and kept contact directly with the government. 
 Jintana82 said the representatives of the villagers alternated to go to 
Bangkok in order to seek repeal of the projects. “We tried to do that for a year. 
Finally, both Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers went in their thousands to 
Bangkok a year later.” Korn-uma83 also told the same story that her husband 
Charoen took strong action in the group at that time. He offered to stop 
leading the villagers but he was denied. Anan also revealed that Charoen, in 
contrast, worked more dedicatedly for rejecting the projects. “At that time 
77   Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008). 
78   Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008). 
79   Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 3, 2008). 
80   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
81   Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
82   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 




                                                   
Charoen was the brave young man that encouraged a lot of villagers to join the 
group … Accordingly, we think that the killing Charoen aimed to eliminate the 
strongest leader of us, so the group would be weak. In contrast, to kill Charoen 
wasn’t scary to us but it was a more important reason to keep fighting.” 
 The villagers84 revealed that the incompatibility of the state agency and 
the villagers led to more violent polemics. In 2003, Jintana was sued for 
trespassing by the state agency, which related to the conflict on the coal-fired 
power plant project. It was a reminder to the villagers that they needed to 
respond to the opponents carefully. Significantly, the death of Charoen in 
2004 became the most powerful grievance and more reason for the local 
villagers’ opposition. The group of Bor Nork villagers had met routinely at the 
Bor Nork temple, in front of the dead body of Charoen.85 The 
villagers 86revealed that they kept fighting for their home place and also for 
the spirit of Charoen. Korn-uma87 also said, “At least the death of my husband 
must be worth making the issue of rights to protect our community to be of 
more concern.” 
 In summary, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups originated with 
social relations. Friends and families were the main relationship types, which 
supported the villagers to get together and build more connections. In 
particular, the role of teacher appeared to be important for the group at the 
beginning. The shared character of the villagers in terms of southern identity 
underpinned the villagers’ trust of each other and made them voice their 
opinions, especially regarding opposition to the coal-fired power plant project. 
Furthermore, the cultural aspect of both civil groups was strongly based on 
respect for parents. The concern for environment degradation was the 
incentive factor for the groups’ forming. The state response stimulated the 
groups to fight for their aims. Besides that, the grievances of the villagers 
facing violent reactions from the state and its agency, together with losing 
their leader, were factors that caused the civil group to associate more closely.    
84   Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008). 
85   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
86   Villager meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008). 




                                                   
The Development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Groups 
In this section, the study looks into the development of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups. The research framework is used as the key tool to analyze 
the groups’ development. The study points out how Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
villagers have developed since they formed as groups. To look at the 
development of both groups, this study also emphasizes the groups’ 
strengthening, which is framed by the groups’ structural aspects, actors, 
interactions and social capital. 
Strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups  
The explanation of the development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups started at the beginning of both groups, which were initiated by a few 
villagers. The Baan Krut villagers met at a local shop, while Bor Nork villagers 
joined together at the primary school and then moved to the Bor Nork temple. 
Both groups had attempted to fight to protect their places and livelihoods 
since 1996. The civil groups had strengthened gradually a few years later. 
Baan Krut became a well-known local environmental conservation 
organization called Group Anurak Baan Krut, and the Bor Nork civil group 
developed similarly to be called Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork.  
 The leader of Baan Krut, Jintana88, said the group had become stronger 
than where they started. “I don’t know how the strengthening of the group 
developed, but I believe that we are now strong enough to face off the 
opponents who want to destroy our home. We are ready to show that we have 
chosen a good and right thing for our hometown … we have come far. We will 
not only help our community but also look after others who were harmed by 
the state.” 
 In the case of the development of the civil groups, this study explains 
that the strengthening of the groups developed from just a local group 
concerned about a local issue to being an organization that can intervene in 
state decision-making. Similarly, as Korn-uma89 said, the Group 
Rakthongthin Bor Nork has been developed from a group of local villagers. 
The protest against the state at the beginning was about rejecting the coal 
88  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 




                                                   
fired power plant project, but the group currently has more concerns in terms 
of human rights issues, which are ignored by the Thai state. 
 Presently, the strengthening of both civil groups has prevented the 
coal-fired power plant projects. The plans of both projects were cancelled. 
Even though both civil groups still keep watching for further state action, the 
civil groups also play a role in helping other communities which are facing 
similar conflicts. 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group structure 
To analyze the structural aspects of the case study, this study focusses 
significantly on the function and form of the civil group. Regarding this, the 
form of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed in terms of 
informal organization. They both used personal relationships for building the 
group from the beginning. Civil group functions also operated informally 
through social relations and networks. 
 In the case of the civil group form, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups are organizations without a specific office. These groups operated any 
place depending on the kind of work to be done. For example, the Bor Nork 
civil group usually had meetings at the Bor Nork temple, but they met at the 
home of the village head sometimes. For Baan Krut, Jintana took the 
researcher to see the place for the group meeting. However, she insisted that it 
was not an official place to work for the Baan Krut civil group. Importantly, 
the group mostly worked in several places such as the town hall and her place. 
An official office was unnecessary for the operation of both civil groups.  
 The structural aspect of both civil groups was definitely informal. 
According to Anan90, the group of Bor Nork must be identified definitely as an 
informal organization even though the group tried to establish positions for 
the villagers in the group. The group of Bor Nork villagers had a simple 
arrangement in order to support their work productively. Consequently, the 
Bor Nork villagers started to have a group leader after the protest in 1998. He 
said, “We just do what we want to do to reach our aim (rejecting the project). 
We don’t need group management or any kind of organizing. So we just make 
everything simple; for example, when the group wanted someone to take 




                                                   
responsibility for finding a bus, we just asked the villagers in the meeting. 
Moreover, we can work anywhere and anytime that is comfortable for most of 
us. ” 
 In a similar way, the Baan Krut civil group developed as an informal 
organization. The structural aspect of the civil group comprised the local 
villagers working with local style. Jintana has been playing the role of a leader 
since the beginning. She believed the Baan Krut villagers worked for the group 
willingly even though they knew they would experience difficulty. 
Nevertheless, she confirmed that the group operates through villager unity. 
She91 said, “I think now (2008) the group works much better than when we 
started even though it is still kind of ‘we just help each other’ but everything 
seems easier than working formally ... Surely, we must have faced a lot of 
terrible barriers but I can confirm that nobody says no if we ask them to work 
for the group.” 
 Regarding this, the researcher thinks that Baan Krut indicated an 
informal form of civil group through the ways the villagers associated and 
worked. Civil group meetings were similar, as they came to have coffee 
together or visiting friends. Sometimes they came to the civil group meeting, 
at the same time dealing with their work. For example, a villager came to the 
meeting to talk about selling pineapples on his farm; he could get two jobs – 
for himself and for the village.92 
 In terms of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ organization, the 
study examines their organization by how the groups operated. In these cases, 
the researcher noted that the organizationof both civil groups operated in two 
kinds of work. Firstly, these groups worked on documents, particularly, to 
contact their networks in order to get more information. Accordingly, the 
groups needed to be proficient at managing and communicating.93 However, 
Jintana94 and Korn-uma95 told the researcher that they had a similar difficulty 
in terms of formal communication, which was needed when responding to the 
state. Korn-uma said, “To contact our networks is fine, but to contact the state 
91   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
92  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
93  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
94   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 




                                                   
needed everything to be formal, such as memoranda.” Jintana thought to put 
the local villagers into the formal system was the way to debilitate the group. 
She said, “It was the trick of the state because they thought we have less 
education and are weak so the state forced us to use a formal process. They 
asked for a memorandum, declarations in terms of documents to show 
evidence. They are very difficult for us.” 
 Korn-uma96 said that to contact government institutions, a formal 
document was needed. Nevertheless, the most difficult work was to get the 
right channel to talk to government representatives, who have the power to 
make a decision. She said, “The officers in the state institutions always asked 
for documents and then said our request was being processed. The cabinet 
also said they hadn’t seen the issue yet or the issue was in the consideration 
process.”  
 Thus both civil groups deal with this difficulty patiently by using their 
networks, which used their relationships. These groups showed their ability of 
classifying what jobs they could do by themselves or asked supporters instead. 
Regarding this, the researcher thinks that these civil groups operated 
productively even though some of the jobs were done by outsiders, such as to 
transtate information in English about the plan for projects; the civil groups 
were not able to do that job, but they could find others to work on it instead. 
Therefore, the civil groups showed the ability to operate the civil group’s work 
effectively. 
 Secondly, the operation of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
indicated in terms of the villagers’ actions. As Korn-uma97 said, the Bor Nork 
civil group called Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork is a small, local organization. 
The group seemed to be intangible because it does not have even an office. 
Nevertheless, the most important feature of both groups focussed on the 
groups’ actions, which comprised not only how to get large networks for 
helping them to limit weaknesses, such as the difficulty of low knowledge of 
legal issues, but group actions also contained the ability to deal with 
opponents, such as learning the state and the state agency compromise 
96   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
processes. This study believes that these showed that both civil groups were 
able to be pressure groups, which used their collective actions power.98 
 In the case of villager collective actions, this study looked into the 
villagers taking action for the civil groups. In particular, the actions that the 
groups used to pressure the state. The villager actions became the important 
key for both groups’ operations as their actions were the only way the villagers 
could present themselves in order to reach their aims. Like, Korn-uma said, 
“We don’t know what people call us. They probably think we are NGOs. Of 
course, we run the group without profit but we are not NGOs and not 
protesters. They will know what we are by looking at what we are doing. All 
that we are doing is for our community.”   
 Anan99 also told the researcher that the villager actions also have 
several levels based on the situation. He revealed that the group meetings had 
declined in the current year (2008), whereas there were innumerable 
meetings in previous years. It was because the present situation was hopeful 
for the villagers and there was no violent confrontation. He also explained that, 
“In the previous years the villagers had acted together as a group of protesters. 
The marching to Bangkok and blocking Prajuab Kirikhan province were the 
villagers’ reactions. All activities to respond to the opponents had been done 
by local villagers without the others, such as politicians and NGOs.” In the 
case of the villager reactions, the researcher noted that Anan tried to explain 
that the villagers’ uprising occurred as a resonse to the opponents, it was not 
the civil groups’ aim. 
  Sureerat100, a local NGO activist, commented on these civil groups, that 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork villager actions had shown the capability of both 
groups, which managed their works and roles productively. She said, “The 
villagers in Baan Krut and Bor Nork could deal with the difficult work in the 
negotiation process with the state in both direct and indirect ways. I think the 
villagers in these groups are good at managing their duties and roles, which 
relate to their responsibilities.” 
98   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
99    Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
 Similarly, as the Baan Krut villager101 said, “It was unnecessary to be in 
charge in the group all the time. Some roles need to be presented by the leader, 
and the villagers might need to show power which will be shown by us, just be 
ready for it.” On this point, Anan102 said that the actions of villagers presented 
the strong goals of the groups. There was a simple rule for the villagers to keep 
in mind. “We must think about our villages and we aim to protect them. 
Surely, we must pay for it, spending our personal money and time. However, 
we know that there nobody forced us to do that.” He also said that the aim of 
the villagers to protect their land led them to take action for the group 
willingly.  
 The civil groups operated casually but with a strong purpose. For 
Jintana, she thought that all the villager actions and group activities definitely 
followed the plans of the leaders. However, to reach the villagers’ aim would 
be the key factor for managing the groups effectively. She103 said, “The simple 
reason that the villagers were keen to take action was they don’t want to lose 
their good livelihoods.” Regarding this, the civil groups showed that the strong 
purpose of the groups pushed the villagers to take action in any roles, and the 
villagers took responsibility accordingly. In this regard, the study determined 
that the purpose of the groups related significantly to the organizing capability 
of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The purpose of the civil group was 
the guideline for the group actions. Consequently, these civil group leaders 
used the purpose of the groups to be a tool for designing the villagers’ actions. 
In other words, the purpose of the groups became the key tool for the 
functioning of group operation. 
 The structural aspects of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are 
difficult to identify due to their informal features. However, this study argues 
that the structure of these civil groups operated certainly as informal 
organizations. The functions of the civil groups operated by using the purpose 
of the group as the guideline for the villagers in playing roles and taking 
actions. The civil group functions mostly related to document-based 
communication and the civil groups’ activities and actions. The civil groups 
101  Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
102  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 





                                                   
organized importantly in terms of coordination or connections. Thus all 
functions operated informally by the social connections of the groups. 
Innovation and self-organization of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups 
To examine the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ development, the study 
looks at the civil groups’ strengthening in terms of the innovation of the 
groups’ organization, including self-organization. Accordingly, this section 
explains how the grassroots in both groups created their works and organized 
their own civil groups relatively. 
 As we saw in the previous section, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups were established informally by the social capital factor. However, these 
civil groups not only emerged from the grassroots in the communities 
themselves, but also were organized by their own knowledge, resources and 
time. For example, as Jintana 104(Baan Krut) said, the meetings were at her 
place. A small shed was beside her local convenience shop. Likewise, Korn-
uma105 (Bor Nork) reported that the villagers met mostly at the temple. These 
places seemed to be the main places for group meetings since 1998. However, 
the groups had other places for their meeting; for example, Jintana took the 
researcher to Bang Sa Parn city council hall when collecting data for this 
research in 2008, whereas Korn-uma showed the researcher around the Bor 
Nork community to see the other places for their meetings. On this point, this 
study considers that the issue of places to work implied they were able to both 
take care of themselves and organize themselves. For the Bor Nork civil group, 
Anan told the researcher that he once had a meeting with Charoen and other 
leaders in a small shed beside a big drainpipe. This was during the period of 
the serious confrontations before Charoen was killed.  
 The grassroots in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups created the 
operating system for organizing their group by themselves. The groups created 
group functions by using their social relations and cultural aspects. The 
villagers associated in the meeting by their social bonding through social 
relationships. Consequently, this study deems that getting the villagers to 
104  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 




                                                   
associate in the meetings, and the establishment of the civil groups afterwards 
indicated the innovation of the grassroots in terms of creating a participatory 
process in local communities. Moreover, the group of villagers also used 
cultural aspects to support their self-organization; for example, the local and 
casual lifestyle, which facilitated the meetings to take place anywhere and 
anytime.106 
 With support from social capital factors, the civil group meetings were 
produced by the coordination ability of the villagers. Watcharee107, an NGO 
activist from Bangkok, who was one of the group consultants, said that the 
group of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers created the civil groups for 
protecting their places by themselves. These groups had designed their work 
and assigned who would take action or responsibility for their plans from the 
beginning. As well, Sureerat confirmed that both civil groups operated well, 
even though they needed some support from her and others. The groups 
mostly needed support in terms of information, documents – particularly 
documents in English – and in the details of law. Thus these groups operated 
independently. All the group actions were made by their own decisions. In this 
regard, the study concludes that these civil groups designed working systems 
in terms of meeting and coordination related to the social capital in their 
groups. Furthermore, as the meeting and coordinating ability of the villagers 
produced civil group actions and activities, the villagers’ actions and activities 
in the civil groups were consequently a kind of civil group innovation in terms 
of the self-organizational ability.  
 Apart from Baan Krut and Bor Nork indicating the innovation of 
forming and operating their own civil groups, this study also explains that 
these groups also showed their self-organization through organizing and 
operating the groups by their own decisions. For example, according to 
Sureerat108, these Bor Nork and Baan Krut villagers asked the other civil 
groups for a lot of support. Thus these groups had made decisions without 
intervention by the others. In this point, both civil groups obviously showed 
that they have not only the ability to create their operating system, but also to 
106  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
107   Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008). 




                                                   
make decisions independently, which means these groups had good self-
organizing capabilities.  
 Moreover, there were the events related to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups that illustrated these groups’ innovations for their self-
organization. On this point, the researcher thinks that the organizing 
innovation and the self-organization definitely showed that the civil group had 
been developed and strengthened, even though some of the group actions 
emerged inevitably due to pressure from the opponents. Nevertheless, the 
group actions or reactions were included in terms of the innovation of the 
group operating. It was because of the operating system came up with the 
ways of the civil groups managing all activities, at least were designed by 
themselves. For example, Anan109 said that during the period of time when 
they had strong confrontation, together with protesting against the state, they 
needed careful plans to act or respond to the state. He said, “At that time, we 
had many kinds of strategy in order to fight the opponents. Charoen, other 
villagers and myself assigned the aspect of mobilization, such as coordination, 
to Jintana, about how many villagers from Baan Krut; the ways to block the 
main roads; who will be in charge of the negotiation …We seemed to be a 
group of soldiers in a war actually.” 
He also revealed that the group had developed gradually because the 
situations surrounding them kept changing all the time so some strategies that 
used to be helpful might be useless afterwardS. On this point, the researcher 
thinks that the groups need to create and adjust the group actions in order to 
strengthen the groups. Like Korn-uma110 said, the local villagers realized they 
must be careful when responding to the state. “We didn’t know how to 
communicate with the state. To confront the state seemed to be complicated 
and dangerous so we must be very careful what we are going to do. The state 
looks at the local villagers as people in a lower class that must follow what they 
want. However, we showed that we might love our country much more than 
the politicians who held the state power.” 
 Even though the Bor Nork civil group created many ways to respond to 
the state, they mostly responded in terms of documents where they put their 
109  Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
claims into the government administration process. However, to promote 
themselves in public was a group innovation when they reacted to the state. In 
this regard, the group thus attempted to present itself carefully. For instance, 
Anan111 revealed that the local villagers’ uprising led many people to think that 
the villagers were terrorists. Nevertheless, the group of Bor Nork villagers 
tried hardly to rectify that this misleading picture made them out to be the 
root of the problem. Significantly, the group of villagers thought that to create 
and design appropriate group actions could strengthen the group 
progressively. Anan also said, “To fight with the state seemed to be very 
difficult, so we might make mistakes in our actions easily, such as when 
Jintana responded illegally to the state agency. Her case was a lesson for us. 
Also, the death of Charoen reminded us to think and act carefully. At this time, 
we couldn’t ask anybody to look after us because the state is our enemy so we 
must take care of ourselves.” 
Regarding this, the researcher noted that the struggle of the civil 
groups was also the reason that innovation in their operating system and self-
organized action were needed.112  
 One of the Bor Nork civil group innovations was the promoting of 
people’s rights issues in terms of community participation in political 
decision-making. In the first few years, the issue of the coal-fired power plant 
projects in Baan Krut and Bor Nork seemed to be a tiny problem. However, 
the group of local villagers in both communities portrayed these projects to be 
the state offending by overlooking local voices. Afterwards, the Group 
Rakthongthin Bor Nork and the group Anurak Baan Krut developed, during 
the period of conflict, in order to confirm the local groups’ standpoint in terms 
of popular participation in the political process. Significantly, the idea to build 
up the local organization to push this issue became a national public 
concern.113 
  On this point, Korn-uma114 said that the uprising of both the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork villagers reminded the other communities to think about their 
rights to participate in state decision-making. She said, “The state decision on 
111   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
112   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-May, 2008). 
113   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, March-May, 2008). 




                                                   
the coal-fired power plant project was made without the local villagers’ 
agreement. Likewise, the state made decisions on the Mae Moh coal-fired 
power plant project, and the Mae Moh villagers have been suffering. We don’t 
want to suffer and we don’t want to see other communities experience it too.” 
The civil groups Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut are also 
known as local environmental conservation groups. These groups concerned 
recently about lacking of community participation and human rights issue.  
 In terms of the Bor Nork civil group innovation, the group of villagers 
attempted to create a strategy for raising their problem publicly. For example, 
they kept the body of Charoen at the Bor Nork temple on purpose. It was a 
group innovation in terms of promoting the issue of a group fighting for 
participation in political processes, and the civil group raised the case of 
Charoen’s death to show the flaw in political transparency. The Bor Nork 
villagers115 said that the meetings operated in front of Charoen’s body as a 
promise to him that his death would be a worthy lesson for Thai people.  
 Korn-uma116 revealed that her husband’s family agreed with keeping 
Charoen’s body at the temple to remind the group of villagers. She said, “His 
death reminds us to keep going to fight for the community’s rights, the right to 
protect our home.” Charoen’s younger brother Samran117 said, “His body 
might say that anyone might give up if they are afraid to die like him. In 
contrast, we wish that it might push us to work hard for our hometown.” Pra 
Wichit118, a monk in Bor Nork temple and Charoen’s older brother, said, “He 
(Charoen) was a good guy and he died to protect our home place. It was unfair 
for people who were being good. His death should be worthwhile in some way, 
at least for provoking other Thais to believe that goodness must win.” 
Nevertheless, Anan119 said that the Bor Nork villagers had been fighting 
because they believed that the case of Charoen’s death would encourage 
people to find a solution for land tenure. It was due to the death of Charoen in 
this kind of the coal-fired power plant project conflict treflected his courage, 
115  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
116  Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008). 
117  Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008). 
118  Informal interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 8, 2008). 




                                                   
which led people to keep protecting Bor Nork from the project. His death or 
his bravery would be worth it. 
 All the group actions were a strategy in order to promote the aim of the 
villagers in terms of environmental conservation and community participation. 
In particular, the group of villagers tried to argue that they had the capability 
to find information and make decisions on their lives. These group actions 
also created their desire to strengthen the civil group significantly. 
  In summary, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group innovation is clear 
from the beginning. The innovation of these civil groups showed as civil 
groups forming in terms of informal organizations. The groups used the 
advantages of social capital to link the villagers into the groups. Moreover, 
they designed the group managing system with their social relationships. The 
features of the civil group organizing operated in terms of the coordination 
ability and promoting the civil groups actions. Importantly, the self-
organization of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups can be seen as these 
groups had been operating their own activities independently. 
Actors in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
In this study, the factor of actors is one important key to the strengthening of 
civil groups in the research framework. To clarify the actors in the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups, the roles of actors will be analyzed. However, the 
actors in these civil groups can be classified in terms of the members in both 
communities; the civil group leaders; the activists and the civil group advisors. 
Each group is explained in the following sections. 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group members 
In this study, Baan Krut and Bor Nork ‘civil group members’ refers to the 
villagers in both communities. Some of the civil group members probably 
were not resident in these communities but they were related to the 
communities in some way, such as they had friends and families there. With 
respect to both civil group memberships, the researcher examined these 
memberships in the fieldwork of this research. The observations for the civil 
group meetings found that the members in the meetings were in the same age 
range – between 25 and 45. The research group discussions, both formal and 




 According to Korn-uma120, group membership seemed to be very 
difficult to identify, and the group had an imprecise number of members. 
Similarly, Jintana121 said, “Surely, the members of the group are villagers in 
our community. We have no idea how many members exactly are in our group. 
And we believe that the group has members from everywhere because to be a 
group member has no rule, no need to pay. It is so easy to count you 
(researcher) to be in our group, if you would like to.”  
 However, looking at the beginning of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups’ formation, the members of these groups were definitely the villagers 
in both communities. The groups’ members also came from social relations in 
these communities. For example, Jintana revealed that originally group 
meetings started with a few Baan Krut villagers. She said, “There were my 
husband, myself and a few friends with their families. I think we didn’t feel 
like any kind of members or staff of the organization. It was like a family 
meeting.” 
 In the same way, the Bor Nork civil group occurred with an informal 
style, and social relationships were important for engaging group members. 
According to Anan122, the group of villagers came together informally. The 
meetings contained a small group of local villagers, and they were all Bor Nork 
residents. He said, “The members in the meetings were mainly families and 
friends. However, the members increased gradually. I think there was a high 
number of villagers in the meeting during 2002. It was in the period of time 
that we had serious confrontation with the government.”  
 Thus, Anan, Korn-uma and Jintana told the researcher in the same way 
that group membership currently emphasized agreement with the civil group 
aims and actions. In particular, the group members must understand the aims 
of the groups clearly, otherwise the groups might be frustrated. The civil group 
members also included the villagers outside Bor Nork village, who opposed 
the coal-fired power plant projects. As Anan123 said, “For me, the villagers who 
opposed the coal-fired power plant project were counted as members of the 
group.”   
120  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
121   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
122   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
 Accordingly, the Baan Krut civil group members encompassed local 
villagers in Baan Krut, who protested against the coal-fired power plant 
project. Surapong124, a Baan Krut villager, said, “There were many thousands 
of villagers and we couldn’t expect that they all agree with opposing the 
project. I think to join the group is not easy and fun. It is serious work and 
dangerous.” 
 In the same way, Chalaew125, a Bor Nork villager, commented on the 
membership of the Group Rakthongthin Bor Nork. She said, “Anybody could 
be a group member. However, group membership can be identified by the 
roles and actions of the member.”  
 Also, the Baan Krut leader, Jintana126, said that anybody might claim 
they were a Group Anurak Baan Krut member, and they might come from 
somewhere else because Baan Krut is now known widely. Regarding this, the 
researcher notes that these civil group memberships counted community 
residents, but also group members could be identified by the agreement that 
they have with the civil groups. The aim of the groups in terms of claiming the 
people’s right to participate in political decision-making recently became a 
stimulus to get more members.127 
 Regarding civil group membership, both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups clarified their memberships by setting out the aim of the groups 
clearly. The strong aim and group actions were factors for getting more 
members. The groups were opened widely, especially for any people who 
agreed with the aims or the group’s point of views. For instance, Jamnong128, 
a Tub Sa Kae resident, revealed that he and some friends thought they were 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork members. He said, “I and my friends joined both 
groups because we admired these groups’ point of views. We claimed that we 
joined these groups because we are Prajuab Kirikhan residents. We are 
concerned that the projects will destroy Baan Krut and Bor Nork villages, and 
they are located in Prajuab Kiritkhan. We show this Khon Tai unity because 
we love our hometown as well.” 
124   Interview with Surapong (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan,  May 8, 2008). 
125   Group interveiw (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
126   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
127   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
  The researcher noted that Bor Nork participants in the meetings and 
group discussions for this research were originally connected by Charoen’s 
siblings and relatives. On this point, Korn-uma129, the widow of Charoen, 
claimed that they generally had many statuses and roles in their communities. 
For example, she was Charoen’s wife and she was also a group member. She 
said, “I and all Charoen family’s members joined the Bor Nork group before 
the death of Charoen … At least we showed that we joined the group because 
we were concerned about our village, and the death of my husband was an 
extra reason afterwards.”  
In the same way as the case of Bor Nork, the members of Baan Krut 
civil group contained members who were mostly friends and family. Thus 
Jintana130 claimed on this point that group membership was less important to 
identify. The members of the group required anybody who aims to participate 
with the group be sincere. 
 With respect to the membership of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups, the researcher clarifies the membership of both civil groups in two 
kinds of roles. Firstly, the members played a role as the operations team of the 
civil groups. The group of activists in the villages comprised the members who 
played vital roles in operating the groups, including the leaders of the groups. 
For instance, the members in the group meetings have been joined together 
since the group was formed. Civil group members basically identified with 
friends and families of the villagers in the communities. The members of the 
group tended to be more affected by the problems of the issue they fought. 
These members participated closely and often in group activities.  
 Secondly, this study sees the civil group members in terms of supporter 
roles. This kind of member appeared to be anybody who supported the civil 
group’s aims and actions. This kind of member might join the group in some 
situation such as marching or the mobilization. Additionally, this explains why 
the leaders of Baan Krut and Bor Nork claimed that both civil groups have 
members from everywhere, due to their support for the group’s viewpoint, 
rather than requiring group membership for participation, in practice.  
129   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
 In this regard, this study raises the point of civil group membership 
because the clarification of civil group members in two kinds of role implies 
the civil group operating and organizing, which is significantly related to other 
factors, such as leadership. For example, Anan131 said that the large number of 
members presented a strong local voice. It worked essentially when the groups 
needed to pressurize opponents, such as when the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups mobilized in 1998. He said the villagers who mobilized at that 
time were definitely from Baan Krut and Bor Nork, together with the villagers 
in the nearby area. On this point, this study argues that membership and the 
number of group members are related to the group’s efficiency. 
 In the case of the civil group, members encompassed anybody from 
anywhere. This means participation in group activities might not be required 
at face-to-face meetings. In this regard, both leaders, Jintana132 and Korn-
uma133, said that the groups counted all the group supporters even through 
the channels of media, linkages and networks. People in all channels that 
supported the civil groups were implied to be members of the groups. 
Furthermore, the two leaders also commented on the issue of civil group 
membership, that the feature of group membership focussed on the ability to 
raise the issue of the problems to the public, and the groups can seek members 
to support their groups. 
 As noted, the members of both civil groups seemed to be young. With 
respect to this, the researcher links this point to civil group actions and 
activities that they could support for building group membership. For example, 
the Bor Nork civil group had their own radio broadcasting station organized 
by the young civil group members. For the Baan Krut civil group, there was a 
football team of young civil group members.134 Regarding this, Anan135 
believed that the young civil group members had grown with the perception 
that looking after their hometown was necessary. He said, “I think some of our 
young generation participated in their parents’ fight. They had learnt naturally 
about we have been working for our hometown such as bringing letters to 
131  Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
132  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
133  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, Apirl 4, 2008). 
134  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April-May, 2008). 




                                                   
their families. Radio broadcasting might be just an entertainment activity for 
the young villagers but it was one way to build a new generation for 
continually supporting the group.” 
 On this point, the young members of the Bor Nork civil group136 told 
the researcher that they grew up seeing their parents participate in the group 
of Bor Nork villagers. They followed their parents’ work intimately. Apinya137, 
a young Bor Nork civil group member, said, “I don’t know exactly how to be a 
group member but I feel very good if I can be. I think it is very cool that I can 
be the one to do something to protect our hometown like my family used to 
do.” Regarding this, the researcher views that the new civil group members 
also came from previous group members. This reflected the continuing of the 
parents’ values by the young generations. 
 In brief, the study finds that the informal aspect of Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil group structures accordingly employed informal membership. The 
members of these civil groups were basically made up of the villagers who 
were residents in these communities. Social relations in the communities were 
the vital factor for members associated with the groups. However, the roles of 
civil group members later appeared in terms of ‘supporters of the viewpoint’, 
while the main group of members played significant roles as a ‘think tank’ in 
order to operate these civil groups. Moreover, current civil group members 
played a role in recruiting new members.  
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group leaders 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups operated informally. The civil 
organization structural aspects were flexible in both form and function. These 
civil groups were comprised of members, also formed by the informal and 
traditional style. Both civil groups had leaders for their organization. In this 
study, the leaders are examined, along with some members who played an 
important role in the civil groups’ decision-making. 
 At the beginning of the Bor Nork civil group, the group of villagers 
gathered without a specific leader. As Anan138 said, he was supposed to be the 
group leader for a while because he was the one who organized the group 
136  Group interview with the radio broadcast team (Bor Nork, May 9, 2008). 
137  Group interview with the radio broadcast team (Bor Nork, May 9, 2008). 




                                                   
meetings and coordinated the villagers in the group’s activities. Anan said that 
the Bor Nork civil group operated inconsistently during the first two years. 
There was no exact plan to even show the government that the Bor Nork 
villagers strongly disagreed with the coal-fired power plant project. The group 
of local villagers, however, worked on outlining the consequences of the 
project without a specific leader. 
 Anan also said that it was fortunate that when Bor Nork civil group 
started and had no specific leader was under unserious situation. The group 
operation focussed mainly on finding out project information and was less 
concerned with the making of decisions. Nevertheless, in 1998, the situation of 
the group seemed to be more serious; in particular, the conflict over the coal-
fired power plant project caused violent confrontations to occur among the 
government, the state agency and the group of villagers. As a result, Suchin 
was chosen by the group of Bor Nork villagers to be the first leader of the 
group, and Charoen became the leader the next year because Suchin stepped 
out of the Bor Nork civil group to work as an activist with an NGO. 
 For the Baan Krut civil group, Jintana139 revealed that the group leader 
tended to be unnecessary at the beginning. This was due to the group working 
mostly on finding information. However, she said, “The group of villagers 
came to work together, and we (Baan Krut villagers) didn’t care who was our 
leader. In fact, I can’t remember when I was selected to be leader. I think we 
were more concerned about working productively for the group. I think leader 
is just a position, it is not important.”  
In terms of the importance of the group leader, the researcher raised 
this point in the group discussions for both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups. This study found the views about the civil groups were similar. Firstly, 
the villagers emphasized the roles of the group leaders, which resulted in 
significant group benefits. For example, the Baan Krut villagers believed that 
Jintana was the one Baan Krut villager who worked hard for the group. She 
was good at group organization and especially well organized at the beginning, 
which impressed the villagers. Anan140 said he was thought to be the leader 
because he worked a lot during a difficult time for the group. Suchin, Charoen 
139  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
and Korn-uma became the leaders of the group for the same reason. They 
worked hard for the group. In particular, their leadership allowed the group to 
operate efficiently. Anan also said, “Suchin and Charoen played a very 
important role in organizing the mobilization, which was difficult work for 
pressuring the government.” On this point, the researcher thinks that 
coordinating a huge number of local villagers across both the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork communities showed the work efficiency of Suchin, Charoen, Korn-
uma and Jintana. For Korn-uma, the researcher thought that the leaders, 
however, worked with the groups’ agreement and decisions were made by the 
group. Consequently, the group leadership came from the self-organized 
efficiency of the groups. 
 Secondly, the villagers in both civil groups believed that 
trustworthiness was required for the civil group leader because the civil 
groups were organizations that operated among conflicts. Significantly, the 
civil group members participated in the group because they trusted in the aim 
of the group in terms of protecting their communities. In this case, Anan141 
revealed that there was a Bor Nork villager who acted closely as a leader, and 
he tried to convince the villagers to accept the project. The villagers knew at 
the end that the opponents thought he was the leader so they bought him with 
a big amount of money. From that kind of experience, the villagers thought 
trustworthiness was an important factor for organizing the civil group and for 
the group leaders in particular.142 
 Also, the Baan Krut villagers143 commented in terms of trust in the 
group leader – that it was the most important requirement for being the 
leader of the group, as leader trustworthiness contributed to member 
cooperation and the efficiency of the group. As Werasak144, a Baan Krut 
villager, said, “I and other villagers came to join the group because we trusted 
in the information provided by Jintana. Afterwards, we trusted in what she 
has done for the group.” Sutin145 said about Jintana that: “She was very brave 
141  Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
142  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
143  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
144  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
to fight with the project owner.” Prapa146 said that the villagers kept joining 
the group because they trusted Jintana’s leadership. She also said, “We saw 
Phi Noi (Jintana) had to work in opposition to the project. She didn’t get any 
money but was in danger.” In this regard, the researcher concludes that the 
leader built trust through working for the group. The strong roles of the 
leaders in terms of focussing on community benefits resulted in leader 
trustworthiness. 
 Thirdly, with respect to the aspect of informal organization in a Thai 
traditional style, the seniority of the traditional leader is supposed to be 
focussed on choosing the civil group leaders. Nonetheless, the researcher 
noted that the leaders of both civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, were 
young. However, the villagers’ group discussions indicated that the issue of 
leader age was dwarfed by the leader’s efficiency. Pittaya147, the oldest Baan 
Krut villager in the group discussion, revealed that the leader’s age had never 
been an issue in group meetings. He said, “I think it is good, maybe much 
better, to have a young leader. Seniority isn’t required for being a leader 
anymore.” Similarly, Anan148 said that the Bor Nork civil group had good 
experience with group leaders recently. He said, “Charoen was very keen to 
talk to the opponents face to face. He was very brave. For Karok (Korn-uma), 
she works as hard as a man even though she is just a young lady. Karok knows 
how to approach the government representatives and develop more networks 
… It is because they are young that they did these kinds of work better than me. 
I am too old to follow changes in the world.” 
In this regard, the researcher concludes that leadership esteem must 
emphasize the leaders’ intentions. The strong intention of the leaders showed 
through the leader roles and actions, which ultimately developed respect for 
the leaders.  
 Fourthly, civil group leaders worked productively with official 
community leaders. Comminity leaders such as Pu Yai Baan and Kamnan149 
had supported the civil group leaders in many ways, especially for connecting 
people in the villages. It showed the leadership efficiency of these civil groups. 
146  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
147  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
148  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
Kamnan Jua150, the Baan Krut community leader, revealed that Jintana is a 
Baan Krut villager who is an ordinary member but she is a leader for the civil 
group. He said, “I am a community leader officially, but I am just a member of 
the group Anurak Baan Krut and Jintana is my boss … I admired her because 
she worked dedicatedly for the group even though it is difficult and dangerous 
work.”  
 In addition, the study determined that official community leaders 
participated mostly in the civil group. Korn-uma151 revealed that there were 13 
or 14 Bor Nork community leaders who joined the civil groups, and all of them 
played an important role as coordinating members. For the Baan Krut civil 
group, Jintana152 told the researcher that the leader of the Baan Krut civil 
group seemed to also be the leader of the Baan Krut community. She said, “I 
have no problem with being the leader. Most of the community leaders 
supported the group activities and they accepted my role.” Moreover, she 
confirmed that the traditional leaders and the official leaders encouraged her 
to work as the leader of the group by giving suggestions and building wider 
networks productively. “I would say that I could not be the leader without 
their support.”  
 Likewise, Korn-uma153 also said, “I am just the villagers’ representative. 
The other leaders (traditional leaders and official leaders) or any villagers can 
be the leader of the group.” Also, Jintana154 revealed that the group attempted 
to push group members to be elected as local politicians so there were some 
members working with the civil group cooperatively. In this regard, the civil 
groups illustrated that some official government leaders were linked to the 
civil group leadership and facilitated civil group leaders to work efficiently.  
 Fifthly, the researcher noted that the image of female leaders of both 
civil groups underpinned the civil groups’ strategy for promoting local groups 
publicly. In particular, both civil group leaders, Jintana and Korn-uma, have 
the image of a strong female leader, who had fought to protect their local 
150 Interview with Kamnan Jua (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 22, 2008). 
151  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
152  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
153  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
communities. In terms of this, a central government officer155 told the 
researcher that the images of Jintana and Korn-uma seemed to be heroine 
symbols for the local community, which is in conflict with the government. 
They are known as strong leaders and became idols for other local groups, 
providing an opportunity to get more networks by promoting the groups to 
the public. 
 In brief, the leaders of Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups originated 
informally based self-organization. Their civil group leadership emphasized 
the leaders’ roles, which were produced through the actions and activities of 
the groups. The civil group leaders required trustworthiness as it related to 
concerns about community benefits. The traditional and official leaders 
facilitated teamwork for the leader even though both civil group leaders were 
female and young. They, however, could be respectable leaders for the civil 
groups. 
The activists in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were formed by local villagers. The 
structure of both civil organizations appeared to be informal, and the civil 
groups organized themselves independently. In this regard, the case study is 
associated slightly with the activists. Thus, this study refers to those activists 
involved with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups recently. 
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups fortunately learnt a similar 
lesson from early problems. Vanida, the well-known activist of the Pak Mun 
case, was one of activists associated with these civil groups since the group 
formed. Nanthachote156 told the researcher that Vanida gave other local 
groups a lot of suggestions over the years. In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups, Anan said that Vanida had supported the group of Bor Nork 
in terms of providing detailed information of the project to the villagers. “She 
said that the villagers should know what will happen to their life and they 
should decide what they want to do. If the local people oppose the government 
without understanding the consequences, they would be just a group of local 
people who are called anti-government and anti-development.” 
155  Fieldnotes from the meeting with central government officers (Bangkok, Feb. 10, 2008). 




                                                   
 Korn-uma157 revealed that Vanida was a respected person for her and 
Charoen, her husband. Vanida encouraged Charoen to lead the mobilization in 
1998, and she always reminded Charoen to be safe all the time. In terms of 
civil group activation, she came to visit and joined the group meetings 
sometimes. Jintana158 thought Vanida was also a respected person, especially 
as she worked dedicatedly for the poor. However, Vanida only acted as a 
consultant and gave moral support to the civil group. 
 According to Anan159, Suwit Watnoo was the only activist engaged with 
the Bor Nork civil group during the group formation. He joined the villagers’ 
group as an activist interested in the issue of human rights. Anan also said 
that Suwit was involved closely with group activities yet he never played a key 
role in any group decision-making. Suwit finally joined the AOP, which meant 
he was an NGO leader. “Suwit joined us closely as a member while he was a 
member of an NGO. Later he decided to be a part of the AOP and attempted to 
link us to the AOP but we declined it.” Apart from Suwit, Jintana, Korn-uma 
and Anan, all confirmed to the researcher that the civil groups were linked just 
a little to activists. Korn-uma160 said, “Even though we learnt from other cases 
of problems such as the Pak Mun and Mae Moh communities, there were no 
community leaders who played roles in our groups. We just had discussions 
sometimes, and mostly by phone.” 
 Likewise, Anan161 said, “We talked to Kanchana162, the activist and 
leader of the Mae Moh civil group, but it was not about operating or 
organizing the group.” Whereas Jintana163 commented on the roles of activists 
in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, that there were no activists 
involved in these civil groups. In contrast, some of these civil group members 
and leaders have been activists in other civil groups recently. In this regard, 
these civil groups showed that activists played a less important role for these 
civil groups at the strengthening stage. The role of the activists mostly 
appeared to be as supporters and consultants for these civil groups.  
157   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
158   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
159   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
160   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
161    Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
162   Maliwan Nakawiroj, a leader of the group of villagers, who suffered by Mae Moh coal  
          fired power plant in Lampang province. 




                                                   
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ advisors  
The advisors to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in this study 
comprised academics who engaged these civil groups in terms of providing 
information and suggestions.  
 Apart from the activists, the academics from universities also played a 
role as advisors for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The first 
interview of this study with Jintana was when Jintana led a group of villagers 
to the Department of Marine Sciences at Kasetsart University. At that time, 
the civil group needed to get official support. Some university staff had been 
engaged with the civil groups previously. Jintana and Korn-uma told the 
researcher that they met Assistant Professor Dr. Thon Thamrongnawasawat, a 
marine-science lecturer in the Faculty of Fisheries at Kasetsart University, 
several times. Both civil groups thought that Dr. Thon could be the one to help 
them protect their places from the destruction of the coal-fired power plant 
projects.164 However, Dr. Thon165 revealed to the researcher that he suggested 
the villagers contact Kasetsart University formally. This was to assign him 
officially to provide specific information about the consequences of the 
projects, in particular, the effect on natural resources and environmental 
preservation.  
 Dr.Thon also commented on the issue of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
villagers’ fight over rejecting the coal-fired power plant project and that the 
villagers needed to get more information in terms of the resource area in 
Prajuab Kirikhan province. He said, “I hoped that academic research could be 
the argument for preserving this area from the degradation of the project.” In 
this regard, the role of academics such as Dr. Thon indicated that they 
specifically supplied academic information for these civil groups due to these 
civil groups thought they have inadequate academic knowledge.   
 The role of the academic seemed to be to support the civil groups only 
in terms of scientific data. The villagers, however, thought that the scientific 
data from academic research could be essential evidence for rejecting the 
project. As Jintana166 said, “We didn’t expect that the academics would join us. 
164  Fieldnotes (Bangkok and Prajuab Kirikhan, March-April, 2008). 
165   Interview with Dr. Thon Thamrongnawasawat (Bangkok, March 2, 2008). 




                                                   
The academic research provided data for helping the villagers to show people 
that the government had made a bad decision. Especially over the coal-fired 
power plant that will destroy our rich natural resources.”   
 Hence, Dr. Thon and the team of academics from Kasetsart University 
appeared to be the main group of advisors, who encouraged the development 
of civil groups. Both civil groups used scientific data to support the issue of 
natural resource degradation. Nonetheless, Jintana and Korn-uma said in the 
same way that there were some masters level students from several Thai 
universities who studied the issue of both Baan Krut and Bor Nork.167 
Jintana168 also said, “Actually, the students’ studies were no help to the group. 
It was because they came and left and no one came back to provide any 
support afterwards.” 
 Anan169 said that the academics, such as the lecturers, researchers and 
university students, involved provided no help for the group of Bor Nork 
villagers, particularly, in terms of operating the group. However, he accepted 
that the scientific data from the team of academics from Kasetsart University 
was crucial evidence to help the civil group respond to the state reasonably. 
“We had scientific reasons to preserve our places and argue that the projects 
are dangerous … and it was why we must protest the project.” Additionally, 
from group discussion the villagers also thought in a similar way that the 
Kasetsart University academics were the most vital advisory team for the civil 
groups. They thought academic research was an important strategy for the 
civil groups in order to promote the issue of the Hin Krut and Bor Nork coal-
fired plant projects to be more broadly concerned.170 A Baan Krut villager171 
told the researcher that, “We know the reason that we protested the project for, 
otherwise we look like stupid villagers since we opposed the investor.” 
 In this regard, the study found that the role of the academics supported 
the civil groups’ development indirectly. The academics assisted the civil 
groups in terms of information that the civil groups used for their operations, 
even though there was no advising in terms of the development of the civil 
167   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
168   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 6, 2008). 
169   Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
170   Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
groups directly. The information and scientific data of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork areas that was provided by the academics as researchers became a key 
tool of the civil groups to rely on and encourage civil groups to ultimately be 
strengthened. 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ supporters and funding 
The groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers are clarified as civil 
organizations which also operated as non-profit organizations. Likewise, the 
study explained that these civil groups emerged informally and were 
community based. The funding and facilities of the civil groups were mainly 
supported by their own members. Apart from that, both civil groups received 
some funding from government projects. 
  According to the head of regional level government officers in the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment172, the groups of Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork villagers must be supported by the NGOs. These officers 
believed that it was impossible that a group of local villagers would be able to 
survive without outside support. The local government officers in Prajuab 
Kirikhan173 thought there were some NGOs and local businesses that 
supported these groups, because the groups seemed to operate without 
difficulty. In this regard, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups must have 
been sponsored by other organizations, in the government officials’ view.    
 To explain that the main funding of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups came from their own members, Anan174 revealed that the Bor Nork 
civil group basically worked through members’ support. The support referred 
to money and other facilities they gave to the group. He said, “In fact, we, I 
mean the group of Bor Nork villagers, didn’t need much money to run our 
group. We worked at the school or temple and had no need to pay for staff. We 
used our own cars or motorcycles. We can share or borrow some facilities in 
working for the group.” 
172   Interview with the government officer, Department of Environmental Quality Promotion  
         (Bangkok, March 4, 2008). 
173   Interview with the local government officers (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2-8, 2008). 




                                                   
Also, the villagers175 said that group meetings took place with no cost. 
Similarly, a Baan Krut villager said there was nothing to pay for the meetings. 
He thought that to join the civil group might cost a little more than the usual 
cost of living. “I joined the group from the beginning. I only paid for 
motorbike fuel.” Also, a female villager of Baan Krut176 said she was the one 
who usually sponsored drinks and snacks for the meetings. “I didn’t think 
these were a cost for the group meetings. They were like I treated my family 
and friends.” 
 The Bor Nork civil group saved funds for future group activities. Korn-
uma177 revealed that the group definitely had no income, as it is a non-profit 
organization. She revealed that funding for the group came from members’ 
donations. “We didn’t have any good funding management because it is just a 
small amount of money. We just recorded what we spent and where we got it.”  
Pratiew178, a Bor Nork villager and one of the members who worked for the 
group on its funding management team, told the researcher that the group of 
villagers had the idea to manage the money of the group. She revealed that she 
worked as kind of group treasurer. This work was needed for group members 
in order to manage the group’s treasury well, even though the group only had 
a small amount of money. Thus the group was not run as a business so the 
funding management just related to the group’s revenue and expenses, which 
could be managed easily and transparently. Moreover, the study found that 
the Bor Nork civil group treasury account was activated in 2013.179 
 For the Baan Krut civil group, Jintana180 revealed that funding 
management seemed unnecessary to the Baan Krut civil group. She said, “We 
accepted that we don’t have a group financial system … We used to think 
about it but we decided to do without funding during normal situations, and 
we are sure that it is not difficult to get funding when we need it.” 
Also, the Baan Krut villagers181 gave more information in terms of the 
group’s funding – that they donated money to the group willingly when they 
175  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
176  Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008). 
177  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
178  Interview with Pratiew (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
179  Phone interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, December 10, 2013). 
180  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
went to Bangkok and the donation was for the trips of the civil group. Apart 
from that, the villagers said they had shared in the expenses of group activities 
sometimes. Nonetheless, they insisted that money had never been a problem 
for running the group. 
 In this case, both civil groups have the same style of funding. The 
funding of the Baan Krut civil group also was earned by fundraising and 
donation along the same lines as the Bor Nork civil group. Anan182 said most 
fundraising of the Bor Nork civil group was during 2002 when group 
representatives went frequently to government meetings in Bangkok. The 
funding was mostly spent on travel. Afterwards, group activities appeared to 
cost nothing; otherwise the villagers would take a share in the expenses 
voluntarily. Likewise, the Bor Nork villagers183 told that they might only pay 
for coffee or tea at the group meeting. A villager 184said, “It was a very low cost 
compared with getting our work done. It was worth it to pay just a little so we 
could keep our village clean.” Moreover, some villagers185 told the researcher 
confidently that the group could get funding support in some ways because 
the villagers thought the donation to the civil group was like paying to protect 
their livelihoods. The villagers must be ready to support the group in terms of 
giving donations, sharing in expenses or raising funds.  
 Additionally, both civil group leaders186 revealed that there was some 
funding support by government institutions. However, all funding support 
appeared to be in order to participate in government projects. For example, 
Korn-uma187 said that she attended the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MNRE) seminar many times. There were some campaigns to 
support citizen participation provided by the MNRE, which related to the 
groups’ roles and there was some funding supported from these campaigns. 
Consequently, the group decided to participate in those campaigns not only to 
get the support funding but, significantly, to take the opportunity of joining 
the government reconciliation processes. She said, “In fact, we accepted the 
support funding from the state because we aimed to let them (the Thai state) 
182  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
183  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
184  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
185  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
186  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
know our (the group of villagers) viewpoint.” Likewise, the Baan Krut civil 
group leader, Jintana188, also said, “We received just a small amount of money 
from the government to support the campaign. To be honest, the money from 
the state couldn’t allow our group to survive. I just want you to be clear where 
the group can get money.” In this regard, funding by government institutions 
appears to be insignificant to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ 
existence.  
 Also, Jintana189 told the researcher in early 2014 that the Baan Krut 
civil group has been operating without a conflict of interest. It might be due to 
the empty bank account of the group. She thought money could be a source of 
conflict so the Baan Krut civil group agreed to have fundraising only if 
necessary rather than collecting any funds. She said, “I think it was not our 
aim of the group to collect money even though it might be a good way to 
manage the group treasury. Thus, the group worked without fundraising for 
the last few years and it wasn’t a problem.” Similarly Thanom190, a Bor Nork 
civil group member, revealed that the group had no more treasury 
management because the group has been operating only ordinary activities, 
which had focussed on meetings and monitoring environmental preservation. 
There were no extraordinary activities, such as marching or mobilizing, that 
incurred high costs for the civil group. As a result, the Bor Nork civil group 
agreed with the cancelation of the civil group bank account because they 
thought it was unnecessary.  
 In summary, the issue of funding appeared to be of little concern for 
the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. The revenue of each group came 
mainly from fundraising and donations. Basically, the civil group members 
took a share in the expenses of the group’s activities. Fundraising and 
donations were usually required for any extraordinary activities. Moreover, 
the civil groups indicated that occasionally they had a small amount of 
funding support from state institutions.   
188  Interview with Jintana (Bangkok, March 2, 2008). 
189  Phone interview with Jintana (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 21, 2014). 




                                                   
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group interactions 
In this section, the study focusses on Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 
interactions, as civil group interactions, considered to be one of the main 
factors relating to civil group development. The study explains the horizontal 
and vertical interactions that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups are 
involved in.  
The horizontal interactions of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups 
To consider the horizontal interactions of the civil group, this study looks at 
the activities and communications of the civil groups, where they are 
connected to other organizations. The study also identified as horizontal 
interactions the regional level of civil group interactions that contained other 
civil groups, local NGOs and local state institutions.  
 Basically, civil group interaction occurred between the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork civil groups. The forming of Baan Krut followed the formation of the 
Bor Nork civil group, which the Bor Nork villagers had already established. 
Anan191 said that a group of Baan Krut villagers contacted him immediately 
after the coal-fired power plant project in Baan Krut had been announced. 
Afterwards, Baan Krut initiated group meetings between the two in order to 
discuss the project. Both civil groups began cooperating in the sharing of 
information. Sometime later, Jintana and the Baan Krut villagers came to visit 
and join the Bor Nork meetings.  
 Jintana192 also explained that the interactions between the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups were mostly supportive of each other in terms of 
information. She said, “We worked independently. B0r Nork is one group, and 
Baan Krut is another. However, we knew that we needed to work together 
sometimes; for example, marching to Bangkok. Otherwise, the government 
wouldn’t hear the small group’s voice.” 
 Thus the interaction of the two civil groups was due to extraordinary 
activities; for example, the villagers mobilizing in 1998, and later traveling 
several times to Bangkok, in 2002, with a huge number of both of the civil 
191  Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
groups’ members.193 Moreover, the interaction between the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups also often occurred frequently in state conciliation processes. 
As Jintana194 said, “I and Karok (Korn-uma, the Bor Nork civil group leader) 
met incidentally sometimes in the government meetings. And we connected 
regularly in order to deal with the state and state agencies. At least, we seemed 
to have a little bit more power than dealing with them alone.” 
 Similarly, Korn-uma195 thought that to connect with other civil groups 
was what was necessary for the Bor Nork civil group. She revealed that, “Baan 
Krut has been facing the same problem as us. We are sometimes known as the 
same group as we presented our standpoints in the same way. However, to 
connect with each other raised the focus of our problem to be of greater 
interest to people.”  
She also told the researcher that the collaboration of Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork was an important factor that led to the construction of the coal-fired 
power plant projects being deferred. The cooperation of the two groups of 
villagers seemed to have more power to pressure the state. 
 Similarly, Anan196 revealed that Baan Krut and Bor Nork worked 
closely throughout 1998 to 2002, particularly when the villagers mobilized in 
1998, and traveling to Bangkok in 2002. At that time, the undertaking of the 
group connections were mostly led by Charoen. Apart from the group of Baan 
Krut villagers, the Bor Nork civil group also attempted to connect to the 
villagers in other communities in Prajuab Kirikhan province, such as Tab Sa 
Kae and Kui Buri communities. Anan said, “There were more people from 
other villages. They all thought that they should help us because they would 
need us to join them one day. For example, the Tab Sa Kae villagers consulted 
us afterwards once they heard that the state planed to build a dam in their 
place.” 
 Likewise, the connection of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
with other civil groups continued to develop. In 2008, the researcher joined 
meetings that involved collaboration between the Baan Krut and Bang Sa Parn 
civil groups. At that time, pressure for the coal-fired power plant construction 
193  Fieldnotes (April-May, 2008). 
194  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008). 
195  Interview with Korn-uma (Bangkok, May 2, 2008). 




                                                   
project had lessened, whereas a large steel industry project was planned in 
Bang Sa Parn. A Bang Sa Parn villager, Supoj197, attempted to lead the Bang Sa 
Parn villagers to petition the government to reconsider the planned project.198  
Supoj199 told the researcher that the Bang Sa Parn villagers were very keen to 
form the group because they were concerned about the impact of the large 
steel industry project, and environmental degradation, in particular. 
 Additionally, both civil groups participated in establishing other small 
civil groups around Prajuab Kirikhan. For instance, a group of Ow Noi 
villagers formed a civil group called the group of motherland conservation 
(Anurak Baan Kert group). Pachern200, the group leader, said that the idea of 
forming the conservation group was learned from the former well-known civil 
groups, namely Baan Krut and Bor Nork. Similarly, the conservation and 
development of a wetlands group from Sam Roi Yod also emerged in the same 
way. These civil groups engaged with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
in terms of becoming a civil alliance in order to interact with the state and 
state agencies. 
 As mentioned previously, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
cooperated not only with other civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan, but also 
interacted with other civil groups, which have similar aims and activities 
around Thailand. For example, civil groups opposed the coal-fired power 
plant project in Kra Bi, Chumporn. The Kra Bi civil group coordinator, 
Sakkamon201, said cooperation among some former civil groups was very 
helpful for the grassroots in responding to the state’s project implementation. 
He referred to the cases of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in terms of 
being the model of how to protect communities from being destroyed by coal-
fired plant projects. Moreover, there were other civil groups in the south of 
Thailand that had become related, initiated by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil group networking with other groups. 
197  Supoj Songseang is the leader of Bang Sa Parn civil group. 
198  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, May 2008). 
199  Interview with Supoj (Bang Sa Parn, May 20, 2008). 
200  Phone interveiw with Pachern (January 11, 2011). 




                                                   
 Additionally, the extending of the civil groups’ network nationally was 
an important strategy of civil group development. Jintana202 revealed that she 
engaged the Baan Krut civil group with other civil groups by trying to build 
more networks. She said, “I have been connected myself as a Baan Krut civil 
group leader in order to get more power. At least the local villagers could 
develop stronger power to support each other at the conciliation process with 
the state.” Consequently, it can be seen that the Baan Krut civil group 
strategically attempted to build wider networks at the national level.  
 Interaction with other civil groups seemed to be based on the idea of 
civil group strengthening. According to Maliwan203, the leader of Mae Moh 
villagers who were affected by the coal-fired power plant project, the case of 
Mae Moh could be seen as a tragic lesson in state mismanagement. The coal-
fired power plant project resulted in hazards surrounding Mae Moh 
community. She said - the Mae Moh villagers had not been formed into a civil 
group at that time, although she had been a representative of the villagers in 
order to interact with other civil groups and other parties. In particular, she 
participated in the state conciliation processes, together with Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork leaders, many times. She also said, “I think we (groups of villagers or 
civil groups) need to be connected in order to make people power stronger.” 
The group of Mae Moh villagers had presented themselves as a civil group, 
and this civil group was one part of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 
network.” 
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have nationwide interactions. 
However, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had no interaction with 
local NGOs. Both civil group leaders insisted that the local NGOs had never 
been involved with their groups. Also, the civil groups’ members revealed in 
the same way that it was inappropriate to engage with any NGOs. It was due to 
them thinking that NGOs might have hidden agendas, because they were 
mainly supported by the state. As a result, they believed that the NGOs 
possibly represented part of the state apparatus.204 In the case of interaction 
with local NGOs, Jintana from Baan Krut and Anan from Bor Nork both 
202  Phone interview with Jintana (Prajuab Kirikhan, May 21, 2014). 
203  Phone interview with Maliwan (July 12, 2013). 
204  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008) and Group discussion  




                                                   
commented that both civil groups involved several interest groups and so 
could not provide backing for any NGOs or other organizations, because there 
could develop conflicts of interest, and so trust was not possible.205  
 Regarding this, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups both show that 
their horizontal interactions comprised of collaborations between Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork, together with other civil groups around Prajuab Kirikhan. 
Additionally, both civil groups also engaged with civil groups right across 
Thailand and scarcely interacted with local NGOs and local government.  
The vertical interactions of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups 
In the case of vertical interaction, both civil groups indicated a little 
interaction with NGOs and state institutions at the vertical level.  
 The Bor Nork civil group leader, Korn-uma206, revealed that the 
interaction of the Bor Nork civil group with national NGOs seemed to be 
scarce due to there being a lack of trust in other parties outside of the civil 
group. However, a little vertical interaction emerged through interaction with 
one NGO staff member named Watcharee (Pum).207 Watcharee belonged to a 
small NGO called ‘The Study of Alternative Energy Group’. Watcharee was the 
only NGO staff member involved with the civil groups. The civil groups 
acknowledged her as part of the network because Watcharee used to be 
Vanida’s co-worker.208 Korn-uma209 said, “Phi Pum was a channel for getting 
wider information. I didn’t think about her as being in an NGO or whatever 
she is, because we just needed more connections.”  
 As for the Bor Nork villagers, they thought their individual connections 
facilitated more networks. For them, interaction between the villagers and 
NGOs seemed unnecessary. They also mentioned that Watcharee was the only 
NGO staff member who connected to the Bor Nork civil group, but as a trusted 
friend. One villager210 said, “Actually, we never trust any NGOs because they 
are possibly backed up by some companies, so none of the NGOs dare to 
205  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
206  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
207  Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008). 
208  Interview with Nanthachote (Bangkok, March 8, 2008). 
209  Interview with Korn-uma (Bangkok, May 2, 2008). 




                                                   
connect to us.” Nevertheless, they thought that to connect with Watcharee 
benefited them, by getting them more allies in the network, even though she is 
in an NGO. They believe in friendship, which they consider can establish 
better interactions. They considered that the bonding of friendship creates 
connections to support the civil group developing into a higher level. 
 Watcharee211 told the researcher that she had become involved with 
both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups to provide them with 
recommendations. She said interactions mostly related to information 
exchange and participating in conferences. She accepted that the villagers in 
both communities have a negative impression of NGOs. Consequently, the 
interaction between her, as a member of an NGO, and these groups of 
villagers seemed to be less than with other groups. However, she insisted that 
the bonding among them showed itself in friendship, which at least resulted in 
helping them to get more friends in order to build civil group networks. 
Moreover, the study found that The Study of Alternatives Energy Group is a 
very small NGO even though it operates at a national level. Overall, these civil 
groups showed only a very thin line of interaction with NGOs at a national 
level. 
 The interaction with state institutions by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups was also identified as a civil group development factor in this 
study. On this point, the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana212, said the 
Baan Krut civil group had scarcely been connected to central government 
because projects provided by the Thai state seemed to be merely propaganda 
campaigns. She said, “There were some projects from the state that tried to 
show that the state was concerned about conflicts, whereas we found that the 
projects were mainly supported by state enterprises. Moreover, villagers such 
as myself have had a lawsuit that I would say that having ‘lawsuite’ is how we 
interact with state.” 
 Similarly, the villagers of the Bor Nork civil group talked about this 
issue in meetings.213 They were concerned that some of the state projects were 
possibly seeking to interfere with the work of the civil group. A villager said, 
211  Interview with Watcharee (Bangkok, May 2, 2008). 
212  Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 8, 2008). 




                                                   
“The state projects have activities to support us to protect our community, in 
particular, in the case of making our homeland clean. In contrast, the state 
still pushes the coal-fired power plant project, which is known as dirty and 
would destroy our home.” 
 Additionally, the Baan Krut villagers said there were, however, many 
kinds of activities from central government created to encourage local 
participation. For instance, the state campaign to provide training courses in 
resources and environmental management to volunteers. This project was 
provided to the villages by the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MNRE). The Baan Krut villagers participated in this project, 
and later related projects. A villager, Sutin214, said, “We hoped that the 
Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment would be part of central 
government, which realized and understood the local villagers’ action in order 
to protect our resources and environment. We want the MNRE to take our 
side, even though we are scared the project might have some hidden agenda.” 
  The Bor Nork civil group also has a similar opinion. The group of Bor 
Nork villagers talked about their interactions with central government, saying 
there was some collaboration between the villagers and the Thai state. Korn-
uma215 told the researcher that, “The cooperation of the Baan Krut villagers 
seemed to be running smoothly on small, good projects. In contrast, the huge 
bad project of the coal-fired power plant still has been in conflict, so I would 
say there is no interaction … and we (herself on behalf of the Bor Nork civil 
group) believe that the connection with the state is very complicated due to 
the conflict of interest on one large project.” 
 The participation of the civil group in small projects with the state and 
the conflict with the large state project showed the impaired interaction of the 
Bor Nork civil group with central government. Notwithstanding this, the 
villagers thought that the connection from participation in state projects 
benefited the civil group. In particular, they saw it as a way to build networks 
for serving the civil group in the future. The conflict in relation to the large 
coal-fired power plant project needed to be solved in a different way in the 
214 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
conciliation process. As a result, civil group and state interactions appeared to 
be having more arguments than collaboration at this stage.216  
 In brief, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicated two kinds of 
interactions with central government. Firstly, there were civil group 
interactions in terms of participating in policy implementation provided by 
state institutions. Secondly, there were civil groups’ interactions with central 
government expressed as responses against the coal-fired power plant project.  
The social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
Social capital plays an important role as a development factor of the civil 
groups in this study. The research framework has two points of view with 
which to explain the relationship of social capital to civil society. The first 
point of view indicates how social capital is created by civil society, and the 
second, how social capital is created from civil society. 
 Following the research framework, this study has thus far mainly 
focussed on the exploration of how civil society becomes established, which 
resulted in a study of social capital in the case studies. However, the opposing 
direction of how the civil groups are a cause of social capital is also important. 
The distinction between the two directions and how they are both involved in 
the development of civil groups is able to be analyzed by considering two 
kinds of social capital: the internal social capital factors, and social capital 
factors outside the civil groups. 
Internal factors of social capital within the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups 
In this study, social capital factors are considered to provide encouragement. 
This is how the causes of the growth of civil society are analyzed. Regarding 
internal social capital, it is encompassed primarily by individual social capital. 
This is what will be emphasized. 
 Social capital within the civil group was already present when the civil 
groups started; for example, the reciprocity during the villagers’ participation 
in civil group activities. As Pratew217 said, “We exchanged help to look after 
our garden while others went to join the group in the city.” In the same way, 
216  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
the Baan Krut civil group members took turns to provide their place and food 
for the civil group meetings.218 
 It was the trust among the civil group members that was the aspect of 
social capital that grew and was also the root factor for civil group 
development. According to the Baan Krut leader, Jintana219, trust was the 
most essential factor since the formation of the group, right up to the present. 
She also said, “The Baan Krut civil group could not work on protecting our 
communities from the dirty power plant project; the villagers in the group 
could not be trusted. Because we might die like Charoen, due to resisting the 
interests of someone, it was very dangerous. So we must be confident that our 
group members can be trusted.” 
For the civil group to operate there had to be trust, which gave the 
villagers confidence to participate in civil group activities. As Korn-uma220 
revealed, the villagers in the Bor Nork civil group understood the danger of 
becoming involved in conflicts of interest. The death of Charoen was an 
example to remind them, and everybody was reminded that they could step 
out of the group at anytime. However, the Bor Nork villagers still maintained 
their relationships to take care of the community, right up till the present. 
Regarding this, the researcher notes that social capital in terms of trust 
appeared continually from the establishment phase through to the 
development stage. 
  Social capital in terms of values and norms emerged in the civil group 
during the development phase. Anan221 told the researcher that teenagers in 
the Bor Nork community seemed to be proud of the Bor Nork civil group’s 
reputation. What the civil group had done so far made them the heroes of the 
hometown in the young villagers’ eyes. Similarly, the researcher notes that the 
significance of the civil group’s values can be seen by how the villagers 
generally, in both Bor Nork and Baan Krut, were proud of their civil groups’ 
reputation, in terms of being a strong community able to stand up for local 
people’s rights. In particular, Charoen was respected as a hero of the local 
218  Group meeting (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008). 
219  Group meeting (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 5, 2008). 
220  Group meething (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, March 17, 2008). 




                                                   
people, because he died to protect their hometown, while Jintana appeared to 
be a symbol of a strong woman who fights for local rights.222 
 A consequence of civil group values is that the pride in the civil group’s 
reputation motivated the villagers to keep participating in civil group activities. 
Pra Wichit223 explained that the reputation of Charoen and the group of Bor 
Nork villagers were valued by the young generation in Bor Nork village and 
became established norms for the operation of the civil group. He said, “I’m 
glad to see the young people in Bor Nork keen to join together as a resource 
and environmental conservation group. The young villagers seemed to be 
proud of the Bor Nork civil group honor and like to continue the ideal of 
protecting the village.” In terms of this, the researcher notes that the values of 
civil group reputation generated a kind of norm in the Bor Nork village.  
 The social capital of the civil group in terms of norms appeared in the 
attempts of the villagers to maintain the conservation ideal of the civil group 
to be further. The civil group norm was built out of respect for the civil group 
leaders. Moreover, the civil group norm contains the ideal of building a 
collective consciousness and greater concern for collective interests as the first 
priority. For instance, a group of Bor Nork children joined together to 
participate in local radio broadcasting. They told the researcher that they tried 
to use the local radio broadcasting station as the channel to show that they 
have an ideal of resources and environmental conservation even though they 
are still a young generation.224 A 14-year-old girl named Pang225 said, “We 
heard about what the Bor Nork villagers had done for our village in the past. 
We knew uncle Charoen was very dedicated. We want to remind the people in 
the village that we must look after our hometown even though there is no 
more coal-fired power plant project … Local radio broadcasting gives us a 
chance to talk to people in our village. Mostly, the program aims to 
communicate and to entertain people. However, we try to promote the idea of 
keeping our village clean.” 
222  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 
223  Informal interview with Pra Wichit (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 1, 2008). 
224  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
 In the same way, a 21-year-old man, Jirasak226, told the researcher that 
he thinks the Baan Krut leader, Jintana, and the group of Baan Krut are 
known widely in terms of being a group of local villagers that protected the 
community from the coal-fired power plant project. He said, “I think it is so 
cool that my local hometown is well known. Importantly, I feel very good to 
know that my parents also joined the group at that time, and I wish I could do 
that too, even though I just joined some small projects about community 
conservation at this time.” 
 Moreover, the young Baan Krut villagers227 admired the courage of the 
civil group leaders and what the civil group had done for the community. They 
thought the story of the Baan Krut battle would be a lesson for them not only 
to learn about resources and environmental protection, but also to teach them 
to understand more about conflict of interests related to the megaproject. The 
story of the Baan Krut villagers shows the ability of local people to form a 
group to participate in the political process, and the ability of local people to 
claim their rights.228 In terms of this, the researcher suggests that the battle of 
the Baan Krut civil group created social capital in terms of values and norms 
for the young villagers in Baan Krut.  
External factors enhancing social capital within the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups 
To explain the development of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in 
terms of external factors, this study focusses on the role of social networks. 
This role was an essential social capital factor, which enhanced the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups. The social network also encompasses details 
related to other social capital components, such as trust, reciprocity, values 
and norms. Moreover, the details of social relations can be further considered, 
because the social components worked through social relationships in the civil 
groups’ network. 
  Social relations in the social network of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups appeared obviously in the civil groups’ interactions. In other 
words, social relations can be seen in terms of how the civil groups interacted 
226  Interview with Jirasak (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 11, 2008). 
227  Group Interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 11, 2008). 




                                                   
within and outside network. In this case, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
connections to outsiders produced social capital in terms of trust for other 
civil groups. The interaction of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups with 
other civil groups occurred through their social relations, and their 
interactions were based in having values and norms to follow. For instance, 
the Bang Sa Parn civil group leader, Supoj229, said that the group of Bang Sa 
Parn villagers established itself successfully by following the Baan Krut civil 
group leader’s guidelines. Similarly, the Tub Sa Kae civil group leader also told 
how their civil group grew strongly through the support of the Bor Nork civil 
group. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups continually 
participated with other civil groups.230 
 Regarding this, the researcher noted that the trust of the other civil 
groups came from the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers’ social capital. The 
other civil groups trust in Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group values that they 
could fight to protect their homeland successfully. For instance, Supoj231 
revealed that the group of Bang Sa Parn villagers wished to copy the Baan 
Krut group. It was because Baan Krut showed them how villagers could be in 
harmony. This helped the group form among the local villagers. He also 
believes that the group of Bang Sa Parn villagers could become a strong local 
community, the same as the Baan Krut civil group. Moreover, he said, “I 
strongly believe that the Baan Krut civil group sincerely helped us. I think we 
understand each other in that we both have to suffer from the force of state 
policy.” 
 On this point, in the researcher’s opinion, new civil groups emerged 
due to trust in the success of former civil groups such as Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork. The new civil groups trust in the way that Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
organized themselves. Therefore, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ 
self-organization also led other civil groups, and other outsiders, to admire 
them. According to the Baan Krut and Bor Nork leaders, Jintana and Korn-
uma, both said in similar ways that the offer of support from NGOs and other 
organizations resulted in the civil group developing its own activities. They 
229  Interview with Supoj (Bang Sa Parn, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 20, 2008). 
230  Fieldnotes (Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2008). 




                                                   
thought they should be wary of close social relations with NGOs. For example, 
Jintana232 revealed that the other civil groups trusted the Baan Krut civil 
group because the Baan Krut villagers associated with the group worked for 
the community’s benefit. Regarding other civil groups, the civil group worked 
independently without involvement with NGOs and businesses. For example, 
the leader of both civil groups thought that connecting to NGOs is not 
important for building the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group network. Both 
civil groups tended to think that they would lose trust if they connected to 
other organizations apart from local villagers or local groups.233  
 Accordingly, the external social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups related to civil group social relations and networks. Social 
relations appeared in the form of reciprocity and trust. Reciprocity provided 
chances for civil groups to help each other, and trust built civil groups 
confident of participating in each other’s civil group activities, especially the 
activities that related to opposing the state. In regards to this, the researcher 
noted that both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups received other civil 
groups’ trust by giving the other civil groups support, which seemed to be a 
kind of social capital in terms of helping or reciprocity. Moreover, social 
relations also resulted in an aspect of social networks. To support the other 
civil groups, the civil groups’ network became a value for civil groups in terms 
of the ability to collaborate, which ultimately also built civil group solidarity 
and unity. 
 In summary, the social capital of both the Bor Nork and Baan Krut civil 
groups was generated in two ways. First, the internal social capital of the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork contains mainly aspects of individual social capital. In 
these cases, civil group social capital consisted of reciprocity, trust, values and 
norms among the villagers or members in the civil groups. Second, social 
capital outside the civil groups was also generated by the support that civil 
groups gave to others. The unity of Baan Krut and Bor Nork became the value 
of civil group solidarity. Moreover, the values of the civil groups tended to 
motivate other civil groups and appeared to originate from the norm of 
community participation. Nevertheless, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
232  Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
groups remained more tightly connected to the group of local villagers and 
civil groups, rather than other networks such as NGOs and business 
enterprises. 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil Group Sustainability 
In relation to the phase of sustaining civil society, this study looked into 
adaptation by civil groups, which is indicated in terms of either vertical or 
horizontal linkages. Regarding this, the role of social capital takes a central 
place as it is related to the continued strengthening of the development of the 
civil group. 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group linkages 
The linkages in this study refer not only to the connections of civil groups to 
other organizations, but also include interactions between civil groups, their 
bonding and degree of participation by members. Civil group linkage, which 
originated through external social capital will, however, be emphasized, 
particularly the forms of linkages which coordinate actors in organizations. 
Although the civil group linkages seem to be similar to civil group interactions 
in the development phase, the linkages in this phase are nevertheless 
significantly different, just as civil group interactions, which cause the 
sustaining of civil groups, are. 
The horizontal linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 
As mentioned previously, the horizontal linkages of civil groups are related to 
the interactions occurring at the development phase. Regarding this, the study 
explores the Baan Krut and Bor Nork linkages by looking at aspects of civil 
group cooperation with other civil groups, and how this affected maintenance 
of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork groups as a civil organization. 
 The connection of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups was 
produced by their linkages, which were formed by a partisan network. To 
interact with other civil groups was one strategy of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups used in order to push the issue of a grassroots voice onto the 
national agenda. Jintana234, the Baan Krut civil group leader, revealed that the 
civil groups had expected that the coordination of them could make their 




                                                   
problems more visible and their voice stronger and more appealing. She said, 
“We believe that the state might launch any projects without letting local 
people participate in the decision-making to our hometown anytime. Our 
connections to the other groups will show that we won’t accept arbitrary 
decision-making. The projects are important to local people so they shouldn’t 
be decided just by the state and business agencies.”  
 Also, Korn-uma235 said, “Even though links with other local 
communities by the Bor Nork civil group seemed to be the method for 
resisting the state, we have shown that we have joined to protect our 
hometown by claiming the rights of popular participation.” 
 Regarding this, the researcher noted that the connections of both civil 
groups created linkages in order to encourage communication of their issues 
and problems. The forms or structure of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups, however, still functioned according to their own groups. There were 
no interventions into each other through linkages.236 In terms of this, Anan237 
(Bor Nork) thought that the collaboration with other civil groups is an 
important way to get the attention of the state, but that combination of the 
civil groups is unnecessary for the Bor Nork civil group. He said, “We 
connected with other groups because we like to work with them, but we won’t 
combine with any group because we might have different goals. And we can 
get state attention in many ways.” 
 For the Baan Krut civil group238, the villagers thought that the form of 
the connections for linking to other groups was based on the aim of the groups. 
Although other civil groups have different issues and problems, they 
nevertheless have a similar aim in terms of protecting their hometown 
through claiming their rights to participate in state decision-making. The 
Baan Krut villagers thought they needed to associate sometimes to achieve 
their mutual aim, but they should deal with the state separately for fixing 
different issues and problems. 
235  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
236  Fieldnotes (April-May 2008). 
237  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 




                                                   
  A villager239 told the researcher, for example, that the Baan Krut civil 
group joined with the Mae Ram Pueng civil group for the community 
discussion stage. At that time, the Mae Ram Pueng civil group was just a small 
group of villagers, and they thought about adding the group of Mae Ram 
Pueng villagers together with Baan Krut, as it might make a bigger and 
possibly stronger civil group. However, Jintana240 told the researcher that, 
four years later, the Mae Ram Pueng civil group was excluded from the 
Prajuab Kirikhan civil group network because the group was funded by a state 
enterprise. She said, “Fortunately, we kept from linking to this civil group as a 
group in the civil network, otherwise that would be a problem.” Similarly, 
according to Anan241 from Bor Nork: “Bor Nork and Baan Krut faced the same 
problem about the same time. We worked together, but we never thought 
about combining both of us into one group.” Importantly, both civil group 
leaders thought that to merge the two civil groups together must cause their 
functions to change, requiring a better structure to manage the group 
productively. 
 In the researcher’s opinion, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ 
adaptation appeared in the building of more linkages to other civil groups, 
rather than transforming their structure to become bigger in size. Additionally, 
both civil groups kept their informal structure and functions even though they 
linked to other civil groups in their network. Importantly, both civil group 
leaders responded to the question of the political conflict between the Yellow 
Shirts and Red Shirts, as something that might negatively affect the civil group. 
They said in the same way that the conflict was a different kind of political 
thought. Jintana242 said, “We (Baan Krut civil group) are probably green, not 
red or yellow. Undeniably, we can be red or yellow; however, it is just a 
political view. We believe that no matter red or yellow, and with any 
government, they support the coal-fired power plant project.”  
 Similarly, the Bor Nork leader, Korn-uma243, said, “We got sick of 
national politics. For the villagers, they could think or join either red or yellow. 
239 Group discussion (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 
240  Phone interview with Jintana (March 1, 2012). 
241  Group discussion(Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
242  Phone interview with Jintana (March 1, 2012). 




                                                   
However, for the civil group we won’t take sides on behalf of the group. We 
always keep in mind that the civil group is run to protect our hometown, not 
for supporting political parties or groups.” 
 Even though the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to be out 
of the national mobilization between Red and Yellow Shirts during 2011 and 
2012, the villagers in both civil groups used to tell the researcher, in 2008, 
that they could create mass mobilization if it became necessary. Anan244 (Bor 
Nork) said, “We are like a troop which can be called to battle. I believe we can 
make it better and bigger than last time in 1998.” Korn-uma245 said, “We seem 
to be quiet, but we are concerned that the state might launch any project at 
any time, so I don’t think the villagers would stay quiet once projects come.” 
Moreover, Jintana246 (Baan Krut) also said, “I believe that if the state launches 
any projects in Baan Krut, the protest group will be bigger because we have 
many civil groups in our network.”  
 Regarding this, there are two vital points for Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil group linkages. The first is that both civil groups adapt in the sustaining 
phase by using connections without alteration of the groups. It is because they 
are concerned about different goals if they combine with other groups. The 
second point is that in terms of the linkages in the civil group network, 
adaptation can develop to become mass mobilization, in order to not only 
sustain the civil group, but also to significantly increase the pressure able to be 
applied on the state by the civil group. In this point, Jintana247 said that the 
developing of mobilization needs more thought, because it might result in civil 
war, in the worse case. 
The vertical linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork coal-fired plant projects being 
cancelled, the conflict between these groups of villagers and the Thai state 
increased. Interaction between both civil groups and the Thai state became 
antagonistic. However, the connection of both civil groups with the Thai state 
244   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
245   Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
246   Interview with Jintana (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
was a continuation of the lack of vertical interaction at the previous phase in 
the establishment of the civil groups. 
 According to Korn-uma248, the group of Bor Nork villagers is local 
people who deny this kind of capitalism (coal-fired plant project), particularly 
in terms of economic development, along with megaprojects. She said, “To 
oppose the coal-fired power plant project in Bor Nork led the state to view us 
as a group with inferior vision.” Nevertheless, while the Bor Nork villagers249 
recognized that the Thai state might think of them negatively, they also knew 
the state (government) needed their votes. In terms of this, Anan250 said the 
local politicians seemed to support the Bor Nork villagers. Connections to 
local politicians in Bor Nork and at the provincial level were empathetic. 
Nonetheless, he believed that the politicians involved had little power in the 
decision-making process for such large projects. 
 Similarly, Jintana and the Baan Krut villagers251 revealed that they had 
expected that all the connections they had built up would also facilitate the 
Baan Krut civil group. However, they realized that the power of local 
politicians was limited at party level so policy-making was not something they 
had much power over. Ultimately decision-making was done by the leaders of 
the government, along with elites and interest groups involved in political 
decision-making. Because of this, they thought it was unnecessary to link to 
any kind of state institution. Jintana said, “I think the Thai political decision-
making system is too narrow to accept local people’s views. The Thai state 
especially contains huge benefits which are decided by such interest groups 
without local community participation, so we will never link because we were 
definitely out of the process.” 
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups opposed the state 
megaprojects, particularly projects that tended to involve harming 
communities in terms of resources and environmental degradation. Both civil 
groups often raised the issue of the projects’ conflict of interests in terms of 
the civil groups’ interaction with the state. Also, they used the issue of the lack 
of transparency in the project processes, which involved several issues, such as 
248  Interview with Korn-uma (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 2, 2008). 
249  Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 
250   Interview with Anan (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
unclear EIA and public hearings. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
maintained a gap between the Thai state and themselves in order to stay away 
from any manipulative propaganda. For instance, the villagers in both groups 
told the researcher, in the same way, that some politicians in high positions in 
government, had visited the groups. This was just to show they ‘cared’ and 
were ‘concerned’ about the issues and problems relating to the projects.252 
 The Political Development Council (PDC)253 is a state institution and 
authority encouraging the Thai civil sector. According to a member of PDC254 
there were 76 representatives, one from each province. The representative 
from Prajuab Kirikhan province, surprisingly, was a member of the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups. The civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan seemed to act 
as an anti-state force in the Political Development Council (PDC), even though 
the PDC is one of the state institutions for building linkages between the state 
and local people. In comparison, Jintana255 claimed that the Baan Krut and 
other civil groups never thought they were state antagonists, even though the 
civil groups had limited participation with the state in some ways.  In fact, 
there was a provincial representative who could represent all people. 
Regarding this, the researcher argues that the linkages between the state and 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork actually appear to be in place but are not well formed. 
 For example, the National Economic and Social Advisory Council 
(NESAC) thought that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to 
understand their roles well, particularly in their responses to the Thai state.256 
Both civil groups communicated with state institutions in many ways. Some 
contacts were made through government offices by formal documents. In the 
researcher’s opinion, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups managed their 
linkage to the state to pursue their interests, such as the linkages they forged 
when they were opposing the projects. These were established when required 
but let go after the cancellation of the projects to revert back to an ordinary 
situation. The contact through formal documents was considered to be the 
appropriate linking to the state. 
252  Fieldnotes (April-May 2008). 
253  The Political Development Council (PDC) = สถายนัพฒันาการเมือง  
254  Interview with a member of The Political Development Council (Bangkok, July 4, 2011). 
255  Phone interview with Jintana (Prajuab Kirikhan, March 1, 2012). 
256  Interview with the National Economic and Social Advisory Council (NESAC) members  




                                                   
 In brief, the horizontal linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups developed in the earlier phase. The linkages were comprised of their 
networks, in particular connections with other civil groups at the same level. 
Nonetheless, even though both civil groups operated by linking to other civil 
groups resulting in productive actions, both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups still maintained their own self-organized structures. In terms of the 
vertical linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, the case study 
indicates that there was very little linkage between the civil groups and the 
Thai state due to the civil groups attempting to protect themselves from any 
conflicts of interest.  
The sustainability of social capital for the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups  
According to the research framework, social capital is the essential factor for 
establishing civil groups, for their development and also for the sustaining of 
civil groups. In this phase, the study emphasizes the social capital of Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork, presenting it in terms of the collective action it brought.  
 The social capital sustaining the civil groups developed from the 
establishment phase, which appeared in terms of individual social capital. As 
well as this, the strengthening of the civil groups in the developing phase was 
aligned to the leaders and the civil group reputations, both of which were still, 
however, related to individuals. This part of the study examines how the social 
capital of Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups progressed significantly during 
this phase from the perspective of the social capital elements such as trust, 
reciprocity, value and norms as they were adapted to provide collective action. 
 The trust shown within a civil group is not that of individual 
trustworthiness. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups support other civil 
groups on behalf of the civil group.Theyestablished social bonds also in the 
name of the Baan Krut civil group, without referring to individual 
relationships. For instance, Picharn257, twenty-one years old, revealed that he 
went to Mae Rum Pueng beach and met a group of villagers who were in 
conflict with Sahaviriya Steel Industries PCL (SSI), the largest fully integrated 




                                                   
flat steel plant. He said, “I told the group I’m one of the Baan Krut civil group 
so they let me go.”   
 Similarly, the Bor Nork villagers believe that social bonding and 
relationships in their group are still the same as when the group started. 
However, the civil group also worked on building up social ties by using the 
sense of being an environmental conservation group. The civil group’s goals 
and objectives in terms of supporting hometown preservation became a tie 
between civil group members and with other civil groups in the civil group 
network. For example, villagers could bring family members and friends into 
the group if they had the same goal and objectives with the civil group. A 
fifteen-year-old girl, Pim258, moved from another village to Bor Nork just a 
few months before the research was carried out. She joined the group of the 
Bor Nork community radio broadcast. She said, “I don’t know anybody here, 
but I knew about the group of villagers of Bor Nork. I learnt from school that 
we have concerns about our environment so I want to join the group.” In 
terms of this, the researcher noted that trust in the aims and objectives of the 
civil group encouraged the group to increase members and the network. The 
civil group’s activities present how the aspect of individual trust and social 
relations transformed to become the aspect of social relations and 
trustworthiness of the civil group.  
 Furthermore, the reciprocity of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups also appears with a collective aspect. Reciprocity plays a wide role in 
the civil groups’ network. The process of turning from helping each other to 
becoming a civil group helping other civil groups focusses on civil group 
benefit. For example, a villager259 told the researcher that after the coal-fired 
power plant project was cancelled, the group of Bor Nork villagers began to 
recognize other civil groups, such as Mae Rum Pueng as much more 
important. She said, “It is either the rejection of the building of the coal-fired 
power plant project or the organizing ability of the civil group. So we can help 
more communities or groups that are facing the same problems as we used to. 
In terms of this, we went to join with the Mae Rum Pueng group.”   
258  Group interview (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, May 6, 2008). 




                                                   
 In the same way, the group of villagers tended to support other 
communities on behalf of the Bor Nork civil group rather than helping the 
network as individual villagers. Also Prapa,260 a Baan Krut villager said, 
“When we opposed the projects in 1994 it seemed to be very difficult to deal 
with things. We left our farm or children with friends sometimes. The offers 
from families and friends to assist were helpful at the time. However, the 
project has been cancelled at the moment so we think of other groups of 
villagers who are facing the same problem with us. They need more offers of 
help than we do. We joined and worked with them the same as we work in our 
group, sincerely.” 
 In regard to this, the study explains how the aspects of social capital 
such as trust and reciprocity emerged during the period when Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork connected with other civil groups, due to a kind of responsibility and 
duty to help the civil groups in their network. Trustworthiness was, however, 
based on what was well known about the civil groups, which was their aim to 
protect the hometown environment. 
 Also social capital, in terms of the value of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups, at this stage was related to their reputation, which was able to 
motivate other civil groups and other communities to form civil groups in the 
same way as them. Their ability to protect their hometown has value and was 
their starting point, which inspired other communities to think about forming 
(civil) groups in order to look after their places. For instance, Padej261, the 
leader of the Baan Kok Payom community in Satoon province, revealed that 
Baan Kok Payom emerged from six small groups of local villagers. He said, “I 
was disappointed once the state seemed to ignore my community as just a 
remote site. The state was overlooking what my community wanted for a 
better life. However, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities are a good 
pattern, which inspired me to form the group in order to look after our 
community. They are an example of the power of unity. At least, if my 
community were to face the harmful project we will be strong enough to 
protect ourselves.”   
260 Group interview (Baan Krut, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 10, 2008). 




                                                   
 In the same way, the inspiration of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups produces a collective sense of consciousness in terms of looking after 
birthplaces for other communities. This seems to be a kind of building up in 
norms of Thai society. For example, the Baan Krut villagers knew the Baan 
Krut civil group had become widely known within Thai society, particularly 
the civil group leader, Jintana. Similarly, the Bor Nork civil group is well 
known because of Charoen. Although the well-known leaders of both civil 
groups seemed to be symbols for the civil group, the sustaining of both groups, 
however, stands on the civil group reputation, with the symbol seemed to have 
built up discursive power. According to Korn-uma262, the state tried to build 
the coal-fired power plant by putting out the idea that the project would bring 
about more income and that the area would be developed for the villagers. She 
said, “We will insist on our idea that our hometown could be developed 
without a coal-fired power plant. To develop our community the villagers in 
this community should be allowed to live safely and happily. In contrast, the 
project must destroy our home, so we will tell people, persuade them to 
believe us that the state is wrong.” 
 Apart from that, the researcher notes that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups had an ability to be tolerant. The experience of encountering state 
enterprises and agencies taught them to be tolerant in conflict situations. In 
the case of Jintana, she was sentenced to four months in jail due to the offense 
of trespassing at the coal-fired power plant project agency’s staff party. After 
she was released, Jintana revealed to the researcher that: “It was my fault, 
owing to my lack of tolerance. However, it was a great lesson learned by me as 
a leader of the group.” Moreover, she thought the Baan Krut civil group might 
end because the leader was in jail. Fortunately, the group was very patient and 
it operated productively without her.263 
 In terms of this, Jintana argues that dealing with state enterprises and 
agencies, including even state institutions in the conciliation stage, requires 
the civil groups to learn to be more patient. She said,  “The conciliation 
process comprises the opposition trying to convince us, and sometimes they 
make you look stupid in the public eye. I learnt that being more patient made 
262   Group discussion (Bor Nork, Prajuab Kirikhan, April 4, 2008). 




                                                   
us become more professional. If you can be patient that means the situation is 
controllable.”  
 Apart from the increase in tolerance, which occurred as the civil groups 
adapted, the aspect of collectiveness also emerged at this stage. According to 
how the civil groups developed through their informal functions, the civil 
groups operated and worked on a local scale without concerning themselves 
with the groups in, or organization of, their networks. For example, being 
tolerant facilitated group communication because it led to communication 
becoming more formal. The long and complicated claims procedure was 
tolerated and accepted by the civil groups. A central government officer264 told 
the researcher that the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups dealt with central 
government departments systematically. The communication between the 
civil groups and government officers appears to be very professional. She 
confessed that, “At first, I thought the group of villagers from Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork might be self-willed. However, they have approached state 
institutions on behalf of the civil group intelligently so far.”  
 Moreover, the civil groups’ tolerance facilitated their collective action. 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers told how they went to join other civil 
groups, although inconvenient, several times. They traveled sometimes long 
distances in order to support other civil groups in their network. Even though 
both projects were canceled, they were willing to support other civil groups, 
requiring lots of patience.265 Regarding this, the researcher argues that being 
tolerant significantly increased the civil groups’ operational ability. The Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups exist strongly due to the encouragement of 
their tolerance. In other words, the adaptation of the civil groups’ social 
capital supported their survival and sustainability.  
 On this point, the researcher argues that the social capital of the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups created development of thoughtfulness and 
considered reflection at the sustaining phase. The products of thoughtfulness 
refer to all social capital elements producing the collective aspect of social 
capital. The basis of trustworthiness of the civil group, as well as the civil 
group values, nurtures norms among the civil groups in the network. 
264   Interview with central government officers (Bangkok, February 11, 2008). 




                                                   
Importantly, the emergence of shared norms became the procedure of 
building the civil group network widely and strongly.   
 In summary, the social capital elements of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups appear in the process of facilitative factors for civil group 
adaptation. The other civil groups respect the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups because they trust in the civil groups’ standpoint in keeping strong 
community. The reputation of both civil groups became an important value, 
which expanded to be norms shared in the civil group network. Moreover, the 
civil groups’ tolerance also developed the civil groups’ adaptation, including in 
terms of the civil group image.  
Discussion and Conclusion: The Baan Krut and Bor Nork Civil 
Groups 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged out of the contentions 
between local communities and the Thai state’s enterprise, in particular the 
case of the coal-fired power plant projects in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
communities. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ establishment was 
owing to the launching of two coal-fired power plant projects in Prajuab 
Kirikhan province in 1994. It provoked the groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
villagers to collaborate in order to fight against these projects. Consequently, 
the civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork, emerged in regard to people’s rights 
in terms of public participation in environmental management policy. It was 
concern at how the effects of the projects could jeopardize the communities 
that led Baan Krut and Bor Nork to seek ways of dealing with this problem. At 
the beginning, a young villager of Bor Nork, Charoen, persuaded the villagers 
in the Bor Nork community to join together in order to discuss the project. He 
and his friends led the group of Bor Nork villagers to seek a solution by talking 
to friends, family and other residents in Bor Nork. The group activities started 
with meetings, group discussions and seeking more information in order to 
serve the aim of thwarting the project. 
 The group of Baan Krut villagers also emerged about the same time as 
Bor Nork, due to the two coal-fired power plant projects proceeding under the 
same national proposal. The group of Baan Krut villagers was led by Jintana, a 




ways to deal with the Thai state and the state enterprises. The attempt by the 
villagers in both communities to establish groups resulted in the formation of 
self-organized groups, both with the same starting point of protecting the 
hometown. 
  The two civil groups developed more fully after their groups established 
themselves through facing the complicated contact with the Thai state and the 
state enterprises. Eventually, the civil groups responded to the state by 
blocking the main street in Prajuab Kirikhan with a group of villagers on 8 
December 1998. This mobilization contained about thirty thousand local 
villagers in the Prajuab Kirikhan province. Moreover, they marched to 
Bangkok on 10 January 2002 because they were unclear about the state 
decision-making in building these projects. Both civil groups exerted pressure, 
which led the projects to be questioned; in particular, there were public 
hearings about both projects. The most important pressure on the projects 
was, however, the death of Charoen on 21 June 2004. The murder of the 
leader of the Bor Nork civil group was recognized as being related to his role 
as leader of the group and so led to disclosure of some of the conflict of 
interests behind the projects. Korn-uma, Charoen’s wife, then carried on the 
Bor Nork civil group as a civil group leader with the help of Charoen’s friends.  
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups became involved in state 
reconciliation processes several times. During this period, these civil groups 
helped villagers in other communities around Prajuab Kirikhan province to 
also form civil groups, such as the Sam Roi Yod civil group in 2006, and the 
Mae Rum Pueng civil group in 2008.  
  The activities of resistance by the civil groups put pressure on the coal-
fired power plant projects in both the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities. 
The result was first for the projects to be postponed, then ultimately canceled. 
However, both civil groups, in particular the civil group leaders, Jintana and 
Korn-uma, continued to maintain group activities, which aimed to support 
local communities’ collaboration in the case of resources and environmental 
conservation awareness. Both groups built the civil group network more 
widely during this time. With the reputation of being strong civil groups that 
had overcome the state, the Baan Krut civil group leader, Jintana, and Korn-




local villagers nationally to form civil groups. This continues even though civil 
groups have to work amongst the national political conflict between Red Shirt 
and Yellow Shirt political movements. 
 According to the research framework, the case study of the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups can be summarized according to the themes of an 
establishment phase, development phase and sustaining phase, as follows. 
The establishment phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups 
 The emergence of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups relied 
heavily on social capital factors. The groups of Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
villagers both emerged through concern about the degradation of their 
livelihood coming from the huge state projects. The coal-fired power plant 
projects were the problem, which pushed the villagers in both communities to 
apply their social capital to form civil groups. The character of social capital 
contains trust, reciprocity, value and norms, which appear in the culture, 
grievances and incentives of the civil groups. Additionally, these social capital 
factors were interlocked by social bonding or social relations in the groups. 
 The social capital of Baan Krut and Bor Nork at the beginning stage 
appears at the individual level. Trust within the groups began with the social 
bonding and relationships of the villagers within the communities. The strong 
identity of southern Thai residents facilitated social relations. Consequently, 
trust within the civil groups was generated out of loose social bonding and 
relationships. Friendship and neighborliness were important components for 
the civil groups’ establishment, along with kinship.  
 Accordingly, the reciprocity involved was similar to helping, because of 
the Baan Krut and Bor Nork identity and lifestyle. The villagers seemed to be 
little inclined to help each other, but this was due to their independent 
lifestyle. The extra help was expressed when the villagers were on duty as part 
of the civil groups. Thus, civil group reciprocity occurred together and 
developed out of the other social capital factors. The villagers in the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork communities exemplify how the strong identity of the southern 
Thai encourages villagers to have great confidence, which relates to producing 




 In the same way, the role of social capital factors also works together 
with the civil groups’ cultural traditions. There is strong respect for their 
ancestors. The perspective of honoring the parentage of the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork formed the villagers’ attitude in terms of preserving the birthplace in 
order for it to be inherited by future generations. Because of this attitude, 
potential environmental degradation caused by the projects was a serious 
concern, bringing severe dissatisfaction at how the state responded. These are 
the main issues that became incentive factors, provoking the villagers to 
establish the civil group. The concern for environmental issues developed out 
of the value and conscience for birthplace preservation, while the issue of the 
dislike of the state’s response resulted in a lack of trust between the Thai state 
and the civil groups. In particular, the killing of one of the civil group leaders 
was a strong grievance factor that led the villagers to increasingly get together 
as civil groups. 
The development phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups 
When analysing the development phase, this study emphasized civil group 
strengthening, which was framed by the groups’ structure, actors, interaction 
and social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. There was 
further formation by the villagers in both communities of environmental 
conservation groups, which they initiated during the previous establishment 
phase. The groups Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut developed 
the form of an organization, even though the groups’ structures and functions 
still appeared to maintain an informal aspect. These civil groups took on a 
formal organizational structure to provide the ability to deal with the 
documents, which relates to dealing with the Thai bureaucracy. Besides that, 
the civil groups’ finances seemed to be managed well through the organization. 
Civil groups designed the functions of their organizations for the civil group 
members to be able to take up specific responsibilities. The development of 
both civil groups indicates an ability to innovate the group structure and their 
self-organizational capability. 
 The leaders of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appear to be the 




phase. The civil groups’ members encompass the villagers surrounding the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities, who are committed to the same aim of 
opposing the coal-fired power plant projects. However, the civil groups’ 
members play several different roles. This arose mostly due to the need to 
participate in the conciliation processes, which involved the creation of civil 
group representatives. This is in contrast to how all the civil group members 
could be called to become part of a mass mobilization if civil group resolutions 
resulted in the need for it. 
 Another feature is how the civil groups’ members include the villagers 
of the new young generation. With regard to this, the civil group leaders 
present the young generation as having a very important role in the 
strengthening of civil groups. They work with confidence and have strong 
goals. Also the involvement of advisors to support the new young generation, 
for example with academic information, was all done without external funding 
support, which confirms the self-organizational ability of both civil groups. 
 In terms of civil group interaction, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups not only connected with each other, but also interacted with several 
other civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan, which indicates their ability to create 
connections at the same level, even though there are scarcely any interactions 
with local NGOs and local government. Similarly, vertical interactions appear 
widely in terms of participating with civil group networks around Thailand, 
and by contrast there are very few connections to national NGOs and central 
government. 
 Aspects of the social capital of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
during the development phase are aligned with social capital at the 
establishment phase. The internal factors of social capital with these civil 
groups contain individual social capital, which occurs within the civil groups. 
Trustworthiness among civil group members and leaders is the strengthening 
factor, as well as the values and norms coming from civil group members 
proud of their leaders, who are kinds of heroes and heroines in both 
communities. In terms of the external factors enhancing social capital, in both 
civil groups it appears as the social network, which is connected by other civil 
groups’ trustworthiness. Moreover, the values of the civil groups also bring 




participation instilled into civil groups that originated from the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork civil groups. The values and norms of these civil groups returned to 
support and strengthen components of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups during this phase. 
The sustaining phase of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicate that the civil group is 
sustained through linkages, along with social capital. The adaptation of civil 
group linkages develops on top of the civil group interactions that emerged 
during the development phase. In the same way, the adaptation of social 
capital maintains the same components, but the aspects are significantly 
transformed. 
 During the sustaining phase, the linkages of the civil group adapted in 
terms of horizontal interactions, which emerged at the development phase. 
The features of the linkages appear in terms of collaboration. They involve the 
need for wider and stronger connections in order to support the forming of 
new civil groups. Importantly, the collaborations of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups built upon the civil groups’ reputation, which in turn 
sustains the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups in Thai civil society. 
Through this adaptation of collaboration, both civil groups have been able to 
maintain their civil group structure and identity. However, the vertical 
linkages of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups show scarce collaboration 
with state institutions, due to a lack of trust at the beginning, even though the 
NESAR and PDC can be a channel to reduce the gap between the civil groups 
and the Thai state.  
 Baan Krut and Bor Nork could sustain themselves after the crisis, when 
they had reached their goal. Therefore, these civil groups have changed their 
goals from opposing the coal-fired power plants in their places to help other 
civil groups facing similar crises. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
supported many small communities with self-organization, and new civil 
groups grew up around Thailand. The activities of these civil groups have 
changed from a kind of mobilization to providing information and sharing 
their experiences of dealing with the problems with the new civil groups. In 




groups showed their adaptation ability, which made these civil groups able to 
sustain themselves.  
 In the case of social capital factors, features of the social capital of the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups adapted from an individual dimension to 
a collective dimension. Collective social capital emerged as the experience of 
trust in personal relationships developed to become trust in civil group values. 
Maintenance of the values and norms of the civil group rely on the civil groups’ 
reputations, though it is also enhanced by their tolerance and maintaining 
their strong starting point of traditional care for the home environment. This 
shows the civil groups’ capability, which could convert individual social capital 
into group or collective social capital. Furthermore, these civil groups’ values 
also encourage other civil groups to reproduce the norms by sharing them 
within the civil group network. 
 In conclusion, this study uses the research framework to portray Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil group dynamics in order to clarify the practical form 
and function of the civil group. The existence of both civil groups is related to 
the developing of appropriate and realistic roles for local civil groups in Thai 
civil society.  
 Firstly, social capital at the establishment phase related to culture, 
grievances and incentive factors. The emergence of these factors was based on 
the underlying social relations of the civil groups. 
 Secondly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers indicated that the 
creation of the civil group structure and assigning of the management function 
were important. The leaders performed an important role, in leadership as 
well as in decision-making. Both civil groups’ leaders played appropriate roles, 
which became the key factor supporting the production of civil group values 
and norms in the next phase. 
 Thirdly, civil group adaptation at the sustainability phase relied on the 
interactions and social capital developed at the previous phase. This included 
linkages developed through civil group interactions in a wider network. In the 
same way, social capital at the development phase adapted from the individual 
form to be a collective aspect, which encouraged the sustaining of both civil 




 Fourthly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged as civil 
organizations about the same time. Sometimes they worked together, but they 
existed independently. On this point, the case study shows they had a similar 
establishment in terms of birthplace preservation ideals, while maintaining 
their own identities related to their self-organization ability, which indicated 
the civil groups’ ability to sustain themselves. 
 Lastly, there was a lack of interaction and linkage between the civil 
groups and the Thai state. Similarly, there was scarce interaction and linkages 
of the civil groups to NGOs due to the civil groups’ conceptions that the NGOs 
might be supported by EGAT. The case of the missing linkage between the 
civil groups and the state must be a concern for the Thai state, because the 
lack of good interaction and linkages between them and civil groups could be a 







Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses the two case studies referred to in the two previous 
chapters, focussing particularly on how the two case studies align with the 
research framework. Summaries of the case studies of the Pak Mun civil group, 
and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, are highlighted in tables to 
provide easy comparison of the two case studies. Also, the research framework 
assessment follows. 
Discussion of Case Study One: The Pak Mun Civil Group 
The conclusion begins by examining the trajectory of the Pak Mun civil group, 
outlined in detail in Chapter Three. The civil group is presented according to 
the framing of the multiple phases of civil group trajectories, as presented in 
Chapter Two (Figure 1). The framing of the explanation of the Pak Mun civil 
group emphasized the components related to civil group emergence at the 
establishment phase, the strengthening elements at the development phase, 
and finally the adaptation factors sustaining the civil group.  
 The Pak Mun civil group emerged out of the association of Pak Mun 
villagers. The civil group started with the sharing of the villagers’ suffering in 
terms of the Pak Mun Dam construction project. This civil group formed when 
the plan for the Pak Mun Dam project was launched. The forming of the civil 
group was initiated by social capital within the community. Social capital 
aspects of trust, reciprocity, values and norms relate closely to social bonding 
and the relationship of the villagers in the civil group; for example, the 
villagers trusted more in their family members, or people they knew, than 
strangers; the Pak Mun villagers easily give offers of help (reciprocity) to 
people they knew, especially people who experienced the same problem as 
them. Social capital mainly compounded with civil group culture, which 
showed as aspects of lifestyle, beliefs and character or attitude of the villagers 
in the Pak Mun civil group. In contrast, the issue of grievances and incentives 




civil group at the emergence stage was initially to stop the dam construction. 












The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group 
 
Social Capital 




Respect of elders. Local lifestyle with local tradition. Strong 





Destroyed community talisman. Threatened by opponents.  




No incentive factors, but some issues stimulated responses as 
livelihoods were affected. Demanding of people’s equality and 
rights. Dishonesty by state agencies. Ecological impacts. 
 
Table 1  The emergence of the Pak Mun civil group at the establishment phase 
 
To strengthen the civil group, the aims of the Pak Mun civil group during the 
development phase (Table 2) moved the aim from finding ways to encourage 
the discarding of the operation of the dam, to claiming for compensation to 
the villagers afflicted by the dam project. Pak Mun villagers strengthened their 
civil group by attempting to develop the group of Pak Mun villagers into a 
pressure group. In this regard, the Mae Mun Man Yean village was designed 
as the symbol of the Pak Mun civil group, to present the group as brave 
villagers. In other words, the Pak Mun villagers showed the ability for civil 
innovation and self-organization by building the Mae Mun Man Yean village 
to symbolize the Pak Mun civil group’s disobedience. However, the civil group 
remained with an informal structure and functioned the same as it did when 
the group emerged. In particular, the senior (elderly) hierarchy was 
maintained. Although the Pak Mun civil group had a specific location for its 
meetings and activities, the civil group used the Mae Mun Man Yean village as 




 At the development phase, the Pak Mun villagers operated their civil 
organization more clearly than in the previous phase, through two main kinds 
of activity. On the one hand, the villagers of the Pak Mun civil group showed 
that they were able to be a pressure group by mobilizing local villagers. 
Consequently, the civil group marched to Bangkok and protested in front of 
government offices. On the other hand, the group of Pak Mun villagers used 
the Mae Mun Man Yean village as a civil group space. The village was set up as 
an open stage, which provided deliberative processes for the civil group’s 
members to engage in. With the aim of being a pressure group, Pak Mun civil 
group membership was not specified, in order to increase the number of 
members when there was a need. As a result, the Mae Mun Man Yean village 
contained several villagers from diverse communities, which later came to be 
counted as part of the civil group network. To help fulfill its civil group 
operation, the village continued some traditional activities, such as local music 
and local wisdom. These activities reminded the Pak Mun villagers that their 
livelihoods had been affected by the dam and that traditional activities had 
been lost. 
 In the case of civil group actors, the main group of existing former 
leaders maintained their important roles in managing the civil group. 
However, the civil group members were mostly in the same age range as the 
leaders. Also, the Pak Mun civil group seemed to be influenced by activists, in 
particular, Vanida. The advisors assisted the civil group in terms of providing 
technical information to support their demands to abandon the dam operation 
and then later for compensation. Additionally, the Pak Mun civil group was 
funded through traditional fundraising, apart from some foundations which 
donated. 
 The Pak Mun civil group interacted with other civil groups and other 
communities’ activities in order to maintain connections for when the civil 
group needed mass mobilization. Reaching out to other civil groups to join 
protests became a significant aim of the civil group. Nonetheless, civil group 
interaction with the AOP started through Vanida’s connections. In contrast, 
interaction with local and central government seemed to fail.  
 In relation to social capital factors, the strengthening of the Pak Mun 




people. Admiration for the Pak Mun civil group in terms of their experiences 
of the difficulty in dealing with the Thai state became the source of values for 























Created the Mae Mun Man Yean village. Informal 
structure with local traditional style (seniority 
hierarchy). Aims of the group focus on stopping the 
operation of the dam and then claiming 
compensation. Functions appear in the form of 
protest and ritual events. Organizing events was 
done with activists’ support. They used the leaders’ 







Main members were Pak Mun community villagers, 
but could be any villagers suffering problems from 
the state projects around the E-sarn area. Members 
mostly were elderly villagers. Leaders developed an 
organization beyond the informal traditional ties 
with the same leaders. Supported strongly by the 
activists. Advisors played few roles. Funding came 




Interacted with villagers in the village and other civil 
groups by participation in cultural and traditional 
events and protests. AOP involved by activists’ 





Individual level of reciprocity and trust. Attempting 
to build up the civil group values and norms. Trust 
only in networks produced by activists. Political 
mobilization influenced civil group social relations 
and generated negative values and norms. 
 
Table 2  The strengthening of the Pak Mun civil group at the development phase 
  
Moreover, the civil group attempted to build the norm of selflessness into the 
civil group. Apart from that, trustworthiness and reciprocity in the civil group 
appeared to be maintained at the individual level also. It was because the Pak 




emerged social bonding. Regarding this, the Pak Mun villagers in the civil 
group presented that they sustained the trust of the elder villagers, traditional 
leaders and also Vanida. However, the social capital of the Pak Mun civil 
group was interfered with by the national political mobilization conflict later 
on, namely, the Red Shirt and Yellow Shirt conflict. 















Linkages to other civil groups generated within the 
AOP. Civil group structure altered to be part of the 
AOP by learning to connect to the other civil groups. 
Linkages organized by AOP, then PMove. Adaptation 
appeared in the co-ordination and collaboration with 






Trust in AOP and PMove. Decrease in reciprocity 
within the civil group. More tolerance with wider 
connections. Reputation for values and norms on 
behalf of the AOP and PMove. 
 
Table 3  The adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group at the sustaining phase 
  
The adaptation of the Pak Mun civil group appeared through the changing 
way the civil group existed in Thai civil society. As mentioned previously, the 
Pak Mun civil group initially operated in part as a pressure group, which 
related to building the network in order to increase their ability to apply 
pressure. Nonetheless, the Pak Mun civil group later also built up a civil group 
network by linking up with the AOP. The adaptation of the civil group resulted 
in learning to work with other civil groups at a wider level, with civil group 
structure and functions also changing to become part of an NGO; first the 
AOP and then PMove.  
 According to the altering of functions and forms due to adaptation, the 
Pak Mun civil group’s social capital aspects also changed to become more 
collective. Trust emerged among the Pak Mun civil group with the other civil 




the civil group becoming connected more to outsiders, so personal trust in 
others appeared to disappear. The civil group’s value and norms came to 
resemble the AOP and PMove (Table 3). 
Discussion on Case Study Two: The Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
Civil Groups 
The second case study contains two civil groups, which are examined together 
according to the research framework. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups will be summarized briefly, based on the context of the case study 
provided in Chapter Four, according to the research framework’s themes.  
 The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged when coal-fired 
power plant projects were announced for their districts. The launching of the 
projects provoked villagers in both communities. The social capital of both 
civil groups was related to the nature of the villagers. The civil groups emerged 
through the villagers’ social bonding and connections, which seemed to be 
loose. These civil groups showed the widely held trust in other villagers or 
residents around Baan Krut and Bor Nork, with specific social character. They 
have the social character of having strong confidence in their Thai southern 
identity, which manifested as independence and less reciprocity. However, 
social capital was also generated in relation to the civil groups’ cultural aspects. 
The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group culture appeared in the local lifestyle 
and tradition, which is similar for all Thais. Hierarchy based on age is 
normally important, but within the civil groups there tended to be more 
emphasis on educated villagers. Teachers, monks and villagers who showed 
they had power or connections played significant roles at the beginning of the 
civil group, during the phase it was being established.  
 The cultural aspect of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups also 
included strong respectfulness of the villagers’ ancestry, because the villagers 
consider their homeland is protected by their ancestors and that it is the 
villagers’ responsibility to continue preserving it. Importantly, the villagers 
mostly earned their living on their own land. Moreover, the villagers had high 
self-esteem in the strong identity of the Thai southern style, which appeared 




Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed to be dispensable, due to the 
villagers appearing to be strong and independent. 
 Grievances definitely provoked the villagers to join civil groups. The 
coal-fired power plant projects brought together local villagers in both 
communities, as they became concerned at the potential environmental 
conservation issue. The projects also broke down some of the villagers’ 
relationships by the incentives offered. The communities were split by this 
and the resulting unfairness. The project was brought to a head through 
discrimination which arose in regard to the leaders of the civil groups, with 
one being murdered and the other put in jail, and the state appearing to 
ignore the situation and even standing beside those causing the oppression. 
There were no incentive factors for civil group establishment, and those that 














The emergence of the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
 
Social Capital 
Loose form of social bonding and connection. Trust in own 
strong identity, self-esteem and confidence. Less reciprocity. 
 
Culture 
Respect of teachers. Local lifestyle with local tradition. Strong 
belief in ancestry and southern charecter. Living with own 
properties and having independent character. Less traditional 




Community fragmentation. Breakdown of social relationships. 
State overlooked environmental degradation concerns and stood 
by the opponents of the civil groups. One of the leaders was 
killed and another put in jail. 
 
Incentives 
No incentives but some stimulation. Demanding participation of 
people with the state, and dishonesty in the public hearing 
process.  
 






stimulation through provocation. That there were stimulation factors rather 
than incentives produces a more reasonable explanation for civil group 
establishment (Table 4). 
 At the development phase, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
strengthened themselves by attempting to create well-managed procedures on 
top of the informal structure. Both Baan Krut and Bor Nork functioned 
effectively through the use of memorandums and document processes, which 
operated well to also present the civil groups’ aims. Promotion of the civil 
group pushed the group of Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers to become the 
signature environmental conservation group. Meanwhile, facilitating mass 
marches and mobilization tended to also be an essential role of the civil 
groups in the negotiation process. Moreover, the civil groups came to 
represent effective participation of people to make the political process 
accountable, when the coal-fired power plant projects were cancelled. 
 With the informal structure and functions, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups also contained a simple condition for civil group membership. The 
civil groups’ members simply had to have the same aim and concern; it was 
opened widely to all the villagers around these communities to join the civil 
group if they wished. The civil groups’ leaders appeared to be the most 
important key actor for group empowerment. The leaders presented 
themselves cleverly as the local villagers’ representatives instead of civil group 
leaders. By comparison, there was little involvement of activists and advisors 
in the strengthening of the civil groups, so their role can be said to have been 
absent.  
 The interaction of the civil groups was a vital factor for the 
strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. In particular, the 
civil groups’ horizontal interactions showed the civil groups’ ability in terms of 
building up the civil group network. However, the connections to the other 
civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan were related to their common interests. The 
developing of the connections with other civil groups in the nearby area was 
carried out in the expectation of getting more collaboration in the future, if it 
became necessary. Moreover, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups seemed 
to learn more about dealing with the state through these connections. Thus 




government, and accordingly, interaction with the NGOs and government 



















The strengthening of the 




Rakthongthin Bor Nork and Anurak Baan Krut created with 
informal structure. Self-organization presented in the ability 
of group functions and management. Attempting to operate 
the group systematically, through valuing the document 
procedure for claims and the groups’ actions. Presented 
works follow the aim of community preservation. Raising 
the need of state accountability. Significant innovation 




Members are mainly the communities’ residents with several 
generations. Leaders came from individual leadership 
ability, with social bonding and social support. Good 
relationships with official community leaders. Few roles for 
advisors. Funding came from donations and fundraising 




Wide horizontal interaction through connections to other 
civil groups around the communities’ area. Started to 
interact across the whole south of Thailand by sharing 
information. Connected to local government occasionally. 
Participated in some central government projects, while 
keeping a strong stand in the conciliation process. Involved 





Individual level of reciprocity and trust within civil groups. 
Values and norms emerged from individual social capital. 
Building up of the civil groups’ values and norms came from 
the leaders and civil groups’ capability.  
 
Table 5  The strengthening of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups at the            
development phase 
 
Social capital factors also facilitated the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
to become strengthened at this phase. Even though reciprocity and trust was 




produced the civil groups’ values and norms. The aspect of values and norms 
emerged through the leaders’ and villagers’ courage, and included the unity of 
the civil group (Table 5).  
 Regarding the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ sustainability, both 
civil groups indicated the ability for adaptation by transforming the civil 
groups’ aim and role in order to perform appropriately. By this stage, the coal-
fired power plant projects, which had led to the creation of the civil groups, 
had been cancelled, so they achieved their original aim to stop the projects. 
Consequently, the civil group seemed unnecessary after this. But the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups retained their connections with other civil 
groups in the civil group network. Their roles appeared, however, to change 
and to take on the role of assisting in the linking between other civil groups 
around Thailand. The connections and linkages took on the features of 
facilitating co-operation and collaboration between the other civil groups, and 
the linkages built up were mostly related to the leaders of both civil groups. 
 As mentioned previously, the role of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups after cancellation of the coal-fired plant project became one of 
supporters of local people who experienced conflict with the Thai state. The 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups used strength of identity, in terms of 
being small local groups who bravely rose up in order to oppose state power. 
In this regard, the leaders of both civil groups appeared to be ambassadors of 
a signature local group which encouraged civil groups nationwide to build up 
a civil group network. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork groups also 
sustained their capability of being self-organized with an informal structure 
and were careful to avoid taking sides in the national political mass 
mobilization conflict between Red and Yellow. Nonetheless, the linkages of 
the civil groups with the NGOs and the state were definitely fractured. 
 To sustain themselves, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
developed social capital as a means of survival. Again, the need of both civil 
groups seemed to disappear due to the projects being cancelled, but they 
continued to have a role in terms of encouraging collaboration through 
linkages, indicating that the social capital of these civil groups transformed to 




 Trust within the civil groups developed on from the previous phase. It 
was based on the strength of the civil groups, which became a vital factor 
facilitating linkages. Additionally, the aspect of reciprocity appeared in terms 
of co-ordination and collaboration; in particular, the loose reciprocity within 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork seemed to support other civil groups by not expecting 
to be reimbursed. Accordingly, the collective aspect of these civil groups 
included civil organizational values. Furthermore, linkages that the civil 
groups built generated social norms in terms of encouraging other local 
communities to value their motherland. Apart from building social norms that 
valued environmental preservation, the civil group also shared this model of 















The adaptation of the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
 
Linkages 
Wide linkages to other civil groups. Building more civil 
networks by helping other civil groups deal with problems 
independently. Adaptation appeared in the ability for co-
ordination and collaboration of other civil groups. Keep the 
civil groups’ identity. Leaders play important roles. No 
linking to NGOs and very little state institutional linkage. 







Social capital showed through the linkages. Appeared in 
collective social capital aspects. Trust in organizational 
relationships (same aims). Reciprocity emerged broadly 
among diverse civil groups through collaboration. Tolerance 
and the collective interest concerned built up values and 
norms. Social trust developed from civil group values and 
the sharing of norms. 
 





Case Studies Findings in Comparative Framework 
This thesis has examined two case studies: the Pak Mun civil group case study, 
and the two civil groups, Baan Krut and Bor Nork. In this section, the case 
studies are compared using the concepts of the research framework. 
Discussion of the comparison of the case studies aims to generate answers to 
the research questions, which will be the guideline for how the discussion is 
presented. 
 The two case studies have been described and explained, using the 
conceptual research framework, as having three phases. The explanation of 
the establishment, development and sustaining phases of the two case studies 
emphasized the context of the civil group case studies’ trajectories, rather than 
looking at the cases through the same period of time. This is because the two 
cases with the three civil groups emerged in different periods. Nonetheless, 
the study deemed the path trajectory of the cases to be significant, because the 
aim of the study is to seek possible ways of sustaining civil groups. As a result, 
the survival of the civil groups currently will be focussed on, and the different 
time frame of the case studies will be left aside. 
The similarities and differences of the case studies at the 
establishment phase 
Comparison of the emergence of the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups is summarized in Table 7. At the civil group 
establishment phase, the case studies emerged through a similar situation, 
even though the first case study, Pak Mun, occurred about five years earlier 
than the second case, Baan Krut and Bor Nork. Regarding the difference in 
their starting period, the civil groups in the second case seemed to be more 
aware of what needed to be dealt with in such contentious circumstances. The 
second case study learned from the first case study, because the state failed in 
the commitments it had made to the Pak Mun civil group many times. 
A feature of the similarities and differences is how reciprocity was 
expressed. That reciprocity occurred was a similarity, but equally, the way it 
was expressed was an important difference. In the first case study the 
reciprocity occurred within traditional community relationships. It indicated 




reciprocity.  It was carried out within traditional patterns of the civil group’s 
activities. The second case study also showed the ‘loose reciprocity’ as there 
was neither accounting involved, however the forms it took were not tied to 
the traditional patterns due to greater independence and assertiveness of the 











Case study two 
Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork 
civil groups 
Similarities Differences Similarities Differences 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








Social capital Trust, reciprocity, 





Own identity, self- 
esteem and 
independence 
Culture Local lifestyle, easy 
trust 
Belief in river, 
humble character, 
elders respected 
traditional ritual  
Local lifestyle, easy 
trust 




Grievances State overlooks local 
wisdom, state took 




State overlooks the 
villagers’ concerns, 
state took the 
opponents’ side 
Leader murdered, 
leader in jail, broken 










dishonesty of the public 
hearing process 






Incentives appeared in terms of stimulating factors or provocation: lack of media support, but with 
activists backing up 
 
Table 7 Comparison of the case studies at the establishment phase 
 
The similarities of the case studies at the establishment phase 
The Pak Mun, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups emerged quickly as a 
result of the pressure of conflict with the Thai state. These civil groups 
contained similar aspects of social capital, which underpinned civil group 
formation. Trust, reciprocity and social bonding were important factors for 
the emergence of the civil groups in both cases. In terms of trust, the villagers 
in these case studies were tied together by their personal trust, forming social 
bonding. The civil groups forming were related closely to the aspects of social 




neighborliness. Also, reciprocity occurred in accordance with trust and social 
bonding found in the case studies. 
 In the case of grievances, the Pak Mun, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups were all disappointed at the role of the government, or the Thai state, 
which seemed to stand on the opposite side to them. Besides, the civil groups 
were dissatisfied at the state’s ignorance of Pak Mun traditional knowledge, 
and the environmental concerns of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers.  
Moreover, incentive factors seemed to be generated through stimulating 
circumstances that contributed to civil group formation. The stimulating 
issues for the Pak Mun civil group related to the affliction brought to them as a 
consequence of the dam construction, while the concerns about the potential 
effects of the proposed coal-fired power plant projects was the provoking issue 
for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork villagers. Apart from that, the dishonesty of 
the Thai state and the state agency also forced the local villagers to seek a way 
in which to respond to the state, which resulted in them forming the civil 
groups. 
The differences in the case studies at the establishment phase 
Comparing the themes between the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups showed that they are more alike than different. 
Nevertheless, the dissimilarities of the case studies at the establishment phase 
are significant and relate to the different context of the two cases. 
 In the case of social capital, the case studies have trust, reciprocity and 
social bonding out of which the civil groups emerge similarly. However, there 
were some differences in the details of the social capital. The social bonding of 
Pak Mun seemed to be more focussed on social relations. Kinship, friendship 
and neighborliness tied the Pak Mun civil group members together, which also 
resulted in the reliance on each other. By contrast, the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups emerged with the self-esteem of the southern identity. Social 
bonding seemed to be based on the relationships of friends and neighbors 
rather than focussing on families. The social bonding of the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork appeared in more open, wider relationships than in the Pak Mun 
civil group. Also, Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups indicated more 




aspect or the villagers’ identity. Regardless of the cause, the study deems that 
there was a difference shown by social relationships in the first and second 
case studies, respectively, at the establishment phase. 
 Likewise, even though the cultural aspects of the civil groups existed 
within the same Thai traditional style, there were differences in the cases, 
which appeared in terms of the villagers’ beliefs and perspectives. The Pak 
Mun civil group believed in respect for the river. The rituals of community 
tradition became important activities of the civil group, together with respect 
for the elders, which as well reflected the humble character of the Pak Mun 
villagers. Whereas the villagers in the Baan Krut and Bor Nork communities, 
believed in their ancestors with a higher degree of self-confidence. They were 
proud of their careers, produced in their homeland, which were given them by 
former generations. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups were formed, 
along with the villagers’livelihoods, by those who were educated. The elder 
hierarchy did not seem to be very important in associating with the civil group. 
 In terms of the case studies’ grievances and incentives, the grievances 
were the affliction factors that supported the civil groups’ forming. The 
discrimination issue arose in the Pak Mun civil group. The villagers were 
threatened and villages destroyed, reflecting the oppression that the Pak Mun 
villagers were facing at that time. By comparison the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups experienced the murder of one leader and the jailing of another. 
Nevertheless, the issue of broken social relationships in the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork communities seemed to occur more strongly than in the case of the Pak 
Mun civil group. Additionally, the incentives of the case studies’ establishment 
appeared as provocation or stimulating factors, with the issue of people’s 
equality and ecological impacts raised by the Pak Mun civil group. In the case 
of Baan Krut and Bor Nork, they also raised the issue of the rights of people to 
participate in state decision-making, as one of the formative elements of their 
civil groups.  
The similarities and differences in the case studies at the 
development phase 
In this section, the study has tabulated and indicated the themes from the 




At the development phase, the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and 
Bor Nork civil groups have presented both similar and different strengthening 
features, in relation to the research framework (Table 8). 
The similarities of the case studies at the development phase 
The case studies, the Pak Mun civil group, and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups, at the development phase indicated similarity in civil group 
structure. For both cases the civil groups developed informal organization. 
These civil groups were formed based on the cultural aspects of Thai society. 
The informal structure of the civil groups could be identified as an innovation 
of the local villagers for both cases. However, the functions of these civil 
groups, even though both had informal structures, seemed to be different, 
which will be explained in the next section. 
 In the case of civil group actors, the members of these civil groups have 
the same membership, which mainly consisted of villagers in their 
communities. The civil groups’ leaders were all residents of the communities, 
and the leaders in two case studies had been in place for a long time, ever 
since the beginning of the civil groups. When the Bor Nork civil group leader, 
Charoen, was killed, his wife became the leader of Bor Nork civil group so that 
there was continuity.  
 For both of the case studies, interactions that developed encompassed 
both horizontal and vertical interactions. The horizontal interactions 
considered the civil groups’ connections to other communities or civil groups, 
local NGOs and local government. The vertical interaction of these civil groups 
looked at the civil groups’ connections to other communities or civil group 
networks in the wider area, as well as how the civil groups connected to NGOs 
and government at national level. Consequently, horizontal ties, especially 
within civil groups, became very important, while vertical ties developed 
inadequately because of the protest orientation. 
 Likewise, the social capital of the case studies indicated similarities in 
terms of developing the same aspects of social capital, which comprised of 
how trust and reciprocity were produced within the civil groups. Additionally, 




Krut and Bor Nork civil groups appeared at the individual level. Social capital 
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Structure Informal, local style.  Seniority hierarchy, 
aim to claim for 
compensation. 
Operated in protests 
and ritual activities. 
Activists involved. 




documents. Aim was to 
get community interest. 
Promoted the civil 
group.  
Actors Long time with the 
same leaders.  
Elder members, Pak 
Mun contained 






Long time with the 
same leaders, less of a 
role from advisors. 
Members in several 




residents, Leaders play 
strong roles.  




lack of interaction 
with local and central 
government. 
Same line of civil group 
connections. 
Building the civil group 
network by own 
connections. Some 
interaction with local 
government. No 
interaction with local 
and national NGOs. 
Social capital Individual level of 
trust and reciprocity. 
Trust, values and 




by political division.  
Individual level of trust 
and reciprocity. 
Build values and norms 
from individual social 
capital, leadership and 





The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed on building the group name and image. For 
the Pak Mun, the civil group image presented as the local villagers, and mostly in name of 
Vanida. 
 
Table 8 Comparison of the case studies at the development phase 
  
The differences in the case studies at the development phase 
As mentioned in the previous section, the case studies have, according to the 
research framework, developed from the same factors. Apart from that, the 




 Both case studies represent innovations by civil groups, which add to 
the concept of civil society. In terms of civil group structure, these civil groups 
have informal structure, but they functioned as groups in different ways. At 
this phase, the Pak Mun civil group aimed to stop the operation of the dam 
and were claiming compensation. For the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, 
the aim focussed on demanding the cancellation of the projects, together with 
demanding transparency in the state’s processes and participation in state 
decision-making. Furthermore, this study determined that the aim of claiming 
compensation by the Pak Mun villagers seemed to be based on individual 
interest, while for Baan Krut and Bor Nork they aimed to employ political 
processes, which not only resulted in focussing on the civil groups’ shared 
interest but also developing a mechanism for participation by people in the 
political system more widely. 
 In terms of the civil group operation, Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
emphasized the use of document procedures, which facilitated the civil group 
being able to bring the problem of coal-fired power plant project issue into the 
political system. Regarding this, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
worked mostly in contact with whomever they could get to support the aim of 
the civil group.  By contrast, the Pak Mun civil group operated by using mass 
marches and local talks on stages, along with traditional ritual activities. 
Therefore, the activities of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups developed 
out of protest and mobilization. They organized their activities in terms of 
participating in political process rather than being protesters as the social 
pressure group. 
 Importantly, it was undeniable that the Pak Mun civil group had in fact 
been supported by activists, even though the activists attempted to only play 
the role of supporter. Accordingly, the self-organizational ability of the Pak 
Mun civil group seemed to be less compared with the Baan Krut and Bor Nork 
civil groups, which organized themselves without the involvement of other 
parties. 
 The case studies also have different membership. Members of Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork identified obviously as Prajuab Kirikhan residents. For the 
Pak Mun civil group, members encompassed villagers around the E-Sarn area, 




civil group indicated that members had to be elder villagers, unlike in the 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, which contained members of varying 
age. In particular, the leadership team of Bor Nork was comprised of the 
younger generation of Bor Nork villagers, the same as in Baan Krut, which 
persuaded the civil group members to form a football team. This was in order 
to strengthen the group with a new young generation. This also reflected a 
different approach to the role of education and development of human 
resources. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups saw a need to ensure the 
leadership were educated and that this needed to be actively developed. By 
contrast, the Pak Mun civil group relied on external support from activists, 
and later from NGOs. Accordingly, the Pak Mun civil group type of leadership 
resulted in limitations to the operation of the civil group. For the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups, the leaders played a strong role, absent in Pak Mun. 
The Pak Mun civil group had activists supported strongly as advisors, while 
Baan Krut and Bor Nork have little support from activists or advisors. One 
more difference was in relation to the actors involved. Some sponsors 
supported the Pak Mun civil group, while the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups had none. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups maintained their 
independence and self-determination through developing their own human 
resources with a focus on education. 
 The interactions described in the case studies also developed in 
different ways. In terms of horizontal interactions, the Pak Mun civil group 
connected to other communities or other civil groups through the activists’ 
connections. The interactions mostly appeared in joining in marching and 
protests, which were organized by NGOs. In the case of the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups, interaction appeared mostly in exchanging information and 
discussion, though they were also involved in blocking the main street and 
marching in the first few years. With regard to this, however, the interactions 
by Baan Krut and Bor Nork appeared to be attempts to build up the civil group 
network. Besides that, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups had some 
connections to local government through some of the civil group members 
who worked at the local government office, and with politicians. However, the 
interaction with national government was absent in both case studies. Briefly, 




connection, but there were no NGOs involved with the Baan Krut and Bor 
Nork civil groups in this phase. 
 In terms of the differences in social capital between the case studies, 
social capital within the Pak Mun civil group was retained at the individual 
level. Social bonding remained important for joining the group’s activities. 
Significantly, the Pak Mun civil group developed trust, values and norms 
through the activists’ connections and networks. Moreover, trust among the 
civil group members went wrong when facing national political conflict. 
Importantly, NGOs strongly influenced the social capital of the Pak Mun civil 
group. Similarly, for the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, social capital 
was retained at the individual level, which also developed afterwards to 
become the values and norms of the civil groups. A key difference was, 
however, that trust in the leaders brought about the value of leadership, 
together with the civil group capability, such that it became the norm of the 
civil group. Additionally, Baan Krut and Bor Nork attempted to avoid the 
national political division in order to protect the civil group from becoming a 
political tool in the national political conflict. Thus, distrust resulting from the 
national conflict did not affect the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. 
The similarities and differences in the case studies at the 
sustaining phase 
In this section, the study compares the case studies in regard to the sustaining 
of the civil groups. Through the long development of the Pak Mun civil group, 
and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups, there emerged similarities and 
differences in their adaptation, due to the need for their own ways of surviving. 
The factors of civil group adaptation, linkages and social capital of the case 
studies are tabulated for comparison in Table 9. 
The similarities in the case studies at the sustaining phase 
The linkages formed in both of the case studies have two main similarities. 
Firstly, the Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups 
all showed that they linked to other civil groups in a wider sphere during this 
phase. In particular, the linkages resulted in the ability of the civil groups to 
build up the civil group network as an important factor for the sustaining of 




the civil group network of these two case studies emerged differently. Both 
case studies, however, equally show a lack of linking to state institutions. On 
this point, the scarce linkages to state institutions by both cases are related to 
the aspect of social capital. Trust was lost with state institutions right from the 
beginning phase, even though both cases existed with culture-based social 
capital, which maintained trust as the normal way to seek to relate with all 
people. 
The differences in the case studies at the sustaining phase 
The Pak Mun civil group and the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups have 
adapted in different ways. In particular, the differences in linkages and social 
capital features resulted in differing ability of the civil groups to sustain 
themselves.  
 In the case of the Pak Mun civil group, the linkages occurred mainly to 
transform the civil group to become part of an NGO. At the beginning, Pak 
Mun related closely to the activist Vanida, who was the main founder of the 
NGO, the AOP. Afterwards, the Pak Mun civil group became assimilated into 
the AOP, and then PMove. Apart from that, the linking of the Pak Mun civil 
group with other civil groups at this phase became linkages produced through 
the NGO’s connections. Consequently, the activities and the way to interact 
with others came to be under the umbrella of the NGO as well. 
 In contrast, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups’ adaptation was 
presented as ways of building up the civil group network at the same level, 
with other local civil groups. The linkages were the interactions of the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups to the other civil groups, located mainly in the 
same area, but also including other civil groups across Thailand. The linkages 
of these civil groups were developed through using their connections and 
interactions from the previous phase in order to link other civil groups 
together into a network of civil groups. The linkages they built up had the 
support of the other local communities to form civil groups, who then 
afterwards worked together. Importantly, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil 
groups were able to maintain their civil organization form and their own 




NGOs, so could work independently. Furthermore, not linking to the NGOs 
also protected the civil groups from interference by NGOs’ resolutions. 
 In terms of the differences between the two case studies, the Pak Mun 
civil group transformed to become part of an NGO, resulting in less reciprocity 
due to the civil group’s functions taking on a more formal aspect. In the same 
way, civil group trust came to be generated by trust under the NGO, as well as 
values and norms. Tolerance by the civil group became a small factor and 
appeared to be replaced by the Pak Mun civil group adapting its ability to 
survive among other civil groups within the NGO’s network. Therefore, 
through becoming integrated with AOP and the PMove, the Pak Mun civil 
group became weakened. Decrease in membership and activity of the civil 
group was the consequence. The change in social capital, through changes in 
how trust, tolerance, values and norms operated, all of which came about as a 
result of forming linkages to become integrated nationally as part of AOP and 
the PMove, weakened the civil society of Pak Mun. A key reason is that the Pak 
Mun civil group did not show leadership as a collective, most likely because its 
leadership had always been heavily influenced by outside activist support. 
Individual relationships within AOP and then PMove became more important 
than the identity and leadership shown by the Pak Mun civil group. The 
weakening of the civil society of Pak Mun therefore also decreased the role it 
had to enhance local democratization, in particular in terms of the self-
organization of the Pak Mun civil group. It can also be said that to the extent 
AOP and PMove contributed to social fragmentation, the Pak Mun civil group 
through becoming nationally integrated not only lost effectiveness in assisting 
local democratization, but also participated in hindering the democratization 
of politics nationally. 
In the second case, the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups existed in 
Thai society differently compared to the first case study, the Pak Mun civil 
group.  At this phase, Baan Krut and Bor Nork present collective social capital 
aspects due to having adapted productively regarding the development of 
factors of social capital that had begun to be established in the previous phase. 
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Link to other civil 
groups, scarce 
linkage to state 
institutions. 
Linkages produced 
by activists and 
NGOs. All activities 
were organized by 
NGOs.  
Link to other civil 
groups, scarce 
linking to state 
institutions. 
Building widely with 
other civil groups with 
own connections and 
networks. Used the civil 
group capability to help 
other civil groups. 
Leaders maintained an 
important role and kept 
the original form and 
identity of the group. No 
linking to NGOs, and 

















Trust in NGOs, less 
reciprocity. 
Tolerance appeared 
only for working with 
others activated on 












Collective social capital. 
Trust in the civil group 
relationship. Wider 
reciprocity, collective 
interest concerned, social 
trust built up values and 
norms, and sharing of the 
norms to the civil group 
network. 
 
Table 9 Comparison of the sustaining phase of the case studies 
 
important, because civil group trustworthiness, namely the reputation of the 
strong local group of villagers, increased progressively instead of personal 
connections. The Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups earned social trust 
more widely because both civil groups maintained participation of people and 
helped other civil groups around Thailand, even though the coal-fired power 
plant projects were cancelled. Regarding this, to build the civil group network 
by linking nationwide civil groups together presented a collective interest by 
the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. With the focus on the aim of 
collective interest, the reciprocity of these civil groups occurred in the shape of 




concern of collective interest generated not only social trust for the civil 
groups, but also values in relation to these civil groups’ reputation of being 
strong local groups able to protect their homeland from the encroachment of 
state projects. Most importantly, the collective social capital of the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups appeared in the sharing of the norm and idea that 
local people must look after their communities. Also that community 
preservation demands the need for local participation in the idea of protecting 
the homeland. The trajectory taken by the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil group 
strengthened themselves and civil society generally through how they 
networked and supported new and other civil groups. It appears that the 
decision to not seek to become integrated nationally was significant in 
ensuring that this was the case. It was possible because of their greater self-
leadership, due to not ever relying on outside activist or NGO support during 
earlier phases. Also, their identity remained strong and grew in importance as 
their leadership among local civil groups increased. The consequence was that 
their local activity was a democratizing influence on other local civil groups, 
nationally.  
Research Framework Assessments 
The research framework considered the key dimensions of civil society, which 
were used to explore and analyze the two case studies. The three phases of the 
civil groups were defined in order to examine empirically the Thai civil groups. 
In this section, the study evaluates the research framework by looking through 
the three phases of civil groups in relation to the case studies. 
 At the establishment phase (Figure 1), the study considered the 
emergence of civil groups as the interweaving of social capital factors 
(Fukuyama, 2001). This was found to be consistent with the sociocultural 
aspects of Thai society and to explain how the presence of social capital 
facilitates civil groups (Foley and Edwards, 1998). In terms of looking at the 
cultural aspect in particular, it was found to be an important feature to frame  
the forming of civil groups, particularly. Cultural aspects include the ordinary 
life of the grassroots, which appears as a collective aspect of the villagers. This, 
along with looking at the grievances, helped the researcher understand the 




under extraordinary circumstances, to form civil groups. Also, grievance 
factors were significant in the interweaving of social capital. In this regard, 
social capital, cultural aspects and grievance factors were found to be 
intrinsically interrelated. For example, civil groups might have greater 
difficulty forming if there is loose social bonding not bound by reciprocity and 
commonly held cultural values and norms. The civil groups in the case studies 
all showed that they associated and operated easily because of the cultural 
aspect that contains social bonding and social relations, as well as trust and 
reciprocity produced through social bonding.  
 In the same way, grievances can be a factor that generates social capital 
to form groups. The suffering of state distrust provoked villagers into the need 
to be associated in order to protect themselves from the state and state 
agencies, as the only way to deal with this kind of hegemony. The intense 
grievances the villagers suffered are the reason for the civil group emerging. In 
the case of incentive factors, it does not seem to apply in the Thai context. 
These factors appear only in more negative manners, as stimulation, which 
motivates the grassroots more widely to join a group. The issues and problems 
creating the stimulation are, however, only indirectly related to the grassroots.  
 According to the literature synthesized in Chapter Two (pp. 6–40), the 
research framework aims to clarify how civil groups developed after their 
establishment, and also how civil groups existed after the issues or problem 
had been resolved. In this regard, the framework contained factors that can 
appropriately analyze civil group strengthening during the development phase 
(Figure 3). As Heinrich (2010) explains, the function and form of civil society 
are related. Based on this, it is necessary to examine these factors because the 
features of a civil group structure and their functions indicate the grassroots’ 
ability in terms of innovation and self-organization. Moreover, the capability 
of designing and organizing the civil group is also related to the civil group’s 
ability to be self- sustaining, which is a key finding of this research. 
 In terms of civil group actors, the research framework encompasses 
civil group members, leaders, activists, advisors and funding supporters 
(sponsors). From the literature review, scholars generally identified these 
actors in relation to the civil society concept. For instance, Boonmee (2007) 




(2000) talks about civil society as ‘community’ and ‘civility’. Archavanitkul 
and Poungsomlee (1999) imply civil society is equivalent to social movements, 
and there is even a study of how civil society relates to the terms ‘state and 
individual’ (Laothamatus, 1999). The research framework attempts to clarify 
specifically what civil society empirically contains in terms of the kinds of 
actors, in the Thai context. In this regard, this study has classified the specific 
actors of the civil group in order to describe their definitive roles for civil 
group development and sustainability. Based on this, the framework focusses 
on the role of actors rather than on their characteristics. It considers any 
people who are significantly involved in civil group operation. For example, 
NGOs can be considered as advisors or activists, depending on what role they 
play for the civil groups. Accordingly, the researcher deems that this 
framework is appropriate, as it has to be flexible when analyzing the actors in 
civil groups due to the actors usually playing many overlapping roles in the 
Thai civil society context. 
 The research framework has set civil group interactions as an aspect of 
how civil groups connect to other societal sections, both horizontally and 
vertically. Civil group interaction relates closely to the civil society conceptual 
model as Hadenius and Uggla (1996) describe it, namely as a space of the 
interactions which are of a decentralized and democratic kind. Regarding this, 
the interactions examined are the horizontal and vertical interactions of the 
civil groups considered when analyzing the strengthening of the civil groups 
through the occurrence of decentralization and democratic processes. For 
instance, decentralization appears in the emerging of new civil groups, when it 
is unnecessary to belong to one big civil organization, such as exhibited by the 
autonomy of the Baan Krut and Bor Nork civil groups. Meanwhile, the 
interactions of these civil groups with each other and other civil groups 
generates a kind of democratic process. As a result, the interaction factors 
required in the framework have in fact examined the strengthening and 
developing of the civil groups. Apart from that, to emphasize civil group 
interactions in the research framework addresses the point by Missingham 
(2003) already highlighted, that the interactions of civil society with actual 




 The analysis of social capital in accordance with the research 
framework has brought agreement with the point that Hadenius and Uggla 
(1996) make, that to develop civil organization requires social capital. In terms 
of this, the occurrences of the social capital factors help this study understand 
how civil groups develop themselves by integrating social capital factors 
within the groups. This also frames the external factors, which encourage the 
producing of social capital. It has helped the study consider the factors 
surrounding the civil groups in relation to the strengthening of the civil group 
at the development phase. Regarding this, the researcher deems that social 
capital at this phase progresses to become more collective in nature, and that 
this emerges as the integration of all factors in the framework occurs. 
Moreover, this process has been helpful in examining the strengthening of the 
civil groups in regard to the creation of civil group values and norms, as was 
reviewed in Chapter Two (pp. 33–34).  
 Moreover, the research framework is comprised of two key factors, 
which aim to examine the ways to sustain Thai civil organization. The key 
factors emphasize the linkages and social capital of the civil groups, which was 
reviewed in Chapter Two. In particular, Edwards (1998) claims that the 
explanation of the differences forms the need for civil society to emphasize the 
role of linkages, because civil society also relates to the differences between 
levels of government and its representatives. Regarding this, this research set 
out to analyze linkages as regional level features. Horizontal linkages have 
been focussed on in this research framework, because Boonmee (2007) 
argued that the horizontal integration of grassroots could provide alternatives 
to solve political problems. And, to put this factor in the research framework 
helped this study find out what linkages could sustain the civil groups, and 
which can be supportive of a strong local institution to counterbalance state 
power.  
  Also, finding useful linkages for the sustaining of civil groups appears 
to be consistent with what Wasi (2000) said about horizontal networks being 
an important tool to strengthen civil society in the Thai context. On this point, 
the research found that linkages are important for the building of civil group 
networks and also to encourage the sustaining of civil groups. Nevertheless, 




researcher deems that the framing for analyzing civil group linkages is better 
considered through the aspects of how they connect or link to the other civil 
groups or institutions. Significantly, the consequences of their links being 
mainly horizontal and within networks requires an emphasis on 
understanding the forms and functions of civil groups if the success or 
otherwise of linkages is to be understood. The production of the form and 
functions of civil groups after linking to other sectors could be interpreted as 
how civil groups maintain their sustainability, which refers to the idea of 
Edwards that implies the differences in forms of civil groups relate to the need 
for flexibility in linkages.  
 Nonetheless, the study has also pointed out that the role of vertical 
linkages has been overlooked when examining the roles of Thai civil 
organization (p. 22). The argument for the role of vertical linkages led this 
study to analyze the connection of civil groups to other civil groups across 
Thailand, together with the connections of civil groups with national NGOs 
and central government. Regarding this, it is undeniable that vertical linkages 
provide a requisite framing to seek the sustaining of civil groups. However, the 
research found that at national level there were connections to civil groups in 
the case studies, but that the connection with NGOs and state institutions 
were, by contrast, inadequate.   
 In terms of this, the study suggests that the flexible linkages identified 
as necessary for the sustaining of civil groups refer to the need to consider the 
contextual features that significantly influence what are the appropriate 
linkages. Therefore it is appropriate to take a regional perspective into account. 
Flexible linking facilitates the connecting of civil groups to other groups in the 
network, which is similar to how Hadenius and Uggla (1996) describe civil 
society, as the group of linkages arranged in a social network. For this reason, 
the study contends that the linkages and networks are essential factors to 
analyze the sustaining of civil groups. Importantly, the study nevertheless 
raises a concern to ensure that empirically analyzing this factor needs to focus 
on the context of the civil groups, as this is what has to be adapted to, which 
can be interpreted as ensuring the sustainability of civil groups. 
 To examine the sustaining of civil groups, it is, however, also necessary 




from the establishment and development phases. In addition, social capital is 
a factor for civil society adaptability and sustainability (Bourdieu, 1980). With 
regard to this, this research also uses the aspect of social capital adaptation for 
interpreting the sustainability of civil groups. Social capital at this phase also 
refers to the features of linkages, according to the idea of Newton (2001). He 
emphasizes the role of social capital in terms of values and trust in civil society. 
Based on this view, this research found that social capital adaptation of the 
civil groups in the case studies appears more in a collective aspect through the 
linkages with other civil groups in the civil network. For example, the Baan 
Krut and Bor Nork civil groups get social trust from outsiders. The outsiders 
(other civil groups and other sectors) trust in the civil groups’ point of views, 
which become in turn the values and norms of the outsiders (civil groups and 
other sectors). Furthermore, the civil groups share their norms to others to 
encourage the civil groups to build a wider civil network in Thai society. 
To summarize the main points, civil society in Thailand emerges out of 
crisis and protest: there is a crisis for the local community, leading to social 
protest. Consequently, horizontal ties, especially cultural processes within the 
village, are initially very important, along with social ties and leadership, 
because solidarity and unity are crucial. By contrast, vertical ties do not easily 
develop, because of the protest orientation initiating the formation of civil 
groups. It is at this stage that the two cases studied showed that there were at 
least two possible trajectories after the initial emergence of a civil group. One 
trajectory leads to the strengthening and sustaining of the civil group and local 
democratization, and one does not. It is not possible to generalize from two 
cases but the evidence from them nevertheless shows that there are some 
specific dynamics that deserve further research. Tensions arose as the factors 
that were crucial to the emergence and development of civil society, such as 
trust, reciprocity and social bonding, were not easily expanded to the national 
level, where relationships involved strangers rather than family and friends. 
Those tensions undermined the effectiveness of civil society and its capacity to 
encourage both local and national democracy. The tension arose out of the 
initial crisis out of which the civil group emerged, but the two cases show that 
it can be dealt with in different ways and that one is potentially more effective 




the emergence of a civil group can lead to some demand for external expertise, 
such as support from NGOs, but can become problematic due to intervention 
by NGOs, even during the early stage. Later on as the civil group develops and 
seeks to sustain itself the reliance on external expertise showed itself to result 
in lack of local leadership and civil group identity, which then led to seeking to 
become nationally integrated with NGOs, for leadership as well as resources. 
The more successful and sustainable solution for civil groups is to principally 
focus on the development of human resources within the civil group. The 
reason is because the reciprocity and trust of social capital cannot easily be 
translated from a local civil group, where local culture is central to the 
formation of social capital, to a national organization. Moreover, because local 
issues prompt the emergence of civil groups, the refocus to national issues 
may also be a difficult translation for a civil group to make. Therefore the 
approach that appears to be more successful and long term sustaining of civil 
society and local democratization, are processes that seek to build up the 
grassroots’ leadership through a focus on education and explicitly seeking to 
nurture a younger generation of leaders. It is this latter approach that allows 
civil society to be converted into something that can survive in normal times, 
so that it is sustainable over the long term. Otherwise, there is evidence that 
dependence on NGOs for guidance results in becoming also a pawn in wider 
political divisions and conflict, which is ultimately destructive of civil society, 
and also ceases to be a democratizing influence in the Thai context.  Civil 
society needs to remain local in its orientation, because if it is drawn into 
national politics, led by NGOs or activists, it loses its horizontal ties, its 
purpose and its social capital. So civil society that works is, like the Baan Krut 
and Bor Nork civil groups in Prajuab Kirikhan, embedded in the Thai local 
society and linked to other local civil society organizations in cooperative 
arrangements, but not subverted by national politics. Indeed such focussed 
persistence and integrity is inspirational to guide the emergence of civil 
society in other communities, to prepare and enable them to also stand up to 
the hegemonic influence of the state. Its democratizing influence is only local, 
but it has a national impact on local civil groups. This is how a civil society 
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THEME OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS ON FIELDWORK 
 
Background: 
The consideration: of particular Thai civil society definitions; participation 
and social capital; horizontal and vertical linkages between groups; potential 
for capacity building for community movement organizations and ability to 





1. The grassroots participatory aspects of political activities; formal and 
informal. 
2. The role of community members; actions and interactions. 
3. The leaders involved in terms of Thai civil society. 
4. The alliances involved in terms of Thai civil society. 
Groups of interviewees: 
1. Local community movement organization; leaders and members. 
2. Local NGOs. 
3. Local politicians and local government representatives. 
4. National NGOs. 
5. National government representatives. 
Questions: 
Group 1 
1. What kind is your organization? (Formal, informal) 
2. How did your organization start?  
3. Why did your organization start? 
4. Who started your organization? 
5. Who are your leaders now? 
6. What is your role in your organization? 
7. What does your organization do now? 
8. How do you sustain your organization? 
9. How do you get new members? 
10. How do you interact with the rest of the community? 
11. How do you interact with other organizations? (Government, NGOs, 
alliances). 
12. Do you have something else you want to say? 
Groups 2 and 4 
1. What kinds/name of your organization? (formal, informal) 
2. How did your organization start?  
3. Why did your organization start? 
4. Who started your organization? 
5. Who are your leaders now? 




7. What does your organization do now? 
8. How do you sustain your organization? 
9. How do you interact with the community? 
10. How do you interact with other NGOs? 
11. How do you interact with government organizations?  
12. Do you have something else you want to say? 
 
Groups 3 and 5 
1. In your role, how do you interact with the community and NGOs? 
2. From your experience, what are the problems working with the 
community and NGOs? 
3. What do you think about how to solve the problems? 
4. Do you have something else you want to say? 
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